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Robert Bricker 
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY 
and 
Kevin Brown 
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY 
THE USE OF HISTORICAL DATA IN ACCOUNTING 
RESEARCH: THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN SUGAR 
REFINING COMPANY 
Abstract: In 1908, the American Sugar Refining Company 
(ASR) reversed its long-held policy of secrecy as to its 
financial condition and performance. Prior work, applying 
contemporary capital market methods to ASR security price 
data of that period, has suggested a value to ASR 
shareholders of this policy reversal. This paper examines 
the historical record of that time and presents additional 
evidence on this matter, particularly in terms of identifying 
potentially confounding events occurring during the period 
under study. The results of this analysis suggest a difficulty 
in attributing observed abnormal returns to ASR's secrecy 
policy reversal on the basis of the results obtained from 
applying capital markets methods. This analysis is useful 
for scholars interested in applying modern capital market 
methods to historical data. It highlights the significance of 
the possible effects of contemporaneous historical events, 
focuses attention on the importance of a deep understanding 
of the historical period studied, and suggests a value in 
combining historical and empirical-markets methods to 
gain a richer understanding of the events and conditions in 
the time period under study. 
The application of modern capital markets methods to explore 
accounting issues in historical time periods has attracted increased 
interest in recent years. One such study, Porter et al, (1995) (hereafter 
PSW) examine the effects of American Sugar Refining's (ASR's) 1908 
reversal of a financial secrecy policy to determine the value of voluntary 
disclosure per se and voluntary disclosure policy. They find in part, 
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2 The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997 
using traditional capital markets methods and an event window around 
the time of the secrecy policy reversal, positive abnormal returns for 
ASR stock. These findings lead them to conclude that the secrecy policy 
reversal had measurable value to ASR stockholders. Narrowly, the 
purpose of this paper is to assess these findings and to consider whether 
other chronologically proximate events and conditions could plausibly 
have affected the valuation of American Sugar securities. Broadly, this 
paper seeks to address the use of data in capital markets studies of 
historical time periods, and the interpretation of results derived in such 
studies. Not addressed in this paper are underlying issues related to 
institutional arrangements, acceptable trading practices, and other 
matters pertinent to the issue of market efficiency during this historical 
period. We are not challenging the assumption that ASR security pricing 
was efficient with respect to publicly available information. Readers 
interested in studying issues of this period related to market efficiency 
are referred to Previts and Bricker (1994). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review 
the PSW study and summarize the historical events amidst which it is 
set, these being the illness and death of H.O. Havemeyer, the long time 
President of ASR, the succession of a new president, and the company's 
annual meeting at which time ASR formally announced the reversal of 
its long-held financial secrecy policy. Several research issues pertinent 
to the PSW study, primarily related to the existence of other possibly 
significant historical events during the period covered by PSW, are 
identified. We then provide a contextual, historical analysis of 
contemporaneous events and conditions of the period and use this as a 
basis for evaluating the PSW study of ASR. Particular attention is 
focused on events reported in the financial press that may have affected 
ASR security pricing, dates on which press reports related to ASR's 
financial secrecy policy are published, and the period of uncertainty 
surrounding the succession to the ASR Presidency that occurred 
following Havemeyer's death. Next, using the PSW data and methods, 
tests extending the original PSW analysis are conducted based on the 
results of our historical analysis. Following a presentation and discussion 
of these results, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the 
opportunities and difficulties of applying capital markets methods to data 
from historical time periods. 
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BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH ISSUES 
The PSW study follows a line of research that has applied 
contemporary capital markets methods and models to data from 
historical time periods. Prior work has included Chow (1983) and 
Sivakumar and Waymire (1993 and 1994). The focus of these studies on 
historical time periods makes them interesting and appealing. Chow's 
work, however, has been specifically criticized by Merino et al (1987), 
and Previts and Bricker (1994) argue generally that such studies must 
fully consider historical contextual issues that are essential in both the 
design of such studies and the interpretation of results. 
The PSW study finds that ASR shareholders earned abnormal 
returns as a result of the 1908 reversal of Henry 0. Havemeyer's long-
held financial secrecy policy. As summarized in PSW, Havemeyer, who 
opposed disclosure of any ASR information, died suddenly on December 
4, 1907 after becoming ill on November 28, 1907. Havemeyer's 
successor, W. B. Thomas, "announced the company's intent to reverse 
its long-standing secrecy policy by making periodic reports" (PSW, 
1995, p. 129) at the company's annual meeting on January 8, 1908. On 
March 23, 1908, ASR made its first annual report available to 
shareholders. PSW examine cumulative abnormal returns to ASR 
shareholders for both the secrecy policy reversal on January 8, and the 
publication of the annual report on March 23 (and each preceding day). 
They find a positive wealth effect which is statistically significant for 
three sets of dates: January 8th, January 8th and March 23rd combined, 
and January 7th and 8th and March 21st and 23rd combined. On the basis 
of the abnormal returns of these dates, PSW conclude the existence of a 
value to voluntary reporting - for the first event as related to voluntary 
reporting policy, and for the second event as related to voluntary 
reporting per se, for ASR shareholders. We do not address the value of 
voluntary reporting per se in the remainder of this paper, but rather on 
the issue of a value to a policy of voluntary reporting, as studied by 
PSW in their assessment of the effects of ASR's secrecy policy reversal. 
The PSW study measures ASR returns from September 30th, 1907 
to May 29th, 1908. PSW use a dummy variable is used to measure the 
difference in returns during the event window(s) in comparison to returns 
outside the event window. The event date for the secrecy policy reversal 
(disclosure precommitment date) is defined as January 8, the date on 
which the company's policy reversal was officially announced during its 
annual meeting. The resulting model is significant (p = .023) and they 
find a significant cumulative positive abnormal return of 2.35 percent. 
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Several issues not fully addressed in PSW may bear on their results 
and the interpretation thereof, as listed below. 
• The date used by PSW to isolate the financial secrecy policy 
reversal effect (January 8th) is the date of ASR's annual meeting. It 
is conceivable that other potentially significant disclosures may have 
occurred on that date. Such disclosures would raise issues about 
distinguishing ASR's secrecy policy reversal from its voluntary 
reporting, per se, (or other economic effects) as causes of ASR 
security price changes. 
• January 8th is the sole date used by PSW in assessing the 
(separable) effect of ASR's secrecy policy reversal. If, however, 
there are other dates on which ASR's secrecy policy was addressed 
in financial press reports prior to January 8, then such dates should 
also be added to any empirical analysis addressing the effect of the 
secrecy policy reversal on ASR securities. 
• The period of the illness and death of Havemeyer is included by 
PSW as a part of the period for estimating ASR normal returns. 
However, any systematic ASR pricing reaction to Havemeyer's 
passing may influence the PSW results. 
Several research questions arise from these issues. First, is it 
reasonable to attribute any abnormal ASR price effect on January 8th to 
a change in the company's financial secrecy policy, or do other 
disclosures confound such an interpretation? Second, were there other 
dates in addition to January 8th (the date used by PSW) which are 
plausible event dates for assessing the effect of the secrecy policy 
reversal? Third, was there an ASR security price reaction to the 
succession uncertainty that may have occurred with and following the 
illness and death of Havemeyer? If so, would this effect influence PSW's 
findings? 
ANALYSIS 
Our analysis consists of two parts. First, we study the events and 
conditions roughly contemporaneous with January 8th to address the 
three questions posed above. Then, using the same data and methods as 
PSW, we conduct additional empirical testing based on the results of our 
first phase of analysis. 
Research question one explores the attribution of the observed ASR 
abnormal return effect to the announcement of the secrecy policy 
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reversal, and whether other information released on this date could have 
had information content and have affected ASR security pricing. An 
analysis of the financial press articles of the period in the Financial 
Chronicle, the Wall Street Journal, and the financial section of the New 
York Times raises issues potentially bearing on this matter. Significantly, 
January 8th was not just a date on which ASR announced the reversal of 
the secrecy policy, but (as noted in PSW) was the date of ASR's annual 
meeting. For instance, it was on this day that the company made its 
initial report of its annual operations to shareholders, and also discussed 
other economic and political developments prospectively affecting ASR. 
It appears (and widely believed), for example, that sugar crop and tariff 
announcements were important factors in ASR security pricing. As 
reported on the following day by the Wall Street Journal, management 
discussed several topics during the annual meeting: that the past year had 
been the best that the company had experienced, that the policy of the 
company with new management would be less antagonistic and less 
secret, that various lawsuits would be adjudicated, that sugar crops were 
smaller and prices higher, that labor trouble in Cuba implied a smaller 
crop, and that government statements on tariffs were favorable to ASR. 
All of these reported disclosures, to the extent unanticipated, could be 
expected to increase ASR security prices. Even with the presence of 
some level of anticipation, the elimination of uncertainty accompanying 
the official company announcement would also tend to increase ASR 
security prices and returns. These several potentially significant 
information disclosures confound interpretations of stock price reactions 
for the day and certainly do not lend themselves to an unambiguous 
attribution of the day's abnormal price effect to any single cause. 
Research question two addresses the existence of additional dates 
which may have lead to a market anticipation of a reversal of ASR's 
secrecy policy. We searched financial press reports of the period from 
the date of Havemeyer's illness to the date of the official announcement 
of the policy reversal to identify all days on which the secrecy policy 
reversal of ASR was discussed, implied, or anticipated. We identified the 
following four dates: 
• In The Wall Street Journal of Thursday, December 5th 1907 in an 
article following H. O. Havemeyer's death, it was asserted that 
"(Havemeyer's) policy was not that of publicity, so that he belonged 
to a passing rather than to a new era of corporate finance." This 
assertion implies that Havemeyer's secrecy policy would not survive 
him. 
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• In the Wall Street Journal of Tuesday, December 10th, 1907, the 
following article appeared: "American Sugar Refining Co.: 
Havemeyer's Death Likely to Result in Abandonment of Secrecy 
Policy". 
• In the Wall Street Journal of Tuesday, January 7th, 1908 in an 
article preceding the next day's annual meeting, it was written that 
". . . it is supposed that the policy of the company will change, the 
keynote of the new administration being less antagonistic and less 
secret". 
• In the Wall Street Journal of Wednesday, January 8th, in an article 
published prior to that day's annual meeting, it was written that 
"Friends of (ASR) . . . admit that more publicity in regard to the 
company's affairs would be better policy... President Thomas has 
given his word to this effect... the first step in this direction is 
expected at the annual meeting tomorrow, when President Thomas 
may in his review of the year disclose more information than has 
been given out heretofore." January 8th was also, of course, the date 
of the actual annual meeting at which the financial secrecy policy 
reversal was officially announced later that day (See January 9 -
New York Times). 
Although PSW use event dates of January 7th and 8th as well as 
those of March 21st and March 23rd, only January 8th is tested 
individually for a secrecy policy reversal effect. PSW's remaining tests 
address the joint hypothesis of a price response as a function of both 
voluntary reporting and the secrecy policy reversal. If PSW's hypothesis 
about the value of a voluntary reporting and publicity policy, per se, is 
correct, then we would expect to see positive security price effects on 
each of the event days, with the effect on the 8th being limited to the 
elimination of whatever uncertainty remained regarding reversal of the 
secrecy policy. 
As related to the third research question posed, any analysis of this 
period or interpretation of results requires consideration of any possible 
effect on ASR security prices of the illness and death of Henry 
Havemeyer. Particularly, as described subsequently, if Havemeyer's 
death resulted in a period of uncertainty related to management 
succession, and if that period was included in an estimation window for 
calculating normal ASR returns, then the stationarity assumption of 
PSW's beta estimate would be violated, with the result that in the 
estimation of ASR normal returns would be mathematically biased. 
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Specifically, the statistical analysis computing returns in the immediately 
subsequent period would be biased in favor of finding abnormal returns. 
Ha.vemeyer's passing was clearly regarded as a significant event in 
the eyes of ASR, the financial markets, and its shareholders, according 
to financial press accounts of the time. These accounts reflect the belief, 
for example, of an association between Havemeyer's illness and death 
and an ASR's stock price decline that occurred. On December 4th, the 
Wall Street Journal's daily column "Features of the Market" column 
noted "American Sugar was naturally depressed on the serious illness of 
H.O. Havemeyer". On December 6th, the same column noted that "(t)he 
first transaction in (ASR) was one point below the closing sale of the 
previous day on President Havemeyer's death. It is admitted that the loss 
to the company is a very serious one . . ."On December 12, as ASR's 
common stock price neared its nadir, "Features of the Market" stated that 
"(ASR) selling . . . comes through conservative commission houses . .. 
It is naturally based upon the very tangible loss the company . . . has 
sustained in H.O. Havemeyer's death and represents investment 
holdings." On December 16, the column reported that "Boston has been 
selling the stock since H. 0. Havemeyer's death. This is a natural result, 
as investors there had great faith in the late president." An article in 
December 17th's Wall Street Journal stated " . . . One reason advanced 
for the marked decline in the stock is the loss of H.O. Havemeyer, which, 
if be true, is indeed a tribute to his ability as the real genius of the 
American Sugar Refining Company." On January 4th, well into ASR's 
price rebound, and following a day on which the stock closed up over 6 
1/2 points to 107, the "Features of the Market" column noted, "One 
reason for the exceptional strength in Sugar is the real scarcity of the 
stock... It was always a dangerous short sale, and was oversold when 
H. O. Havemeyer died". 
As the matter of succession was not settled at ASR at the time of 
Havemeyer's illness and death, it is plausible to believe that his passing 
initiated a significant process of increasing uncertainty as to management 
succession and ASR prospects. PSW, in contrast, address the possible 
impact of Havemeyer's death from a different perspective: 
" . . . our results may be confounded by Havemeyer's sudden 
death. For example, investors may have expected Havemeyer's 
death to lead to the adoption of a disclosure policy, and 
impounded any wealth effects at that time. Accordingly, we 
investigated ASR stock returns at the time of Havemeyer's 
death. The evidence does not support the hypothesis that 
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favorable effects of the subsequent policy reversal were 
capitalized when Havemeyer died; the market adjusted return 
on the date of his death was -2.26 percent. No large price 
movements were observed in adjacent days." (PSW, 1995, p. 
136-137) 
PSW, then, focus on the possibility that the death of Havemeyer 
itself may have signaled a reversal of the secrecy policy, and so test for 
a positive abnormal return effect. But they do not examine an alternative 
possibility that an uncertainty-increasing process began at the date of 
Havemeyer's illness regarding management succession and ASR 
prospects and concluded at ASR's announcement of his successor, 
resulting in a negative abnormal return effect for the period. 
Chronologically, this succession-uncertainty process occurred 
several weeks prior to ASR's annual meeting and the formally 
announced reversal of the secrecy policy. Havemeyer's sickness began 
November 29th (he died December 4), and W.B. Thomas was announced 
as his successor on December 20th. A visual inspection of Figure 1, 
which is reproduced from PSW, shows that ASR returns turned negative 
about the time of Havemeyer's sickness and death, and remained 
negative until the December 20th announcement regarding W.B. 
Thomas. 
FIGURE 1 
ASR Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns 
(Reprinted from Porter et al [1995]) 
Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns on ASR Common Stock from Late 
November 1907 to Late March 1908 
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decline in ASR returns during this period, it does provide prima facia 
evidence of a decline in ASR security prices as well as an analyst and 
press belief that this was so. Such an effect, as described above, would 
bias an analysis of abnormal returns on January 8th in favor of a 
rejection of the null hypothesis. Specific empirical tests on this are 
described later in the paper. 
The empirical portion of our analysis began with a replication of a 
portion of PSW in order to establish comparability with its data and 
methods. Using the same parameters and process for selecting a data set, 
and duplicating the general model employed by PSW, we tested for a 
price effect on January 8th, the date of the financial secrecy policy 
reversal. Following PSW we employed a dummy variable for the date of 
January 8th as the secrecy policy reversal event date, and used the 
railroad index to proxy for the market. The results, shown in Table 1, 
Panel A, compare the PSW results (Item 1) with our replication (Item 2); 
The results are generally consistent, including an event-variable 
coefficient (probability) of .0235 (.023) and .0237 (.026) respectively. 
Therefore, we are comfortable that our data and method fairly closely 
approximates those of PSW. 
Table 1 
Estimation Results for Event Parameter Models 
Panel A 
Single Event Models 
Description (event dates) ά ά(t) β β(t) δ δ(t) δ(p) r2 CAR% 
(1) Porter Results .008 1.11.833 12.18.0235 2.29.023.436 2.35 
(1/8/08) 
(2) Replication Results .001 .91.798 11.31 .0237 2.24.026.387 2.37 
(1/8/08) 
(3) Four Event Dates Results .001 1.21 .796 11.16 -.0061 -1.14 .250 .386 -2.45 
(12/5/07,12/10/07, 
1/7/08,1/8/08) 
(4) Uncertainty Results .001 1.72 .791 11.23 -.0070 -2.47 .014 .400 -10.47 
(12/3/07 through 1/19/08) 
(5) Two Event Dates Results .001 1.01 .795 11.12 .0031 .40.687.382 .61 
(1/7/08,1/8/08) 
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ά 
.001 
ά(t) 
1.67 
β 
.791 
β(t) 
11.21 
δ1 
-.007 
δ1(t) 
-2.458 
δ1(p) 
.015 
δ1CAR% 
11.20 
δ2 
.0025 
δ2(t) 
.387 
δ2(p) 
.131 
δ2CAR% r2 
.50 .398 
where δ1 represents the "succession uncertainty" event of 12/3/07 to 
1/19/08 
and δ2 represents the "secrecy policy reversal" event of 1/7 and 1/8/08. 
Next, to empirically address research question 2, we tested for a 
policy reversal effect using the four dates identified above (days on 
which reversal of the secrecy policy was discussed in press articles). 
Although PSW use event dates of January 7th and 8th as well as those 
of March 21st and March 23rd, only January 8th is tested individually 
for a secrecy policy reversal effect. PSW's remaining tests address the 
joint hypothesis of a price response as a function of both voluntary 
reporting and the secrecy policy reversal. Using the method described 
above, we tested for a secrecy policy reversal effect using December 5th, 
December 10th, January 7th, and January 8th. The results are given in 
Table 1, Panel A, Item 3 which shows no significant effect on the 
secrecy reversal variable for the dates with secrecy policy reversal 
references. Notably, the sign of the coefficient on the event variable is 
negative (-.0061). 
Using the data set and general model described above, we tested the 
hypothesis derived from research question 3: that an uncertainty-
increasing process began with the illness of Havemeyer and ended with 
the announced selection of Thomas. We employed a dummy variable for 
the dates of December 3rd, when Havemeyer's illness was first reported 
in the New York Times, through December 19th, the day before the Wall 
Street Journal announced W.B. Thomas's upcoming election as ASR 
president. We observe in Table 1, Panel A, Item 4 a highly significant 
effect (p. = .014) on the event days in the direction consistent with an 
uncertainty-increasing process (that is, negative). Using PSW's method 
of calculating the size of the abnormal return as the product of the 
dummy coefficient (-.0070) and the number of days in the event period 
(15), we find a cumulative abnormal return of -10.50%. Overall, this 
evidence is consistent with a picture of investors who became 
increasingly distressed by the uncertainty of management succession 
until the experienced W. B. Thomas was identified as H. O. 
Havemeyer's successor. As a further test of investor uncertainty during 
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this period, we compared an ASR market model using the period of 
September 30th 1907 through January 19th, 1908, with a model using 
a period of the same length immediately after. As shown in Table 2, 
ASR's beta increases from .786 to .963 in the two models, and their 
difference is marginally significant at alpha = . 10. 
Irrespective of the interpretation of the above results, they 
demonstrate that any model used for estimating ASR normal returns that 
includes the period from December 3rd through December 19th cannot 
assume beta stationarity; the inclusion of the period effectively 
incorporates a bias for rejecting a null hypothesis for any event date(s) 
proximately subsequent to that period. This occurs because the inclusion 
of the uncertainty-increasing period mathematically reduces the slope 
(coefficient) on the systematic (market) return. Given the evidence and 
findings described above, the PSW findings are reinforced by the 
occurrence of an event window that merely happened to fall following a 
period of significant negative abnormal returns included in the estimation 
period. Indeed, any event identified during the period immediately 
following the resolution of the succession issue would be biased towards 
the finding of positive abnormal returns for ASR investors. A second 
implication, as mentioned earlier, is that any policy reversal tests using 
event dates falling during this period could be confounded by the 
succession uncertainty effect. For this reason, our earlier results, which 
included two secrecy policy reversal event dates falling during this 
apparent succession uncertainty period, may be biased against finding a 
positive ASR abnormal return associated with a reversal in its secrecy 
policy1. 
1
 It is hard to have much confidence in these results. As described in the 
next section, tests reveal a negative security market response to the succession 
uncertainty accompanying the illness and death of Havemeyer, which 
potentially confounds any analysis including event days in the period from 
November 29th to December 20th. The policy reversal test described above 
includes the event dates of December 5th and December 10th. Further 
complicating any interpretation of our results, news articles on ASR on the 
two remaining days, December 7th and 8th, refer to both the secrecy policy 
reversal and other matters of potential importance. We have previously 
described the topics covered in the press on January 8th. The day before 
ASR's annual meeting (January 7th) The Wall Street Journal not only 
discussed the anticipated secrecy policy reversal, but based on favorable news 
about the sugar market and the favorable estimates made regarding ASR's 
financial results, the article declares ASR's "past fiscal year... was one of the 22
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We, therefore, respecified our model to include a separate dummy 
variable for the event dates falling in the succession uncertainty period 
and used only the event dates of January 7th and January 8th (we 
removed December 5th and 10th). The results, shown in Table 1, Panel 
B again suggest no effect of the secrecy policy reversal. The coefficient 
on the policy reversal variable is positive (.0025) but not significant, 
with an implied CAR of .50%. The succession uncertainty variable is 
negative (-.007) and significant (p = .015), with an implied CAR of -
11.2%. While this may appear odd, our investigation suggests that it 
may reflect (as reported by the financial press) C.A. Spreckels' 
published attack on ASR which appeared on that day. 
To test the sensitivity of the results to the separation of the 
succession uncertainty dates as a second event, we reran the analysis 
including the succession uncertainty dates as estimation dates (that is, 
along with all the other dates in the estimation period), continuing with 
January 7th and 8th as event dates. Table 1, Panel A, Item 5 shows a 
positive coefficient on the policy reversal variable that, while slightly 
larger than the result in Panel B, is still statistically insignificant. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclusion, the results do not necessarily rule out that the positive 
wealth effect observed on January 8th for ASR shareholders resulted 
from ASR's reversal of its secrecy policy. However, our analysis of the 
events and context surrounding January 8th suggests the following. First, 
there were several disclosures with potential import to investors. While 
PSW are correct in their finding of an empirically measurable abnormal 
return on January 8th, it is difficult to know how much of this effect can 
be attributed to the official policy reversal announcement versus ASR's 
report of a good year, Cuban crop shortages, favorable government tariff 
policies, the methodological artifact stemming from the succession 
uncertainty following Havemeyer's death (nonstationary beta), or the 
secrecy policy reversal. There are, thus, several possible factors which 
may have contributed to the ASR abnormal return effect found by PSW 
on January 8th. 
Second, the financial press anticipated the reversal of the secrecy 
policy other dates. When included in an analysis, no positive abnormal 
best that the company has experienced..." 
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returns for those dates are found. However, these results may be suspect 
because the analysis includes event dates during the negative-return 
period that accompany the apparent succession uncertainty at the time 
of H.O. Havemeyer's death. Nevertheless, when controlling for the 
succession uncertainty dates and reducing the event dates to January 7th 
and 8th, we found no secrecy policy reversal event effect, even when 
including the succession uncertainty dates in the "normal return" 
estimation period. Yet even this result cannot be relied upon, as financial 
press articles attribute ASR stock price weakness on the 7th to C.A. 
Spreckels published criticism of ASR on that date. 
Finally, as mentioned just above, the positive abnormal return of 
January 8th is, in part, a statistical artifact resulting from the succession 
uncertainty following Havemeyer's death. During this period of 
succession uncertainty ASR returns were below market returns. The 
nonstationary beta confounds the interpretation of any event dates 
occurring during the succession uncertainty period (including some of the 
secrecy reversal policy dates), and mathematically biases any statistical 
analysis using this period in the window for estimating normal returns in 
favor of finding a positive abnormal return for immediately subsequent 
dates. 
We conclude that it is not possible with the present data and capital 
markets methods to empirically and statistically attribute ASR's positive 
abnormal returns to its reversal in its secrecy policy. Our objective, 
however, is not to disprove that ASR's secrecy policy reversal resulted 
in a stock price change. Rather, our point is to emphasize the importance 
in considering all the contextual factors salient to research focusing on 
historical time periods. This is particularly important when applying 
contemporary markets methods to data from such periods. Aside from 
issues of market efficiency during this period (Previts and Bricker, 
1994), the nature of historical data may frequently place some 
limitations on the drawing of conclusions, particularly when the data are 
scarce and the historical context of the events renders data interpretation 
ambiguous. Correspondingly, it may be in such instances that historical 
analysis can be a useful and tool for more fully investigating, 
interpreting, and augmenting the results of empirical work. In this way, 
modern capital markets method and historical analysis may prove to be 
valuable complements in studying historical time periods. 
It is helpful and desirable for accounting scholars to carefully 
construct research that applies contemporary methods to historical 
accounting data as a backdrop for considering present-day issues. 
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Empirical researchers are to be commended for conducting pioneering 
work in this area. Future research of this sort should continue to develop 
full and careful approaches to combining historical analysis with modern 
capital market methods, so that adequate consideration of the 
fundamental contextual factors can be used in the design of such 
research and in the interpretability of results. 
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Appendix A 
American Sugar Refining Prices 
November 1, 1907 through January 31, 1908 
Date 
11/1 
11/2 
11/4 
11/6 
11/7 
11/8 
11/9 
11/11 
11/12 
11/13 
11/14 
11/15 
11/16 
11/18 
11/19 
11/20 
11/21 
11/22 
11/23 
11/25 
11/26 
11/27 
11/29 
11/30 
12/2 
12/3 
12/4 
12/5 
12/6 
12/7 
12/9 
12/10 
12/11 
12/12 
12/13 
12/14 
12/16 
12/17 
12/18 
12/19 
12/20 
American 
Sugar 
100.625 
100.625 
104.000 
105.000 
103.625 
103.625 
103.625 
105.875 
104.500 
104.250 
101.875 
100.500 
101.250 
103.000 
101.125 
101.750 
101.000 
101.500 
103.000 
103.000 
104.000 
103.000 
103.750 
106.000 
107.750 
106.000 
106.500 
107.250 
107.750 
107.000 
105.000 
102.000 
98.375 
98.375 
94.125 
94.125 
95.625 
95.750 
96.250 
98.000 
100.000 
Dow Jones 
Railroad 
index Notes 
84.360 
84.140 
85.050 
85.720 
84.270 
85.090 
85.070 
85.910 
85.410 
84.800 
84.150 
82.500 
82.970 
84.600 
82.930 
82.380 
81.410 
81.490 
83.400 
81.720 
83.510 
84.090 
85.800 Havemeyer is ill 11/28 
87.130 
88.280 
87.320 Havemeyer illness reported in NY 
89.110 Havemeyer 
90.300 Havemeyer death reported. Secrecy 
90.560 reversal—date 1 
90.120 
89.190 
87.880 Secrecy policy reversal—date 2 
87.850 
87.850 
86.940 
87.760 
86.730 
86.610 
87.230 
87.390 
88.780 W.B. Thomas announced as 
Havermeyer successor 
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17 
Date 
12/21 
12/23 
12/24 
12/26 
12/27 
12/28 
12/30 
12/31 
1/2/08 
1/3 
1/4 
1/6 
1/7 
1/8 
1/9 
1/10 
1/11 
1/13 
1/14 
1/15 
1/16 
1/17 
1/18 
1/20 
1/21 
1/22 
1/23 
1/24 
1/25 
1/27 
1/28 
1/29 
1/30 
1/31 
American 
Sugar 
100.125 
99.125 
98.750 
96.875 
100.250 
99.250 
100.875 
99.500 
101.375 
107.000 
106.250 
106.500 
104.750 
107.000 
108.250 
108.250 
110.250 
112.250 
113.375 
113.250 
112.125 
113.625 
113.625 
113.250 
111.000 
112.375 
111.875 
111.500 
113.500 
113.500 
114.500 
112.500 
113.500 
114.250 
Dow Jones 
Railroad 
index Notes 
89.350 
88.110 
87.610 
87.010 
88.410 
88.350 
89.500 
88.770 
89.810 
90.380 
90.370 
91.120 
91.150 Secrecy policy reversal—date 3 
90.820 Annual Meeting. Secrecy policy 
92.860 —date 4 
92.030 
93.750 
94.270 
95.060 
95.100 
94.680 
95.270 
95.750 
94.670 
93.090 
92.760 
92.460 
91.660 
92.220 
92.730 
93.400 
92.400 
92.440 
92.190 
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Appendix B 
Pertinent Articles from the Wall Street Journal 
1. "Features of the Market" extract - dates as noted: 
Wed. 12/04/07 "American Sugar was naturally depressed on the serious 
illness of H. O. Havemeyer. Washington has been selling 
a little of the stock lately, which has often shown some 
tendency to sell off about the time of the meeting of 
Congress. American Sugar, however, has been very 
much out of politics for a long time past." 
Fri. 12/06/07 "The first transaction in American Sugar was one point 
below the closing sale of the previous day on President 
Havemeyer's death. It is admitted that the loss to the 
company is a very serious one, as he raised it from the 
most sensational gambling counter in the unlisted 
department to one of the best held and distributed 
industrial stocks in the market." 
Wed. 12/11/07 ". . . Sugar also was subjected to considerable pressure. 
There was a poor market in it..." 
Thurs. 12/12/07 "Inquiry from people in close touch with the Havemeyer 
family and the American Sugar situation disposes of any 
rumors of a change in the holding of the stock arising out 
of the death of the president. The selling, however comes 
through conservative commission houses, and in the 
opinion of specialists does not indicate a short position of 
any consequence. It is naturally based upon the very 
tangible loss the company has sustained in H. O. 
Havemeyer's death, and represents investment holdings." 
Fri. 12/13/07 "American Sugar opened active and higher. H. Content 
who is thought to have sold something like 25,000 shares 
on Wednesday, was reported active in making a market, 
helped by J. Carlisle, the specialist in the stock. It used to 
be one of the best trading industrials on the board, and 
the present opportunity is considered favorable for 
reviving interest." 
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"Halsted & Hodges, who were among the heavy sellers of 
stocks in the early trading of Wednesday, sold American 
Sugar and Amalgamated Copper in considerable quantity 
on the opening strength. Traders called this good 
selling, and took it to be long stock." 
"American Sugar showed the severest break in the 
industrial list, losing over 4 points. . ." 
"Houses which used to do a good deal of business for 
lower Wall Street when American Sugar was the most 
active industrial on the list, have been selling that stock. 
Some of this is probably for shorts." 
"There was renewed pressure in American Sugar at the 
outset, with selling by J. Carlisle, the specialist in the 
stock, CD. Barney & Co., and other influential 
commission houses. Boston has been selling the stock 
since H.O. Havemeyer's death. This is a natural result, 
as investors there had great faith in the late president. 
One disturbing factor, however, in the market has been 
some selling from Washington in the past few days." 
Trade interests seem to be the principal bears in American 
Sugar. One view is that the short crop will hurt earnings. 
The fact possibly that trade enemies of the company see a 
chance of retaliation for the Havemeyer attitude towards 
them in past years." 
Fri. 12/20/07 "American Sugar, after opening quiet, advanced a point 
and a half in the first ten minutes. Traders began to suspect 
from the beginning of the week that short selling was being 
encouraged, and a sharp demand for the stock in the loan 
crowd on Wednesday confirmed this view. The 
Washington houses have been borrowers of the stock." 
Mon. 12/23/07 "There was some disposition to test the strength of 
American Sugar, but J. Carlisle, the specialist in the stock, 
had buying orders, and seemed able to support it without 
much difficulty. It is well and widely held, and soon 
becomes oversold." 
Sat. 12/14/07 
Mon. 12/16/07 
Wed. 12/18/07 
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Tues. 12/24/07 "Traders think that a little of the American Sugar bought to 
support in the recent decline has been coming out quietly. 
Lower Wall Street advices are bearish, but such speculators 
do not seem to have made much by their preliminary 
campaign after H.O. Havemeyer's death." 
Fri. 12/27/07 "With very little pressure Sugar disclosed a rather weak 
technical position. There is no doubt that the rally to par 
forced in most of the shorts. The bear talk still comes from 
lower Wall Street, and it looked as if a little long stock were 
coming to the market, to judge by its more frequent 
appearance in loans." 
"The selling of Sugar in the forenoon was taken as 
indicating that the New Street bear party was trying to 
make an active market. S.L. Blood & Co. and E. F. Hutton 
& Co. were conspicuous among the sellers, while the 
specialists supported." 
Sat. 12/28/07 "Bear points on American Sugar were again current. They 
have reference to the election of the new president on Jan. 
8, when lower Wall Street believes some permanent 
difference among leading holders as to policy may make 
itself felt." 
Sat. 1/04/08 "One reason for the exceptional strength in Sugar is the real 
scarcity of the stock. It loaned at 1.64 premium in the first 
hour, and has been in demand flat in the loan crowd for 
some time past. It was always a dangerous short sale, and 
was oversold when H.O. Havemeyer died." 
Wed. 1/08/08 "American Sugar was 2 points lower at the opening on the 
violent attack by Claus A. Spreckles published in a morning 
paper. While the Street does not regard him as altogether 
impartial witness, traders admit that the attack is the most 
formidable made upon the stock in many years." 
Thurs. 1/09/08 " . . . Speculators who attacked American Sugar on the 
protests of Mr. Spreckles found a market which was too 
much for them, and probably took losses during the course 
of the day..." 
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2. Additional Articles - dates and titles as noted: 
Tues. 12/03/07 "Answers to Inquires" 
An investing advice column states: " . . . [American] Sugar 
stock is in danger of being adversely affected by an 
industrial slow-up, and also by agitation of the tariff 
question." 
Thurs. 12/05/07 "H. O. Havemeyer" 
Announcement of the death of H. O. Havemeyer: " . . . 
Under his control the American Sugar Refinery Co. has 
. made a remarkable record of profitable operation. Mr. 
Havemeyer's methods imparted steadiness and efficiency to 
his corporation, but his policy was not that of publicity, so 
that he belonged to a passing rather than to a new era of 
corporate finance." 
"H. O. Havemeyer Dead" 
Provides a brief biographical sketch of H. O. Havemeyer. 
Fri. 12/06/0 "American Sugar Refining Co." 
Article downplays the impact of H. O. Havemeyer's 
death:"While the removal of death of Henry O. Havemeyer, 
founder and president of the American Sugar Refining Co., 
for between sixteen and seventeen years, is a loss which is 
bound to be severely felt, the splendid organization which 
had been perfected under his leadership, in the opinion of 
those most familiar with its affairs, has gathered sufficient 
momentum to carry forward the business without 
interruption or diminution of prosperity.. ." 
Tues. 12/10/07 "American Sugar Refining Co.: Havemeyer's Death 
Likely to Result in Abandonment of Secrecy Policy" 
Article predicts more open communication with 
stockholders. 
Wed. 12/11/07 "Dividends and Meetings" 
"The directors of the American Sugar Refining Co. have 
elected Horace Havemeyer, a director of the company to 
succeed his father, H. O. Havemeyer, deceased. Vice-
President Thomas was appointed acting President until the 
next annual meeting, Jan 8. 
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Appropriate resolutions were passed by the board regarding 
the death of Mr. Havemeyer." 
Mon. 12/16/07 "American Sugar Refining: Trade and Company 
Conditions Good" 
"Secretary Heike, of the American Sugar Refining Co., 
says: "The condition of the sugar trade and of the company 
is very good. We are doing a normal business for this 
season of the year, and the general business recession has 
not as yet affected the sugar market. The sugar crop is a 
little short this year.' 
In the sugar trade it is stated that there is no apparent cause 
for the selling of sugar stock. The American Sugar 
refineries are all running. Its sugar accumulations are 
sufficient for thirty days, and of these, 50,000 tons were 
bought by Mr. Havemeyer shortly before his death, at the 
lowest prices current for sugar for the year and as l/4c. 
below present values, which transaction netted a profit of 
$200,000. 
The company's purchases of sugar in October and 
November show their cost was below present value. The 
total stocks of all refiners is only 100,000 tons. 
Mr. Thomas, the acting president, has been in the 
management for many years and has wide knowledge of the 
sugar trade. 
It is said the financial results for the present fiscal year are 
the best that the company has yet experienced. The profits 
from the Beet Sugar industry along are said to have 
increased fully 25%." 
Tues. 12/17/07 "American Sugar Refining Co. Again Center of 
Interest" 
"Not for years has the American Sugar Refining stock been 
so active as during the past week when over 107,000 shares 
changed hands at prices ranging from 106 1/2 to 92 3/4, the 
latter being the lowest point recorded in years. 
Considerable interest has been aroused as to the causes of 
this activity, and all the more so, since the company's 
officials maintain the trade is normal for this time of year, 
and that conditions, generally, are favorable. Injustice to 
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the 17,000 stockholders it should be pointed out that in the 
sugar trade there is utmost confidence as to the future. The 
crop is a little short of last year's crop, but on the other 
hand much better prices prevail. 
For the fiscal year, about to close, it is believed, and there 
is sufficient ground for so doing, that the earnings will be 
larger that in any year heretofore. .. . 
. . . One reason advanced for the marked decline in the 
stock is the loss of H. O. Havemeyer, which, if be true, is 
indeed a tribute to his ability as the real genius of the 
American Sugar Refining Co. The company was 
apparently too well organized for such to have a radical 
effect, though it undoubtably did occasion considerable 
selling." 
Wed. 12/18/07 "American Sugar" 
"Many thousand shares of American Sugar common have 
been picked up by individual investors on the decline to 92 
3/4, and in the cause of several Boston houses, Sugar 
buying last week was the investment feature..." 
Fri. 12/20/07 "American Sugar" 
".. . The notice states that proxies will be voted for the re-
election of Messrs. Parsons and Frazier and the election of 
Horace Havemeyer to succeed his father. It is the intention 
of the board, as Mr. Heike [Secretary], at the annual 
election of the officers after the stockholders meeting, to 
elect W. B. Thomas as president of the company." 
Tues. 1/07/08 "American Sugar Refining Co. Completes a Successful 
Year" 
"The American Sugar Refining Co.'s past fiscal year, 
which will be reviewed at the annual meeting on 
Wednesday, Jan 8., was one of the best that the company 
has experienced. . . 
With the inauguration of the new management it is 
supposed that the policy of the company will change, the 
keynote of the new administration being less antagonistic 
and less secret. It is presumed that the various lawsuits 
inherited from the Havemeyer regime will be adjudicated. 
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. . . The strength of the stock in the past week, during 
which it showed a net gain of seven points, is attributable 
to various causes. Primarily, the crop is smaller than last 
year's. This in itself, is sufficient cause for the higher 
prices prevailing... Another bull point as far as the stock 
is concerned is the spread of the labor troubles in Cuba. 
Still another factor pointed to with considerable satisfaction 
by the sugar traders is the attitude of Secretary Taft taken 
in regard to the duty on sugar and the regulation of the 
supply from the Philippines. . ." 
Wed. 1/08/08 "American Sugar" 
"The officers of the American Sugar Refining Co. brand the 
Spreckel's charges against the Sugar Co. as utterly absurd. 
Acting President Thomas says, 'The story is, of course, 
untrue,' and Secretary Heike is equally emphatic in denying 
the truth of the account. 
Friends of the American Sugar Refining Co. in the sugar 
trade admit that more publicity in regard to the company's 
affairs would be better policy. The new management has 
already committed itself to more open and less antagonistic 
methods. President Thomas has given his word to this 
effect. It will however, take some time to bring about this 
result completely but the first step in this direction is 
expected at the annual meeting tomorrow, when President 
Thomas may in his review of the year disclose more 
information that has been given out heretofore." 
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DEFINING AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES 
Abstract: This paper explores the efforts of the audit 
profession to dominate definitions of their roles and 
responsibilities throughout the last two decades. The 
paper considers alternative definitions of these roles and 
responsibilities as forwarded by others and the 
justifications and defenses provided by auditors to 
legitimize their conceptions of these matters. 
The U.S. auditing profession maintains that its work enhances the 
reliability and credibility of financial statements and thereby facilitates 
the operation of capital markets. Although the profession has 
benefitted greatly from legislated requirements for annual audits, it 
has also fought forcefully to dominate the definitions of its tasks, 
roles, and responsibilities—to perform audits as it sees fit. In 
developing and maintaining a particular position relative to their 
responsibilities in conducting financial audits, auditors have attempted 
to tell the public whom they serve as well as the types of tasks that 
the public may reasonably expect the profession to undertake. 
This insistence upon a self-definition of tasks, roles and 
responsibilities should not be surprising. With the passage of the 
securities acts and licensing statutes by individual states, auditors 
have demarcated the attestation of financial statements as an element 
of their professional jurisdiction. Through such demarcations, 
professions attempt to gain legitimate control over particular kinds of 
work [Abbott, 1988]. They claim the right to perform work within 
their jurisdiction as they deem appropriate and also to dominate 
public definitions of their professional tasks. In effect, professions 
are asking the public to trust that they know best how to define their 
professional roles and responsibilities and how to accomplish their 
professional tasks. Carmen Blough [1939, p. 165] succinctly captured 
this position in discussing why auditors should refer to audit 
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procedures "deemed" appropriate rather than exhaustively listing the 
procedures performed during an audit in the audit certificate (i.e. 
report): 
[These words] say 'You must trust me to do a good job as an 
accountant. No detailed recital that I might make of the 
auditing procedures followed would tell you enough to make 
it worth your while to read them. If you cannot trust me, 
you had best not depend upon my certificate, but if you can 
bring yourself to the frame of mind where you believe I will 
do what an honest, capable and independent public accountant 
should do, then you may rely upon it.' 
In exchange for defining its professional work and 
responsibilities, however, a profession must also be seen to perform 
the work defined as contained in its jurisdiction. In other words, an 
obligation is imposed upon a profession to do what it says it will do. 
For some professions, this obligation is perhaps difficult to monitor. 
For example, do lawyers actually serve the needs of justice, their 
primary jurisdictional claim [Abbott, 1988].1 For other professions 
such as auditing and accounting, "failures" to accomplish professional 
work may be highly visible and the definition of a "failure" contested. 
Audits are seen to fail. Indeed, the history of auditing might be 
interpreted by some as a history of auditing failures [Power, 1992]. But 
when is an audit to be described as a failure, and when do such failures 
suggest weaknesses in auditing practices or failures by the auditing 
profession more generally? Are sudden and unexpected corporate 
bankruptcies evidence of an audit failure? What of the failure to detect 
material fraud? When may audits described as failed be interpreted to 
imply the roles and responsibilities of auditors should be redefined? The 
answers to these questions no doubt depend upon to whom they are 
addressed. 
The significances or meanings to be attached to an audit opinion, the 
only visible sign that audit work has been performed, remain ambiguous. 
Does a "clean" report imply that fraud was absent or that no fraud was 
detected? Can one infer from a "clean" report that a corporation is 
financially sound and can be expected to continue its operations into the 
future? Or does a "clean" report refer only to the use of GAAP in 
constructing financial statements? Each (or all) of these meanings may 
be and have been assigned to the "clean" audit report. Yet, they carry 
1This claim is also being increasingly contested in recent years. 37
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significantly different implications for the roles and responsibilities of the 
auditor. If a "clean" report is interpreted to mean no fraud is present, 
then the auditor has a responsibility to detect fraud, to search actively to 
find it. If it implies only that no fraud was detected, then the auditor may 
not be seen as responsible for searching for fraud. If the report is 
interpreted to imply that a company will continue to exist, then the 
auditor must assess its future viability before issuing a report. 
In recent decades, considerable attention has been given to the 
existence of an "expectations gap" between what "the public" believes 
auditors should do and how auditors have defined their roles and 
responsibilities. Disagreement and controversy have surrounded the 
significance and content to be accorded the term "auditors"roles and 
responsibilities". This gap has been explored in the accounting 
literature. For example, Humphrey et al. [1992] have critically 
examined the response of the profession to this gap, primarily in the UK 
context. Hooks [1991] has considered efforts to match public concerns 
with auditor actions, and suggested that the profession may benefit from 
public ignorance. These and other authors have raised questions 
regarding whether auditors act in the public interest when they adhere to 
extant standards rather than assess the economic consequences of audited 
transactions [Merino & Kenny, 1994; Martins & McEnroe, 1992]; when 
they respond to public outcries in particular ways [Fogarty, 1996; 
Byington & Sutton, 1991; Mills & Bettner, 1992] or even whether they 
meet their own definitions of serving the public interest [Sikka et al., 
1989]. In this paper, I hope to make a modest contribution to this 
literature by examining the efforts of the U.S. accounting profession to 
dominate definitions of its roles and responsibilities during the last three 
decades. These efforts have occurred amidst tension between the 
perceived obligations of auditors to perform particular tasks and their 
declared "rights" to define such tasks. In part, this tension has arisen 
from the particular cultural values [Abbott, 1988] with which auditors 
have aligned their work. The next section briefly considers some of these 
values in an historical context and the justifications employed by 
auditors to legitimize their work. It also outlines the ways that auditors 
defined their professional tasks during the 1970s. In the subsequent 
sections, I consider the challenges that have been posed to these 
definitions and the responses of auditors to these challenges, from the 
1970s to the 1990s. The final section contains some concluding 
observations. 
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WHY ARE FINANCIAL AUDITS "VALUABLE"? 
In the 1970s, auditors described their role as one of enhancing the 
credibility of financial information and furthering the operations of an 
effective capital market [Carmichael, 1974]. This claim bears a striking 
resemblance to those made in the 1930s regarding the necessity for 
enhanced financial disclosure by corporations. Prior to the 1930s, 
corporations were required neither to submit annual reports to 
government agencies or shareholders nor to have such reports audited. 
Corporate managers "regarded their company's affairs as private and 
privileged" [McCraw, 1984, p. 166].2 Indeed, "Mystery [i.e. 
nonreporting] was treated as an asset, on the grounds that publicity 
would be too informing to competitors" [Ripley, 1927, pp. 178-179]. 
During the economic depression, corporate secrecy was increasingly seen 
as a threat to the functioning of capitalism undermining the legitimacy 
of the securities industry [McCraw, 1984]. For some, the "worst 
damage" of the Depression was the "wholesale betrayal of confidence by 
investors" [Andrews, 1932, p. 354], including "unrestrained financial 
exploitations which create[d] fictitious values never justified by 
earnings" [Roosevelt, 1933, p. 226]. 
Regaining investor confidence was deemed essential to the economic 
recovery of the U.S. [Roosevelt, 1933], and enhanced disclosure by 
corporations was seen as one means to this end. It was in this climate of 
economic depression and distrust that the 1933 Securities Act ("Truth 
in Securities") was enacted. The act was described as a response to "the 
reticence of financiers" [Rep. Rayburn, quoted in McCraw, 1984, p. 
166], and required that specific disclosures accompany the issuance of 
new securities. The 1934 Securities and Exchange Act extended these 
disclosure requirements to encompass all publicly traded companies and 
established the Securities and Exchange Commission. The New Deal 
legislation also required that the disclosures and reports submitted by 
corporations be audited. These audits would enable a new era of "caveat 
vendor" [Andrews, 1932, p. 359], supplanting that of caveat emptor 
which had been prevalent in previous decades. After all, "it is generally 
regarded that an independent audit of any business is a good thing" [Col. 
Carter during Congressional hearings on the Securities Act, quoted in 
Carey, 1960, p. 187]. Through enhanced disclosure, audit, and other 
practices, confidence and trust were to be restored in the operations of 
2Also see Ripley [1927] and Robbins [1929]. 39
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the securities markets.3 The practice of auditing was thus closely linked 
to the cultural value of credible financial reporting seen as necessary for 
the securities markets. 
In the 1970s, audits were still described as affirming the truthfulness 
of financial statements and ensuring that financial statements were 
"fairly presented" [Palmer in New York Times, April 6, 1975]. This 
function was loosely linked to various audit practices including the 
review and testing of company records and the procedures and controls 
used to assemble financial information, approval of the use of various 
accounting principles, and examination of financial statements to ensure 
they contained no material misstatements, omissions, or misleading 
presentations of data [Silverman, 1971]. Through the application of 
such practices, the auditor was to render a professional opinion "as to 
the reliability of a company's financial records. . . judged in terms of the 
adequacy of records from which the information emanates and the 
acceptability of technical accounting principles involved in recording 
transactions" [Silverman, 1971]. In describing their role in this way, 
auditors maintained that the purpose of an audit was to ensure that 
financial statements fairly presented the financial position and condition 
of a business entity and that the notion, "fairly presented", was a 
function of the acceptability of various accounting principles. The audit 
profession did not accept responsibility for the preparation of financial 
statements. Instead, these statements were declared to be the 
representations of management and the responsibility of management 
[Mautz and Sharaf, 1961].4 
The terms used to describe the auditors' role were quite 
ambiguous—ensuring "fair presentation" and the "truthfulness" of 
financial reporting. While such ambiguity serves to suggest the expertise 
and knowledge required to conduct an audit properly through the 
exercise of professional judgment [Power, 1992], it also increases the 
possibility of multiple and conflicting interpretations of these terms as 
well as multiple and conflicting assessments as to whether auditors had 
accomplished these ends in specific instances. What obligations did the 
profession maintain were undertaken by auditors? Could financial 
statements be described as "fairly presented" when an auditor failed to 
3See Neu [1991a, b] re: trust production in the Canadian securities industry. 
4This statement echoes an opinion of the SEC which maintained that the 
"fundamental and primary responsibility for the accuracy of information filed with 
the Commission rests upon management" [quoted in Montgomery, 1940, p. 13]. 40
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detect fraud? With fraud, revenues and assets might be overstated or 
expenses and liabilities understated. If information about these 
accounting categories could be said to represent the financial condition 
and operations of an entity but the categories themselves were 
"inaccurate," then could one argue that the financial statements fairly 
presented the operating results and financial condition of the entity? Did 
the term "fairly present" which appeared in the standard audit opinion 
imply that financial statements were free of material errors resulting 
from fraud or other illegal acts? 
Prior to the passage of the securities acts, the primary purpose of an 
audit was to "ascertain the actual financial condition and earnings of an 
enterprise," with the minor object of detecting and preventing fraud and 
errors [Montgomery, 1921-22, pp. 19, 21, and 1927, pp. 23, 25]. 
However, by 1940, the detection of fraud was no longer described as an 
object of the audit, as this would "require an examination of such detail 
that its cost... would be prohibitive" [Montgomery, 1940, p. 13].5 By 
the late 1940s, it was argued that audits were not designed to detect 
fraud, nor were auditors responsible for its detection [Montgomery, 
1949; Kohler, 1947]. 
Throughout the 1970s, auditors continued to maintain that the 
concept of "fairly present" as defined by the profession imposed a very 
limited obligation upon auditors to detect fraud or other illegal acts. 
Some argued that it was "sheer ignorance to think the purpose of the 
audit is to detect fraud" and, in their engagement letters with corporate 
management, audit firms often included explicit statements to indicate 
they were not in the business of detecting fraud [Hershman, 1974; Blinn, 
1977]. According to the professional literature of the time, auditors were 
responsible for detecting fraud only when such detection could occur 
through the application of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) 
[Holdren, 1969; Carmichael, 1975; Kapnick, 1976]. Yet, GAAS was 
seen to guide the conduct of "ordinary" audit examinations—those in 
which fraud was not thought to occur. Indeed, audits were assumed to 
be performed in a corporate environment of honesty and integrity 
[Solomon and Muller, 1977] and auditors were not required to presume 
that fraud had occurred while conducting an audit [Kapnick, 1976]. As 
a consequence, the application of GAAS could not be "relied upon to 
assure the discovery of either defalcations and similar irregularities or 
deliberate management misrepresentations" [Carmichael, 1975, p. 79]. 
5Through such arguments, auditors were also aligning their work with notions 
of efficiency. 41
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From this perspective, if auditors properly applied GAAS in an 
engagement but failed to detect fraud, then no audit failure had occurred 
even though the financial statements might contain errors. The audit 
profession thus limited its definition of an audit failure to include only 
those cases in which an auditor failed to apply GAAS. In doing so, it 
maintained that auditor performance and their roles and responsibilities 
were to be assessed only by reference to the rules and guidelines 
established by the profession. Auditors were to be evaluated on their 
own terms rather than by reference to the roles and responsibilities that 
nonauditors might believe should guide the conduct of an audit. 
In defining an audit failure as a failure to follow GAAS, the 
profession was promoting and claiming its right to establish definitions 
of "fairly present" and to perform its work as it saw fit [Abbott, 1988]. 
Even as it continued to call upon broader cultural values such as the 
credibility of financial statements to justify and legitimate the usefulness 
of an audit, the profession also attempted to control and define the terms 
used to assess whether these values had been achieved. In this way, and 
through these definitions, the audit profession was attempting to 
construct and define the "proper" roles and responsibilities of auditors. 
Furthermore, with its limited definition of an audit failure, the profession 
was apparently attempting to equate the performance of an audit in 
accordance with GAAS as sufficient evidence that the cultural value of 
credible financial statements had been achieved [Abbott, 1988]. If 
audited, financial statements were to be seen as credible. The profession 
was attempting to preclude public discussions of the meanings and 
significances to be assigned to the audit and, instead, sought to define 
those terms seen to provide the audit process with value in ways desired 
by the profession, and thereby to control the significance of work 
performed within its jurisdiction. 
QUESTIONING THE DEFINITIONS PROVIDED BY 
AUDITORS—1970s 
Although the profession forwarded its desired definition of an audit 
failure and thereby of a "quality" audit, the revelation of scandals such 
as Westec, Yale Express, and Bar-Chris [Why Accountants, Business 
Week, 1971] as well as National Student Marketing [Wall Street 
Journal, October 29, 1974], Beverly Hills Bancorp [Wall Street 
Journal, August 14, 1974], and Equity Funding [Wall Street Journal, 
January 8, 1975; January 10, 1975; December 18, 1975] raised 
questions about the propriety of the auditing profession's definitions, 
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including questions about its roles and responsibilities in detecting fraud. 
Some commentators suggested that if audits could fail to detect a fraud 
of the magnitude of Equity Funding, then as currently conducted they 
might have little value [Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1974; Hershman, 
1974]. The Equity Funding scandal was seen to place intense pressure 
upon auditors to accept a duty to detect fraud [Wall Street Journal, 
January 8, 1975]. 
Members of the SEC also criticized the profession's position on 
fraud. Some commissioners considered auditors in a strategic position 
to "nip fraud before it blossoms" and criticized them for failing to heed 
"red flags" that were indicative of potential fraud [Wall Street Journal, 
July 12, 1974]. In referring to several major cases of substantial 
management fraud, one SEC commissioner commented: 
In most of these cases, the fraud was one which was designed 
to present a misleading picture of results through transactions 
with related parties or through outright fictitious 
transactions... If the accounting profession adopts the view that 
auditors should never be responsible for detecting management 
fraud, there is little likelihood that increased imposition of the 
truly onerous and unfair burdens on the accounting profession 
can be prevented. Standards can best be promulgated by the 
profession and can serve to allay fears that auditors will become 
insurers against all forms of management fraud, however 
carefully concealed [News Report, Journal of Accountancy, 
1973a, pp. 14,16]. 
He urged the profession to accept responsibility for fraud detection [New 
York Times, October 17, 1973] as did the Commission more generally: 
"We believe that in examinations for corporations whose securities are 
held by the public, accountants can be expected to detect gross 
overstatements of assets and profits, whether resulting from fraud or 
otherwise" [quoted in Hershman, 1974, p. 53]. 
In addition to concerns about auditor responsibilities to detect 
material errors, auditors were criticized for a perceived failure to 
maintain their independence from their corporate clients [It's Time to 
Call, Fortune, 1970; Why Accountants, Business Week, 1971]. These 
questions were particularly troubling as they suggested that auditors had 
failed to meet their own definitions of a "quality" audit. Did auditors 
serve their corporate clients or act in the public interest by protecting 
investors and creditors [The Big Bath, Newsweek, 1970; Why 
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Accountants, Business Week, 1971; New York Times, November 5, 
1973]? Were auditors "too friendly" with management and should they 
continued to be hired as employees by their former clients [New York 
Times, November 18, 1972]? Had heightened competition within the 
profession resulted in an increasing unwillingness by auditors to insist on 
"compliance" with financial accounting standards and to "pursue 
incompetence" [Letter to the Editor, New York Times, December 7, 
1975]? Was a "more muscular audit" needed to alleviate pressures on 
auditors to provide creative accounting answers for clients who 
otherwise threatened to change auditors [New York Times, April 14, 
1974]?6 
Although accounting writers indicated an awareness of criticisms 
that auditors were not adequately independent of corporate clients, that 
accounting results disclosed too little, and that financial statements were 
too complex [e.g., Seidler, 1973], the general response of the profession 
to these criticisms can be summarized in a single phrase: "You just don't 
understand." Even as auditors continued to argue that audits enhanced 
the credibility of financial information, they also claimed that audits were 
not designed to detect fraud. While auditors insisted they could enhance 
the credibility of financial reporting without actively searching for fraud, 
the public appeared to disagree with this position and apparently 
expected that significant or material fraud would be detected by an 
audit.7 In contrast to the definition of an audit failure forwarded by the 
profession, the public defined such failures as including those audits 
6
 Apparently, the Securities Acts were not as effective in allowing 
auditors to escape the "grip" of management as was originally hoped 
[McCraw, 1984], nor were the rules on independence sufficient to achieve 
this end despite an awareness by the profession of the need for public 
confidence in the "unbiased and selfless character of the public accountant's 
role" [Miranti, 1990, pp. 176-177]. 
7For example, a 1974 Arthur Andersen & Co. survey "indicated that 66% 
of the investing public believe[d] that the most important function of the 
public accounting firm's audit of a corporation is to detect fraud" [cited in 
AICPA, 1978, p. 31]. Further, Baron et al. [1977] reported survey results in 
which nonauditors indicated higher levels of auditor responsibility for the 
detection of deliberate material falsifications than did auditors. With the 
exception of auditors, the survey respondents also indicated a preference for 
extending auditor responsibilities with respect to the detection of deliberate 
material falsifications of financial statements. 
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which did not detect material fraud or errors. This difference in 
definition called into question the propriety of the practices both followed 
and defined by auditors in conducting audits. The controversy 
surrounding Equity Funding and other corporate failures as well as 
questions about the independence of auditors suggested that the 
profession had not succeeded in equating the performance of an audit in 
accordance with GAAS as sufficient evidence that credible financial 
reporting had been produced. These corporate failures highlighted 
differences between the ways in which the auditing profession linked the 
audit to credible financial reporting and how the public interpreted this 
linkage. 
The profession interpreted these criticisms as indicative of a failure 
by the public to understand the roles and responsibilities which it had 
defined. The public was described as misinformed about the services 
customarily performed by CPAs [Solomon et al., 1976, p. 68]. These 
differences between public interpretations and auditor interpretations of 
how an audit was to intersect with the production of credible financial 
statements were construed by auditors as indicative of a need to educate 
the public. A properly educated public would accept that audits could 
enhance the credibility of financial statements without serving as 
guarantees of the accuracy of financial statements [Hershman, 1974]. 
In emphasizing the necessity for educating the public, the profession 
attempted to avoid reassessing its own definitions of its roles and 
responsibilities. Instead, confronted with these differences and 
interpretations, the audit profession renewed its efforts to dominate the 
signficances to be assigned to its roles and responsibilities and to 
persuade the public to accept the value of an audit as defined by 
auditors. In particular, the profession sought to manage impressions, 
emphasized better communication by auditors, called upon other cultural 
values to justify its position, and outlined expertise and its limits. 
Managing Impressions. Through various means, the AICPA 
attempted to manage public impressions about the roles and 
responsibilities of the audit profession. In 1973, the AICPA Board of 
Directors announced the formation of a special committee "to study 
whether the auditing standards, which are currently considered 
appropriate and sufficient in the examination of financial statements [by 
the AICPA], should be changed in the light of Equity Funding and to 
report its conclusions to the Board of Directors and the auditing 
standards executive committee" [News Report, Journal of Accountancy, 
1973b, p. 14]. The Institute justified forming the committee by 
indicating that "the Institute shares the general public concern about the 
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Equity Funding disaster, which caused enormous losses to investors and 
creditors apparently by reason of massive and collusive fraud" [News 
Report, Journal of Accountancy, 1973b, p. 14]. Although some 
individuals claimed that no lessons could be learned from such a poorly 
conducted audit engagement, others suggested that the fraud was 
possible because Equity Funding employees had exploited blind spots 
and crevices in existing audit practices [Wall Street Journal, January 8, 
1975; Tipgos, 1977]. 
This AICPA special committee later concluded that the Equity 
Funding fraud could have been detected using existing auditing standards 
and that the professional position with respect to its responsibility to 
detect fraud was sound [Wall Street Journal, June 5, 1975; Olsen, 
1982]. For the committee, the Equity Funding scandal was not 
interpreted as evidence of the profession's failure to perform appropriate 
tasks but rather as a failure by individual auditors to follow established 
rules and guidelines. Even so, the committee urged that the standards 
relating to fraud detection be restated in more positive terms to avoid 
public misunderstandings of the audit and to reemphasize that audits 
might detect fraud but were not specifically designed to do so [Olsen, 
1982]. The committee in this way reasserted the position of the 
profession with respect to fraud detection and maintained that the audit 
purposes as previously articulated were sound. The problem confronting 
the profession was thus seen as one of educating the public about the 
proper role of the auditor rather than a reconsideration of this role. 
Audits were not designed to detect fraud, and the public was to accept 
the profession's definitions of its roles and responsibilities. 
This emphasis upon interpreting public criticisms as the public's 
failure to understand the auditor's role can also be seen in the 1974 
formation of the Cohen Commission on auditor's responsibilities.8 This 
commission was charged with "determining] whether a gap exists 
between what the public expects of auditors and what auditors can 
reasonably be expected to accomplish [News Report, Journal of 
Accountancy, 1974, p. 14]. The wording of this announcement 
suggested the results the AICPA anticipated the Commission would find: 
the public's expectations of auditors were unreasonable and auditors had 
appropriately defined their tasks. As part of its efforts at impression 
management, the AICPA later pointed to the formation of the Cohen 
8The Commission was to explore mechanisms for developing auditing 
standards, possible alterations to the standard audit report, and whether 
auditors should monitor all financial information released to the public. 46
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Commission as evidence that it was taking the steps necessary to police 
itself: "We're going to show that accountants are concerned about the 
consumer" [New York Times, May 9, 1976]. Apparently, the formation 
of the Commission rather than any changes resulting from its possible 
recommendations was to be seen as sufficient evidence of auditor 
concerns about discrepancies between public and auditor interpretations 
of how to define auditor tasks and responsibilities. 
Emphasizing Better Communication. Again, criticisms of auditors 
were interpreted as the public's failure to understand properly the role of 
the auditor. However, this failure was now explicitly attributed to faulty 
communications between the auditor and the public. At times, this faulty 
communication was blamed upon the media for misleading the public: 
and if the public has cast the accountant in the role of the 
nemesis of all those who would embezzle funds, falsify financial 
statements or commit other corporate crimes, it is not altogether 
at fault. Some of the recent publicity in connection with 
lawsuits involving prominent accounting firms appears to lend 
considerable credence to the idea that the auditor is, in the final 
analysis, the conscience of business, big and small. In reality, 
this is a popular misconception [Silverman, 1971, p. 80]. 
At other times, faulty communication was attributed to the existing audit 
opinion. In 1969, Roth [p. 61] argued that 
A better understanding of the independent auditor's role by the 
users of our reports and by the public generally might go far 
toward reducing the number of cases taken to court and 
resultant unfortunate legal decisions. One means of attaining 
better understanding could possibly be a clearer explanation of 
the scope and purpose of our audit in our short-form report. 
Rosenfield and Lorenson [1974] also blamed the ambiguous audit report 
for the turmoil over auditor responsibilities. In particular, they faulted 
the statement made within this standard report that claimed financial 
statements were presented fairly in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles. They recognized that this statement could be 
subject to a number of different interpretations, each of which implied 
differing responsibilities for auditors. 
The failure of the public to understand was in part a consequence of 
poor communication by auditors. As such, the solution to then current 
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controversies surrounding the audit profession was to consider 
"improving" the audit report so as to describe better the profession's 
conception of an audit's purpose. However, this purpose was still to be 
defined by the profession. Apparently, "improved communication" was 
to be a monologue in which the public would be told by the profession 
what it could "reasonably" expect from an audit. In calling for altered 
audit reports, there was a presumption that the existing practices, roles, 
and responsibilities of auditors were appropriate. The public was to 
accept that the audit profession knew best how to enhance the credibility 
of financial information. 
Calling Upon Other Cultural Values. Other authors attempted to 
justify more directly the position of the profession with respect to the 
discovery of fraud. They attempted to convince the public (or perhaps 
only Congress and the SEC) that its interpretations of the role of an audit 
were unreasonable and inappropriate. Some pointed to the confusion 
regarding the definition of fraud and noted that many business failures 
arose from other factors such as bad management or adverse economic 
conditions [Catlett, 1975]. They also argued that requiring auditors to 
accept responsibility for fraud detection would interfere with American 
cultural values of "free" enterprise and "opportunity for all" [Catlett, 
1975; Cooney, 1995]. By imposing such requirements on auditors, they 
would be reluctant to accept more risky companies as clients. As a 
result, these companies (often start-ups) would be unable to obtain audit 
services and would thereby be effectively denied access to capital 
markets. Following this chain of reasoning, free enterprise, and 
consequently competition within industries, would be hampered if 
auditors were required to accept fraud detection as one of their 
responsibilities. Stated in other words, the "traditional" responsibilities 
of auditors as currently defined served to promote greater economic 
opportunities for all.9 
It was also argued that requiring auditors to accept this 
9Interestingly, some individuals attempted to employ the weight of 
"tradition" as a reason to maintain the status quo. They claimed that fraud 
detection conflicted with the "traditional" audit approach and was, in general, 
too costly an undertaking [e.g., New York Times, April 6, 1975]. However, 
these arguments represented an effort to construct such a tradition. The 
Cohen Commission later traced the steady erosion of fraud detection as an 
audit objective [AICPA, 1978, pp. 33-35]. See Hobsbawn and Ranger [1984] 
on the construction of traditions. 
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responsibility would sacrifice another cultural value—efficiency [Abbott, 
1988]. Relative to the large number of audits conducted each year, the 
incidence of undetected fraud (an audit failure as defined by the public) 
was claimed to be small (a claim perhaps impossible to either refute or 
substantiate). Requiring auditors to search actively for fraud would 
result in the performance of additional audit procedures. But if one 
assumed that undetected fraud was a relatively infrequent event, then 
obviously such additional efforts would not be cost-effective [Hershman, 
1974], but rather a waste of auditor time and client money.10 
Outlining Expertise and Its Limits. Again, auditors maintained 
that the public failed to understand the particular expertise of auditors. 
Some expressed the opinion that an adequate answer to the question of 
what "good" is an audit that could not provide assurance that material 
fraud was detected "is exceedingly involved and probably beyond the 
grasp of the average user of the auditor's work" [Carmichael, 1979], the 
"non-expert." Others questioned the ability of such non-experts to 
understand the "esoteric, highly specialized professional standards and 
responsibilities" of the auditor [Solomon et al., 1976]. In effect, because 
the public was not expert in auditing, the nature and extent of the 
complex tasks underpinning the audit report were best left to those 
specifically trained in undertaking these tasks. In making these 
arguments, Solomon et al. [1976] criticized the actions of the trial judge 
in the Continental Vending case who had instructed the jury that "proof 
of compliance with GAAP [generally accepted accounting principles] is 
evidence which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive 
that [the auditor] acted in good faith, and that the facts as certified were 
not materially false or misleading." The judge's instructions were to be 
seen as inappropriate because the professional expertise and judgment 
of the audit profession was being effectively supplanted by that of a less 
informed and knowledgeable jury. Instead, for these authors, the jury 
should have been instructed that compliance with generally accepted 
accounting principles would be sufficient to acquit the auditors. In 
forwarding these arguments, the authors suggested that the audit should 
be considered an end in itself and that the means to this end were best left 
to the experts, the audit profession. In deciding whether an audit had 
resulted in the production of reliable financial reports, one need look no 
further than assessing whether the statements were prepared in 
accordance with the established accounting rules and auditing standards. 
10This argument echoes that made by Montgomery [1940] to explain why 
fraud detection was not an audit purpose. 49
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Even as some maintained that the expertise of auditors lay beyond 
the understanding of the general public, others argued that this expertise 
also had its limits. Now, auditors were argued to possess no special 
powers in detecting fraud. They were not favored with hindsight and 
conducted audits under a presumption of honest management [New York 
Times, April 6, 1975]. As such, the audit profession could not and 
should not undertake responsibilities it could not successfully fulfill 
[Catlett, 1975].11 Such justifications for the status quo presumed a 
certain fixity in the nature of an audit engagement and a self-assurance 
as regards its continuing relevance in the face of efforts to exclude 
nonauditors from any role in defining its nature and purpose. These 
justifications also suggested an extraordinary confidence in the 
continuing importance of the audit profession and its self-defined tasks. 
In issuing revised auditing standards on fraud and illegal acts in the 
late 1970s, the profession attempted to maintain the status quo. The 
fraud standard repeated previous professional statements about the 
limitations of the existing audit process, limitations that might allow 
errors to remain undetected. As such, it was seen to do little more than 
to reiterate "traditional" audit doctrine and to emphasize that frauds do 
occur [Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1976] and might remain undetected. 
Similarly, the proposal on illegal acts explicitly recognized the expertise 
limitations of auditors and indicated that auditors could not be expected 
to provide legal opinions. Again, this new requirement was seen to have 
little effect upon existing auditor responsibilities [Wall Street Journal, 
January 31, 1977]. 
The articles appearing in the accounting practitioner journals and 
elsewhere during this period seemed to emphasize the necessity for 
making the public understand the auditor's roles and responsibilities as 
interpreted by auditors. This understanding was to be imposed upon the 
public by the profession. Although auditors claimed to act in the public 
interest, they also maintained that as "experts" they were best qualified 
to decide their responsibilities. They argued that the profession was best 
situated to decide what constituted reasonable public expectations with 
11This lack of expertise/professional competence argument was also used 
to justify resistance to placing upon auditors a responsibility for the detection 
of illegal payments [New York Times, September 28, 1976]. Many illegal acts 
were seen as far removed from entity's financial affairs (the area of audit 
expertise). As such, it was unlikely that an auditor could detect them during 
the audit engagement (e.g., violations of OSHA or EPA regulations) [Solomon 
and Muller, 1977]. 50
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regards to audit performance and auditor roles and responsibilities. 
Auditors were to define these tasks both for themselves and the public; 
they were to control the activities within their professional jurisdiction 
and to decide whether the credibility of financial statements was being 
enhanced by their activities. 
CHANGING THE TERMS OF DEBATE 
In 1976, a highly critical Senate staff study was released about the 
accounting profession [U.S. Senate, 1976]. This study claimed that the 
professional interests of auditors were too closely intertwined with those 
of large corporate clients, attacked auditor claims of independence and 
questioned the reliability of private audits [New York Times, January 23, 
1977]. In a cover letter, Senator Metcalf stated that the Big Eight 
accounting firms had shown "an alarming lack of independence and lack 
of dedication to public protection" [New York Times, January 17, 1977]. 
The study suggested that governmental regulation of auditors might be 
necessary, including the establishment of federal auditing standards 
[Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1977]. It also questioned the 
appropriateness of the existing process for establishing accounting 
standards [U.S. Senate, 1976]. Initially, the AICPA expressed dismay 
at the Senate staff's 
unwarranted conclusions. This effort [of the AICPA over 35 
years] combined with actions of SEC results in achieving the 
highest quality of financial reporting and disclosure of any 
country in the world [Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1977]. 
Partners from Big Eight firms were reported as describing the staff study 
as both wrong and superficial [New York Times, January 17, 1977]. 
Despite these assertions, several auditors who later testified during the 
Congressional hearings about the study urged Congress to allow the 
auditing profession time to reform itself. 
With the publication of this report and the convening of subsequent 
Congressional hearings, attention appeared to shift away from questions 
about the appropriate roles and responsibilities of auditors and towards 
an emphasis upon finding specific practices that could serve as symbols 
suggestive of the appearance of auditor independence. The threat of an 
increased federal role in the operations of the auditing profession appears 
to have been a critical element in this shift. The "new" practices 
installed during this period included the formation of audit committees, 
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disclosures of disagreements between auditors and corporate clients, and 
the implementation of mechanisms to discipline and control the actions 
of auditors, such as peer review. In emphasizing the development and 
implementation of these practices, questions that had earlier been raised 
about the proper roles and responsibilities of auditors faded into the 
background. This shift was quite significant in that it allowed the 
auditing profession to continue forwarding its preferred meanings for an 
audit and its definitions of the appropriate roles and responsibilities for 
auditors. With this shift, attention was redirected from the 
interpretations to be accorded an audit to focus instead upon the sorts of 
services an audit firm could be permitted to provide and still claim its 
independence from clients and the types of disciplinary techniques 
needed to convince nonauditors that professional self-regulation was 
possible and workable.12 
This shift from a consideration of roles and responsibilities to 
finding and installing specific practices of self-regulation occurred in 
spite of the publication of the tentative and final conclusions of the 
Cohen Commission. In its tentative conclusions, this Commission 
suggested that the expectations gap often described by auditors as 
unreasonable was apparently ". . . caused by the failure of auditors to 
fully assume responsibilities they are capable of assuming, rather than 
by unreasonable user expectations" [Seidler, 1977, p. 20]. The Cohen 
Commission recommended that auditors be required to provide a broader 
range of information about corporate clients and to expose publicly the 
wrongdoing of clients in certain circumstances. It further recommended 
that the auditors clarify their responsibility for fraud detection. In 
making this recommendation, the Commission commented that the users 
of financial statements "should have the right to assume that audited 
financial information is not unreliable because of fraud and that 
management maintains appropriate controls to safeguard assets" 
[AICPA, 1977, p. 36]. In other words, credible financial reporting could 
not be produced if auditors failed to detect material fraud. 
These recommendations suggested that public interpretations of the 
significance of the audit and auditors' responsibilities of should 
supersede some definitions forwarded by the profession. While the 
profession was to decide how these different tasks would be 
implemented, the Commission explicitly accepted a role for the "public" 
in defining the responsibilities of auditors. In this way, its 
recommendations might have been seen to threaten the dominant role of 
12See Fogarty [1996] on peer review. 52
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the profession in defining its own roles and responsibilities. 
Unsurprisingly, its recommendations tended to be ignored by the 
AICPA.13 
INTEREST RENEWED 
As the 1980s began, Congressional interest in accounting and 
auditing matters subsided. In 1981, the New York Times commented: 
Pressure for Federal regulation has waned. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission has shredded its letters warning of the 
importance of auditor independence from the companies they 
audit. And, perhaps most surprising, certified public 
accountants now occupy powerful positions in Washington 
[New York Times, October 7, 1981]. 
In this same article, an AICPA representative was quoted: 
For the first time in years, the accounting profession is 
experiencing real power in Washington not just outside 
influence. 
Even as regulatory interest in accounting waned, articles continued to 
appear in the press (although with less frequency than earlier) that were 
critical of auditing and accounting. The media continued to report on the 
ways in which "slick" accounting ploys were used to improve the 
reported income of companies [Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1980], on 
the rise of accounting "scams" accepted by auditors without qualification 
[Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1982], about SEC charges that financial 
statement "fudging" was a growing practice [Wall Street Journal, June 
2, 1983; "The SEC Turns Up the Heat," Business Week, 1984] and on 
the increasing number of corporations that fired auditors who had issued 
13Indeed, the AICPA was accused of responding superficially to these 
recommendations by studying the report intensively in small committees 
while failing to heed its advice [Seidler, 1979]. For example, the AICPA 
announced the formation of a committee to study the tentative conclusions of 
the Cohen Commission in 1977. This announcement also suggested the 
importance of the Commission for public relations purposes: "This is the type 
of independent study that would benefit any profession which is accountable 
to the public" [News Report, Journal of Accountancy, 1977, pp. 16, 18]. 
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qualified audit opinions [Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1983]. 
As the prohibitions on advertising and client solicitation were either 
dropped or substantially reduced, competition within the auditing 
industry (often taking the form of price competition) increased 
dramatically and auditing firms entered into the "alien world of 
marketing" [Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1981]. Accounting firms 
were now characterized as ever more aggressively "courting competitors' 
clients, promising lower audit fees" [New York Times, October 3, 1984] 
and squeezing profit margins on the traditional auditing business of the 
large accounting firms [New York Times, December 30, 1984]. In this 
environment, concerns were raised about "whether growing competitive 
pressures [might] be encouraging auditors to bend the rules in favor of 
clients, such as keeping a questionable loan on the books to keep up the 
bank's profits on paper" [New York Times, March, 10, 1985]. Questions 
were also raised as to whether audits had become "loss leaders used 
merely to win more profitable management and tax-consulting contracts 
with the client" [New York Times, February 18, 1985]. These questions 
suggested that auditors were failing to carry out the roles and 
responsibilities which they had defined for themselves. They implied or 
stated outright that auditors and audits were not enhancing the credibility 
of financial statements in at least some instances. 
Such questions arose amidst a number of significant "audit failures" 
occurring relatively soon after an entity had received an unqualified audit 
opinion ["Auditing the Auditors," Business Week, 1983]. In 1982, Penn 
Square Bank collapsed three and one-half months after receiving an 
unqualified audit opinion [Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1982]. 
Although the auditors had warned Penn Square directors that the bank's 
financial problems were growing, they issued an unqualified audit 
opinion because of perceived risks to depositor confidence [Wall Street 
Journal, August 17, 1982]. Similarly, three weeks before the FDIC 
declared United American Bank insolvent, its audit firm issued an 
unqualified audit opinion on the bank's financial statements even though 
many federal investigators had been present during the audit [Wall Street 
Journal, March 4, 1983]. In 1984, the New York Times listed several 
instances of alleged audit failures including Litton Industries, Security 
America Corporation, Drysdale Government Securities Corporation, 
Saxon Industries, Flight Transportation, Alpex Computer, United 
American Bank, Penn Square Bank, and Datapoint [New York Times, 
May 13, 1984]. Later, the New York Times [November 23, 1984] 
reported several lawsuits pending against a single international 
accounting firm arising from audit work at DeLorean Motor Company, 
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Nucorp Energy, Seafirst National Bank, Frigitemp, the Reserve 
Insurance Co., and the Financial Corporation of America. Between 1980 
and early 1985, the largest accounting firms paid more than $ 175 million 
in settlements and judgments over disputed audits [McComas, 1986]. 
Despite earlier efforts to convince the public that the profession had 
no responsibility to detect fraud, the significant number of instances 
designated as "audit failures" again raised questions regarding the 
significances that could be accorded to an unqualified or "clean" audit 
opinion. For example, the New York Times [May 13, 1984] commented 
that auditors are thought of as 
the watchdogs who will detect fraud or emerging financial 
problems before those problems sink a bank or make a 
corporation's stock price plunge. 
But such faith has been eroded lately through a series of 
incidents in which some of the most elite accounting firms have 
blessed a financial statements on the eve of disaster. 
Were auditors fulfilling this responsibility? Did the audit enhance the 
credibility of financial reports? 
In 1985, Congressional attention again focused upon the auditing 
profession and hearings were held about the role of auditors. Before 
these hearings began, Rep. Dingell, the Committee chair, indicated his 
concerns about "whether accounting is giving us a fair and accurate and 
truthful picture of what is going on in the industry" [New York Times, 
February 18, 1985]. His committee intended to raise questions regarding 
whether competitive pressures and MAS services were eroding the 
independence of auditors [New York Times, February 18, 1985] and why 
auditors had not provided advance warning of the deteriorating financial 
condition of banks and other companies [Wall Street Journal, February 
12, 1985; February 19, 1985]. 
In opening the hearings, Dingell referred to a U.S. Supreme Court 
description of the auditor's role: 
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a 
corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes 
a public responsibility transcending any employment 
relationship with the client....This public watchdog function 
demands that the accountant maintain total independence from 
the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public 
trust [quoted in Miller, 1986, pp. 28-29]. 
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The media also reported charges by the Dingell committee that the 
existing regulatory framework had not been effective in 
providing a warning system that might have prevented a series 
of financial disasters in the last few years—including the run on 
Continental Illinois National Bank, and the collapse of Penn 
Square Bank and Drysdale Government Securities. In each 
case, auditors gave the company's financial statements a clean 
opinion shortly before disaster struck [New York Times, March 
7, 1985].14 
Given these concerns, the Dingell committee investigated the role of 
accounting firms in "blessing" those accounting practices that were 
perceived to mask the financial condition of several savings and loan 
entities that later failed. Comments in the press indicated that the 
committee believed self-regulation was flawed: ". . . the same people 
write the (financial accounting) rules, interpret the rules . . . [sic] and 
enforce the rules" [Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1985]. Dingell 
commented: 
The present self-regulatory system permits the accounting firms 
to control the setting of audit standards, to apply those 
standards to individual clients, and to sit in judgment of 
themselves when an audit failure occurs. All of this is done in 
private [quoted in Miller, 1986, p. 32]. 
The many alleged audit failures raised renewed concerns about the 
independence and objectivity of auditors in the high-pressure competitive 
environment in which accounting firms also offered consulting services 
[Dingell, 1985; Wall Street Journal, September 20, 1985]. During the 
hearings, Dingell highlighted these concerns by referring to a newspaper 
advertisement that ended by saying "In fact, there's only one thing wrong 
with calling ourselves Deloitte Haskins & Sells & You. The You really 
should come first." He commented: "That doesn't sound too 
independent to me" [New York Times, March 10, 1985]. The terms 
employed in the previous paragraphs to describe the perceived problems 
with auditing are quite telling—a public watchdog function, an early 
warning system, "inappropriate" clean bills of health, "blessing" of 
misleading financial accounting practices, and concerns about the 
14Also see New York Times [March 10, 1985]. 56
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"independence" of auditors. Admittedly, some of these terms might be 
seen as high-flown rhetoric by a Congressional committee desiring the 
public attention it could receive by focusing upon the perceived failures 
of auditors. However, by asking whether the public watchdog function 
of auditors was impaired, the committee suggested that auditors should 
serve this function. In suggesting that auditors had failed to provide 
advance warning of imminent corporate failures, the Committee implied 
that auditors had this responsibility. Further, in saying that auditors had 
"blessed" misleading accounting practices, the Committee claimed that 
auditors had failed to carry out the roles and responsibilities which the 
profession had defined for itself. The committee's allegations were thus 
doubly damning—not only had auditors failed to define their tasks 
properly but they had also failed to perform the work which they 
themselves had defined as appropriate. 
The Dingell hearings challenged the definitions of roles and 
responsibilities advanced by the profession. These hearings suggested 
that the issuance of an audit report implied broader responsibilities than 
those previously accepted and advocated by auditors. During the 1970s, 
auditors had maintained that audits were not specifically designed to 
detect fraud. Now, they were again criticized for failing to detect fraud 
and also for failing to provide an "early warning" of possible corporate 
failures. The media, in its coverage of the Dingell committee hearings 
and elsewhere, appeared to define an audit failure as the issuance of a 
"clean" audit report shortly followed by the declaration of corporate 
bankruptcy or the incidence of financial problems [Wall Street Journal, 
February 21, 1985; March 7, 1985]. This definition contained no 
reference to GAAS and implied that an audit failure could occur even 
when an auditor had followed such practices, a definition that conflicted 
with that provided by the auditors. 
Auditor Response. The auditors responded by attempting to defend 
their own definitions of the roles and purposes of an audit and to deny 
that the existing system was "broken." In testimony before the Dingell 
Committee, Philip Chenok, AICPA president, indicated that the 
incidence of audit failures was quite small relative to the large number 
of audits performed, claiming that of 50,000 audits performed since 
1979 only 123 might be called "audit failures" [Wall Street Journal, 
February 19, 1985]. In a later editorial, Chenok again stressed the 
relative infrequency of audit failures noting that "audit failures can and 
do occur but they are rare in relation to the tens of thousands of audits 
conducted each year. They result from human error by individual 
auditors. They do not reflect the overall quality of work in the 
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profession" [New York Times, March 17, 1985]. The small number of 
acknowledged audit failures was used to suggest that the current system 
was operating properly. 
The audit profession and others again argued that nonauditors had 
failed to understand the "proper" role of the auditor and the signficances 
that could be appropriately assigned to audit opinions. For example, 
Chenok [1986] noted that the Dingell hearings were concerned with 
whether auditors had effectively discharged their duties. He maintained 
that in order to answer this question one must understand the function of 
the independent audit—it was to report on the fairness with which 
financial statements presented corporate financial position [Chenok, 
1986]. The audit profession was to be judged on its own terms. 
As in the 1970s, auditors maintained that criticisms of the profession 
resulted from the public's failure to understand the "appropriate" role of 
the auditor and to accept the definition of this role as forwarded by 
auditors. From this perspective, an unqualified audit opinion was to be 
seen as providing reasonable assurance that financial statements 
conformed with generally accepted accounting principles rather than as 
providing evidence of a "clean bill of health." As such, an unqualified 
opinion might be appropriate for a company on the brink of financial 
collapse as long as the financial statements "reflect[ed] a fair and 
accurate picture of the company's financial condition" [New York Times, 
March 10, 1985].15 Furthermore, audits were not foolproof as the audit 
process relied upon a small sample of company transactions, many 
accounting matters were open to judgment [New York Times, March 10, 
1985; Chenok, 1986] and fraud was difficult to detect [Chenok, 1986]. 
Perhaps the following quote best summarizes the audit profession's 
position with regard to the controversy surrounding its work: 
A number of the questions raised in your proceedings [the 
Dingell Committee] and in our own studies of these matters are 
provoked by even more fundamental questions concerning 
auditor performance. These questions involve not how well the 
15However, if an entity was seen to be on the brink of collapse, the going 
concern assumption would be invalid and the use of historical cost accounting 
inappropriate according to generally accepted accounting principles. One 
wonders how many financial statements of companies that failed shortly after 
receiving an unqualified audit opinion were prepared using a basis of 
accounting other than historical cost. 58
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auditor has performed, but whether the auditor must undertake 
additional responsibilities to satisfy society's needs. Repeatedly 
it has been asserted that the public is seeking more from 
auditors in the area of protection from fraud and early warnings 
of business failure. In these respects, it would seem that there 
exists a gap between public expectations of the auditor's role 
and that which the auditor is, in fact, today performing. It is 
our belief that skepticism about the work of independent 
auditors has more to do with this mismatch. . . than it does with 
actual performance failures [cited in Miller, 1986, p. 34]. 
Again, the profession attempted to reframe concerns about its work as 
evidence of rising public expectations rather than as a controversy over 
the meanings to be assigned to audit reports and audit work and who 
would decide such meanings. Although concerns about the responsibility 
of auditors to detect fraud had arisen previously, the profession had not 
substantially altered its conception of its responsibilities or accepted an 
explicit responsibility to detect fraud or warn of imminent corporate 
collapses. It was still attempting to dominate definitions of its roles and 
responsibilities and to resist those forwarded by the Dingell committee 
and the press. Again, it formed a committee amidst the controversy. 
This committee was to "look at the current responsibilities of 
management, the auditors within and outside the company to detect 
fraud" [Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1985] and to develop methods 
to prevent and detect fraud among public and closely held companies 
[Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1985].16 The framing of the issue to 
be investigated by this panel suggested the answer desired by the 
AICPA. In particular, note the ordering of the individuals whose 
responsibilities were to be investigated: managers followed by internal 
auditors followed by external auditors. This ordering might be 
interpreted to reflect the profession's interest in maintaining that the 
detection of fraud was primarily management's responsibility. 
Congressional Intervention? Despite the arguments of the audit 
profession and SEC and the tentative actions taken by the audit 
profession, several Congresspersons introduced legislation to require 
16In announcing the formation of the panel, the AICPA denied that its 
formation was linked to the Dingell hearings that were due to begin on 
February 20, 1985: "We have been considering suggesting formation of this 
panel since last September, and we aren't doing this in reaction to the 
hearings" [Chenok in Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1985]. 59
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auditors to report to Government authorities suspicions of fraud or other 
illegalities noted during an audit [New York Times, May 23, 1986]. Rep. 
Wyden, a bill sponsor, indicated that "We've got to have an early 
warning system out there" [New York Times, May 23, 1986].17 Despite 
criticisms, the audit profession was still seen as a means to enhance the 
credibility of financial reporting. The bill did not propose replacing 
auditors with other experts. Instead, the responsibilities of the profession 
would be altered and expanded by this legislative action. The bill was 
of course, opposed by accounting firms as well as by the SEC and 
certain trade groups [Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1986]. 
In justifying this opposition, certain members of the profession 
expressed concerns that by requiring auditors to "blow the whistle" the 
relationship between the auditor and the client would be fundamentally 
altered [e.g., Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1986], "put[ting] us into an 
adversarial police-like role with corporations we currently service, and 
no one would benefit" [Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1986]. Auditors 
would become nothing more than "state-regulated examiners" when 
auditing "should be a private-sector activity, not an extension of the 
government's role" [Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1986]. Changing the 
role of independent auditors "to a police role" would detract from the 
primary responsibility of auditors—that of providing opinions as to 
whether corporate financial statements accurately reflect the "true" 
financial condition of a company [New York Times, May 23, 1986]. 
This proposed role for auditors would be "unworkable in relation to 
the auditor's principal objective of assessing the fair presentation of 
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles . . ." [Miller, 1986]. The bill was seen as "unworkable" in 
part because it conflicted with the auditing profession's definition of its 
own roles and responsibilities. From its perspective, auditors were to 
assess whether financial statements fairly presented financial condition 
and performance, a task that did not require them to search actively for 
fraud even if it might result in material misstatements of financial 
condition and performance. These comments suggest the reluctance of 
auditors to alter their conception of their roles and responsibilities and 
a desire to dominate the definitions of tasks and responsibilities within 
their jurisdiction. 
17
 Wyden later introduced a watered down version of the bill to require 
auditors to inform management about significant fraud and then to notify the 
SEC only if management failed to act properly upon such information within 
three months [Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1986]. 60
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Other prominent members of the auditing profession began to 
advocate altering professional responsibilities to include a responsibility 
for fraud detection. Change was seen as necessary in light of public 
expectations that auditors and the financial reporting system would warn 
the public of impending failures [Bertholdt, 1986]. Although the 
auditing profession was not described as failing to meet its public 
responsibilities, some believed it could no longer ignore the concerns 
raised by Congress, courts and the public. The expectations of the 
public were described as changed and so the roles and responsibilities of 
auditors and financial reporting should also ". . . be amended to provide 
the 'predictive' value the public now demands" [Connor, 1986, p. 77]. 
Perhaps, in these changed circumstances, auditors should accept 
responsibility to search for conditions that might lead to materially 
misstated financial statements and to reduce the risk that fraud would 
remain undetected [also see editorial by Connor in Wall Street Journal, 
December 3, 1985]. 
A limited role for the public in defining auditor's roles and 
responsibilities was also implied by the Treadway Commission report 
which recommended amending the auditor's opinion to indicate that 
auditors could provide reasonable but not absolute assurance that 
financial statements were free of fraud [New York Times, July 13, 
1987].18 This role was further recognized with the issuance of several 
new auditing standards in 1988 that were intended to improve auditor 
performance and communications, to address the concerns raised by the 
Treadway Commission report, and to narrow the expectations gap. 
Among other requirements, these standards enjoined auditors to be alert 
for illegal activities during the conduct of an audit, to design audit work 
to provide reasonable assurance of detecting material irregularities and 
errors, and to inform the board of directors of any such findings.19 These 
18
 This report also recommended that all public companies be required to 
have audit committees and that auditors be evaluated by their peers. However, 
the report contained little evidence that audit committees, peer reviews, or an 
altered audit opinion would educe the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting. Indeed, pTL which was embroiled in financial scandal had an audit 
committee. However, the committee was composed of individuals with little 
experience, and they served primarily to rubber stamp the fraudulent activity 
of pTL officers such as Jim Bakker [Tidwell, 1993]. 
19Rep. Wyden criticized the new standards on the detection of fraud as he 
believed auditors needed to report suspicions of fraud to regulators ] Wall 
Street Journal, February 10, 1988]. 61
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standards implied that, in designing audits, auditors could no longer 
presume that management was honest and expressed more affirmatively 
the responsibilities of auditors relative to fraud [Carmichael, 1988]. The 
audit report was also revised in an effort to articulate more clearly the 
responsibilities of auditors to detect errors and irregularities. In 
particular, the following sentence was added to the report: "Those 
standards [GAAS] require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of 
material misstatements" [Roussey, et al., 1988, p. 45, emphasis added]. 
The new audit standards also required auditors to evaluate whether there 
was substantial doubt about a company's ability to continue as a "going 
concern" and to disclose such doubts.20 
Reactions to these standards by auditors included criticisms of the 
lack of clarity in detailing the extent of the auditor's responsibility to 
detect fraud [Neebes & Roost, 1987]. Others continued to advocate the 
"right" of the profession to define its own tasks and responsibilities. For 
example, Elliott and Jacobson [1987, p. 18] asked: 
Should CPAs judge proposed standards primarily by whether 
they do or do not conform to public expectations...A 
professional either has expertise and integrity that separates him 
[sic] from the public or he [sic] does not. . . That does not mean 
that public expectations are unimportant, only that they should 
not be the basic criterion used to evaluate proposed auditing 
standards. The appropriate criterion is whether and to what 
degree a proposal would improve the effectiveness of audits of 
financial statements. This responds to the public need the 
profession serves, not to supposed expectations. And needs and 
expectations can differ. (Emphasis in original) 
Although Elliot and Jacobson raised some valid criticisms of the 
proposed expectation gap standards in the remainder of their article, their 
basic opposition to the new accounting standards was premised upon 
disagreement over who should define the roles and responsibilities of 
auditors. For these authors, auditors should decide the nature and 
content of the tasks within their professional jurisdiction. In turn, the 
20A business bulletin that briefly described the proposal preceding this 
new requirement indicated that predictions of survivability were "a 
responsibility auditors have tried to duck until now" [Wall Street Journal, 
December 11, 1986]. 62
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public must rely upon (and trust) auditors to assess public needs rather 
than capitulate to unwarranted public expectations. Yet, the authors did 
not explicate how one could distinguish between a need and an 
expectation nor did they suggest any measure by which to evaluate the 
effectiveness of audits. Instead, they presumed that audits were essential 
to the economy and were capable of addressing the warranted concerns 
of the public by continuing on those terms previously established by 
auditors. In other words, the lay public was to have little role in defining 
this work or its expected outcomes. 
In contrast to the events of the 1970s, critical attention was not 
deflected from the auditing profession. As the media reported on new 
corporate failures, questions about the usefulness of audit opinions, and, 
in particular, questions regarding how financial results could turn sour 
so quickly after the issuance of a "clean" audit report continued to be 
raised. Alleged audit failures included Regina Co., Allegheny 
International Inc., Crazy Eddie Inc., Coated Sales Inc., and American 
Biomaterials Corp. [Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1989]. The ZZZZ 
Best Co. collapse was thought to provide the ". . . most vivid proof that 
the present system for independent auditors reporting financial fraud" did 
not work [Dingell in Wall Street Journal, January 22, 1988]. This 
collapse was particularly troubling as ZZZZ Best had fired one audit 
firm and hired another shortly before its financial collapse. Although the 
first audit firm communicated its suspicions of financial misdeeds to the 
SEC within the allotted time (30 days), this communication occurred 
after ZZZZ Best had filed for bankruptcy protection {Wall Street 
Journal, January 22, 1988; New York Times, January 27, 1988]. 
The audit profession was also heavily criticized in the press and by 
Congress, the General Accounting Office and others for its perceived 
failure to warn the public of the impending savings and loan crisis, a 
warning some claimed might have reduced the costs arising from the 
savings and loan bailout [see e.g., Wall Street Journal, November 23, 
1987; Jacob, 1991; Sternberg, 1992; "Big 6,"Business Week, 1992]. 
The quality of audits was criticized in almost every major savings and 
loan failure.21 For example, after the failure of Lincoln Savings and 
Loan, one regulator commented: "Lincoln is proof positive that any 
thrift in America could obtain a clean audit opinion despite being grossly 
insolvent" [Wall Street Journal, November 21, 1989] and allegations 
21Indeed, a GAO report [1989] alleged that auditors had in some instances 
failed to verify independently management assertions about the collectibility 
of loans and criticized the quality of several audits that it investigated. 63
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were also made that Lincoln's auditors had approved transactions that 
were "accounting-driven" in order to generate profits [Wall Street 
Journal, August 7, 1989; November 15, 1989]. Congress held many 
hearings to investigate these savings and loan failures, at which auditors 
were frequent witnesses. Audit firms were confronted with numerous 
lawsuits and paid significant settlements and fines in the aftermath of the 
savings and loan crisis [see e.g., Wall Street Journal, December 30, 
1988; January 24, 1989; January 27, 1989; March 2, 1990; February 6, 
1991; June 14, 1991; July 5, 1991; December 6, 1992]. 
In the midst of this controversy and scrutiny, Rep. Wyden continued 
to advocate legislation to require auditors to report to regulators the 
uncorrected illegal acts of audit clients and to promote legislation 
designed to establish an early warning system to prevent future financial 
debacles such as that which had occurred in the savings and loan 
industry [Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 1990, October 5, 1990, August 
2, 1991; September 3, 1991; July 29, 1992]. Various versions of this 
bill continued to be opposed by assorted business groups receiving on 
again but mostly off again support from the AICPA. This continued 
opposition occurred within the context of a self-described audit "liability 
crisis". Audit firms were reported to have expended hundreds of millions 
of dollars in fines, legal fees and settlements in the wake of the savings 
and loan crisis and as a consequence of securities fraud class action suits 
filed after a fluctuation in stock prices. One 1992 commentary estimated 
that accounting firms faced 4,000 liability suits (twice the number in 
1985) and that the largest firms were spending $30 million each year in 
legal fees [McCarroll, 1992]. Indeed, lawsuits resulted in the 
bankruptcy of one major U.S. auditing firm in 1990. 
Legal liability exposure was now described as the profession's top 
concern [see e.g., Sternberg, 1992; "Big 6", Business Week, 1992; 
O'Malley, 1993a,b; Lochner, 1993; Epstein, 1993; Fogarty et al., 1994] 
and it portrayed itself as a scapegoat for bureaucratic errors and investor 
desires to avoid losses ["Big 6", Business Week, 1992; O'Malley, 
1993a]. Members of the profession sought liability reform as litigation 
was increasing ". . . at a rapid rate . . . but that would not be so bad if 
only incompetent or dishonest auditors were penalized by huge 
judgments. However, few intelligent observers believe that this is the 
case" [Lochner, 1993, p. 94], as "unwarranted litigation and forced 
settlements constitute the vast majority of claims against accountants" 
[O'Malley, 1993b, p. 84]. In 1992, the Big 6 accounting firms joined a 
coalition of professional organizations and business, the Coalition to 
Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits, to lobby in favor of federal 
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legislation to curb "abusive lawsuits alleging securities fraud" [Wall 
Street Journal, September 1, 1992]. 
This rising incidence of litigation against auditors was interpreted as 
a search by the public for absolute assurance and as a threat to the 
ability of the financial reporting system to provide relevant, reliable and 
credible information. From this perspective, the audit opinion was to be 
interpreted neither as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval" 
[McCarroll, 1992; Jacob, 1991] nor as suggesting that a particular 
company was a worthwhile or safe investment. Public expectations for 
audits were characterized as spiralling ever upward with regards to their 
ability to prevent fraud, mismanagement and business failure. Lochner 
[1993, p. 94] argued that "Far too much weight is being placed on 
accountants' work, in part because even some businessmen [sic] are 
ignorant of how audits are performed and what they represent. . . . audits 
cannot guarantee accuracy or the detection of fraud; they are not 
insurance policies." 
In this environment, auditors expressed concern as to whether 
legislation such as that proposed by Rep. Wyden would open the door 
for additional lawsuits against auditors—now by their clients 
[Silverstein, 1992; O'Malley, 1993a]. Further, some members of the 
profession began to characterize the necessity for liability reform as 
inseparable from auditors agreeing to undertake additional 
responsibilities [e.g., O'Malley, 1993a,b; Epstein, 1993]. This 
connection was made most explicitly by O'Malley [1993b, p.85] who 
argued that "any effort on the profession's part to meet these [public] 
expectations . . . always seems to generate newer and even more 
unrealistic expectations. . ." [O'Malley, 1993b, p. 85]. He also stated 
point-blank that "the accounting profession will not support any further 
legislative expansion of the independent auditor's responsibility without 
meaningful liability reform—for it is our view that increased obligations 
that create unreasonable expectations will almost certainly produce 
increased litigation" [O'Malley, 1993a, p. 7]. In other words, further 
participation by the public in defining the roles and responsibilities of 
auditors would carry a price—tort reform. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
With the passage of the "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995" [Public Law 104-67], the legal liability concerns of auditors 
were addressed. This new legislation enacted a system of proportionate 
liability under which auditors will pay damages based upon the share of 
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fraud for which they are held responsible. In exchange for this 
protection,22 the new law explicitly requires auditors to include 
"procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal 
acts that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of 
financial statement amounts", "procedures designed to identity related 
party transactions . . . or otherwise require disclosure. . ." and "an 
evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of the 
issuer to continue as a going concern during the ensuing fiscal year" 
[Public Law 104-67]. Furthermore, the law places a responsibility upon 
auditors to provide the SEC with a copy of their report of any illegal acts 
which have a material effect upon the financial statements when 
management fails to take "timely and appropriate remedial actions" and 
the Board of Directors has failed to inform the SEC of such a report 
within one business day after its receipt from the auditors [Public Law 
104-67]. Auditors, in exchange for liability reform, have accepted an 
affirmative duty to notify regulators of illegal acts in prescribed 
circumstances. Auditors must still implement the requirements of this 
legislation and the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA has issued 
a proposal providing additional performance requirements to enable 
auditors to meet their fraud-detection responsibility [Wall Street 
Journal, April 4, 1996]. 
After decades of vociferous opposition to accepting responsibilities 
to detect fraud, such a responsibility has now been enacted into law. 
Throughout much of the period examined in this paper (and before), 
auditors sought to dominate the definitions of their roles and 
responsibilities and to equate the conduct of an audit with the production 
of credible financial reporting. Auditors were no doubt correct in 
asserting that an audit could not always be depended upon to detect 
frauds nor to warn infallibly of imminent business failures. However, in 
defining their roles and responsibilities, they argued that neither of these 
responsibilities were elements of their tasks (at least prior to the issuance 
of certain auditing standards in 1988). In part, the failure of auditors to 
"educate" the public as to the value of an audit that excluded such tasks 
from their jurisdictional domain arose from cultural values with which 
audits were aligned. The public refused to accept that despite credible 
financial reporting significant fraud could remained undetected and 
corporations could fail soon after a "clean" audit report was issued. 
22It was reported that proponents of the bill including the Big 6 auditing 
firms " . . . spent millions of dollars on a massive lobbying campaign 
[Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1995] for this legislation. 66
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Auditors had perhaps little choice in terms of the cultural values 
with which to align their work. While the profession benefited greatly 
from the Securities Acts, growing rapidly after their passage [McCraw, 
1984], it was in another sense limited by these acts. This New Deal 
legislation did not fundamentally alter either the securities industry or 
public policy with respect to it. Instead, the legislation seemed designed 
to restore confidence in the industry and to encourage broad-based stock 
ownership. The legislation adhered to the "belief that shareholders are 
'owners'" who could participate effectively in corporate governance 
through disclosure and proxy provisions [Merino & Neimark, 1982, p. 
39]23 Although shareholders were not expected to participate in the day-
to-day operations of corporate enterprises, they would receive 
information about the uses of funds, earnings, assets and liabilities of 
corporations. Required disclosures would provide the light". . . so that 
ownership may know what is being don with its property" [Andrews, 
1932, p. 354]. Auditors were closely linked to these purposes by the 
requirement in these acts for an "independent" check upon the 
representations of management and the profession was thereby connected 
to the provision of credible financial reporting. 
The emphasis upon disclosure and financial reports as a means to 
control management seemed to require a third party to verify these 
reports.24 This verification may be seen as an additional mechanism to 
suggest that measures had been taken to prevent management 
appropriation of stockholder property. Auditors were to be the 
intermediaries [Miranti, 1990] between the investing public, the claimed 
owners of the firm, and possibly avaricious and unscrupulous 
management. As a consequence, the administrators of the Securities 
Acts were also dependent upon auditors. This dependence perhaps 
partially explains why the profession was able to limit its responsibility 
throughout much of the period examined. While the value of "credible 
financial reporting" might be used to criticize and question the 
profession, it also limited the actions of government and closely linked 
the State, the SEC and the audit profession.25 No alternatives were posed 
23Also see Blough [1939], who referred to shareholders as owners of the 
enterprise, and Ripley [1927]. 
24My thanks to Barbara Merino for her comments which have been 
integrated in this paragraph. 
25See Galambos [1982] on the formation of such triocracies. 67
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to replace auditors as monitoring devices for private property. Instead, 
the emphasis was placed again and again upon either questioning the 
auditors or upon installing particular techniques to suggest their 
independence from management. The profession was criticized but never 
threatened with replacement or extinction. 
So we see the development and installation of new self-regulatory 
practices during the 1970s occurring amidst questions about the 
responsibility to detect fraud or warn of imminent corporate failures. 
Similar questions were raised during the 1980s amidst a myriad of 
corporate failures and frauds (perhaps particularly those in the savings 
and loan industry). Auditors were again constructed as failing to 
accomplish the work they had defined for themselves and were 
confronted with renewed demands to alter their previously self-defined 
tasks. Even then, the profession was successful in obtaining payment in 
the form of liability reform in exchange for ceding some control over the 
definition of its responsibilities. This paper suggests the difficulties of 
altering such responsibilities for an entrenched and well-organized 
profession even in instances where the definitions it forwards may starkly 
contrast with those anticipated or expected by the public. 
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Abstract: This study reexamines the accounting profession's 
response to opportunities and incentives given it during 
three unique periods in its history to foster reliable 
accounting, reporting and auditing practices. By profession, 
we mean the auditors of publicly held companies as 
represented by the American Institute of Accountants and 
its predecessor, the American Association of Public 
Accountants (AAPA). We use two models of 
professionalism, the Functionalist and the Conflict models, 
to interpret the profession's response to these events. We 
find that both self interest and the public interest may have 
motivated many of the actions taken. These motivations are 
not, however, mutually exclusive and both may be used to 
interpret the same behavior. 
INTRODUCTION 
The accounting profession in the United States developed into its 
modern form by 1940. The American Institute of Accountants (AIA) 
was the national organization of accountants. A code of ethics was in 
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place and the AIA had disciplinary authority over its members based on 
that code. The AIA's Committee on Accounting Procedure, forerunner 
to the Accounting Principles Board and later the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, was responsible for setting accounting standards, 
albeit not mandatory at the time. A workable, sometimes uneasy, 
relationship existed between the profession and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. The state societies had licensing control over 
new CPAs, setting educational and experiential requirements, although 
most used the national examination written by the AIA [Miranti, 1990]. 
Annual audits of publicly traded companies were legally mandatory. 
At the beginning of the century, little of this was in place. There was 
no national organization of accountants of any size or influence [Previts 
and Merino, 1979]. The first state licensing legislation was passed in 
New York in 1896. Other states followed but licensing requirements 
varied, ranging from substantial experience, educational and examination 
requirements to virtually none. The minimal amount of regulation over 
accounting and auditing practice may be explained by the relative 
simplicity of accounting and a fairly small securities market. 
An explosion of mergers and consolidations at the beginning of the 
twentieth century accelerated the growth of accountancy. Knowledgeable 
and competent accountants were needed to handle these complex 
accounting transactions and the status of the fledgling discipline began 
to rise [Littleton and Zimmerman, 1962; and Previts and Merino, 1979]. 
Growing companies and expanding manufacturing industries also needed 
accountants to set up financial and cost accounting systems. With the 
later passage of tax legislation, accountants carved out a permanent 
place for their skills in the tax area. 
Until the passage of the Securities Acts, public corporations faced 
little independent oversight. Audits were largely voluntary despite 
spreading public ownership of stock although companies increasingly 
engaged auditors to attest to their annual financial reports [Merino et al, 
1994]. A large portion of audit work prior to 1920 was the balance sheet 
audit attesting to a company's collateral and liquidity to satisfy bankers 
who supplied most corporate financing [Chatfield, 1974]. Companies 
sometimes requested auditing services for their own information 
[Miranti, 1990]. The auditor's role was therefore strikingly different 
from that of today. Francis Pixby, at the 1904 World Congress of 
Accountants, said that the auditor's duty was to the company not to 
stockholders [Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 180]. In 1933, the accounting 
firm Seidman and Seidman wrote that neither audits nor financial reports 
were for the benefit of stockholders [Letter, 4/6/33]. Many prominent 
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people, including accounting practitioners and academics, criticized 
audited financial statements as unreliable for investment decisions 
[Smith, 1912; Kohler, 1926 & 1932; Berle, 1926; Hatfield, 1927; 
Ripley, 1927; Couchman, 1928; Robbins, 1929; Farr, 1933; Pecora, 
1939]. Management could choose from a variety of alternative practices 
and valuation methods without disclosure and could count on the support 
of their auditors. Changes of method were not reported. Despite 
criticism, the business sector was not interested in promoting a stringent 
monitoring system over their activities and were indignant at the 
suggestion. "Every businessman used his own accounting principles and 
fought like hell to sustain them" [Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 219]. 
The voluntary nature of the audit, the absence of authoritative 
accounting rules, and the weakness of auditors worked against the 
presentation of financial statements in accordance with accounting 
conventions considered to be sound according to textbooks and other 
guides of the time [Montgomery, 1926]. 
So long as the discontinuance of audits or change of auditors 
passes without comment from stockholders or creditors, the 
auditors are hampered in their efforts to make accounts as 
accurate and their certificates as complete and informative as 
possible. If auditors take too rigid a stand the directors will 
simply publish unaudited accounts or perhaps seek some more 
amenable auditors [May, 1915, p. 251] 
Twenty years later, Littleton [1935, p. 285-6] believed little had 
changed: "(Q)ualified to serve these men may be, but free to serve with 
a real independence they are not... When their powers of persuasion are 
exhausted, auditors have but little choice except acquiescing or 
resigning." 
PURPOSE 
This study examines the accounting profession's response to 
opportunities and incentives given it during three unique periods in its 
history to foster reliable accounting, reporting and auditing practices. By 
profession, we mean the auditors of publicly held companies as 
represented by the AIA and its predecessor, the American Association of 
Public Accountants (AAPA). We use original correspondence between 
the AIA, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and other published 
materials as evidence. 
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The profession's responses to these opportunities for change may 
have been motivated by self interest rather than by protection of the 
public interest as suggested by the rhetoric of the time and by some 
modern historians. Wootton and Wolk [1992], for example, offer a 
nonproblematic account of the development of the accounting profession 
that obscures the profession's battles to preserve its independence and 
extend its power. 
EVENTS TO BE DISCUSSED 
Three extended events in the profession's history provide the focus 
for this discussion. The first event is the reaction of the profession to the 
demands and regulatory threats posed by bankers, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) from around 
1912 to 1917. The second is the collaboration between the NYSE and 
the AIA as they worked to improve reporting practice in the face of 
impending regulation in the early 1930s. The third is the response of the 
profession to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 
1934-1939. All three events threatened accountancy's professional 
identity. Two models of professionalism are used to interpret the 
profession's actions. 
APPROACH USED TO ANALYZE THE EVENTS 
The functionalist and the conflict models of professionalism 
[Kultgen, 1988] help interpret the actions of accounting's emerging 
leadership within the AIA. Sociologists have used both models to study 
professions [e.g. Durkheim, 1957; Collins, 1979] and Hooks (1992) 
applied similar models in her analysis of events occurring more recently 
in accounting history. 
The functionalist model explains and predicts the behavior or 
characteristics of either an individual or a group but it is group activities 
that are of particular interest in this research. The primary assumption 
of this model is that the profession is devoted to the public interest, to 
human welfare. The service offered is important and complex requiring 
extensive education, training, experience and a commitment to lifetime 
learning. However, mastery of technical skills is not enough. The 
professional must develop and exercise judgement because client needs 
are highly individual and not amenable to textbook solutions. The 
complexity of these efforts means that only a professional can assess the 
quality of the work performed by another (Kultgen, 1988, p. 79, 81, 91, 
95). 
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Professional groups form to ensure quality. They determine what 
technical skills are needed, set standards for admission to the profession, 
provide opportunities for continual education and monitor the work of 
members through peer review and investigations of complaints. They 
write codes of conduct that describe the behaviors professionals should 
exhibit in their work and toward clients and other professionals. The 
desire to preserve quality leads the group to lobby for licensure to 
prevent the unqualified from practicing and harming the public (Kultgen, 
1988, p. 74, 85). 
Society gives the profession a license and a monopoly over practice 
because it values the service and believes that this will help the 
profession ensure high quality performance. Sustaining high quality is 
the duty of a profession that wishes to maintain its license, but it is also 
its desire so it willingly engages in self-monitoring activities. The 
benefits of monopoly are status and high fees but these are secondary to 
the rewards derived from a love of work and a desire to help others. The 
professional is judged therefore, not by the fees commanded but by the 
quality of the service provided (Kultgen, 1988, p. 84, 85, 95). 
The conflict model, which focuses on group behavior, assumes that 
self interest is the dominant motivation of a profession whose purpose it 
is to monopolize control over practice to secure status, power and 
economic gain. It predicts that practitioners will organize and, as a 
group, position themselves as a profession to secure the benefits of 
monopoly. 
Organizing, unrelenting promotion of the value and need of their 
services, writing a code of conduct and setting standards for admission 
are actions taken to convince those in power that a profession deserving 
a license is in place and, once acquired, that it deserves to keep it. Codes 
of conduct may be unenforceable and disciplinary mechanisms weak, but 
the group can point to them as evidence of their concern with the public 
welfare. Prohibitions of contingency fees, competitive bidding and 
advertising serve to create a professional appearance but also protect the 
elite professionals from losing market share to newcomers, even those 
admitted to the professional group. Limiting access to the profession 
through examination and other requirements is not motivated by public 
welfare but by securing economic gain [Kultgen, 1988, p. 122, 123, 
130]. 
Relationships with third parties are important. "The status of the 
individual professional and the entire profession is tied to the status of 
those served" [Kultgen, 1988, p. 128]. The social standing acquired from 
proximity to corporate management or other influential groups, as well 79
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as the fees generated, limit the willingness of the profession to jeopardize 
those relationships by imposing too restrictive standards of practice upon 
them. 
In conclusion, the key to both models is motivation. It is possible for 
an action to be in the public interest while at the same time be an element 
in the profession's negotiation for market power. Since motivation is 
unobservable, and the models predict behaviors that are not mutually 
exclusive, they may be used as alternative explanations for the same 
events. 
THE EVENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THEM 
Event 1: Bankers and Federal Agencies Demand Change 
Bankers in the second decade of this century asked for improvements 
in auditing and accounting. They accused small businesses in particular 
of issuing misleading and unreliable financial statements out of either 
ignorance or deceit without resistance from their auditors [Smith, 1912; 
AIA Special Committee Reports, 1912-1914]. Bankers wanted certain 
auditing procedures to be consistently and universally applied [AAPA, 
Yearbook-1913:159ff] and offered to support the AAPA in its attempts 
to standardize practice. Colley [1914] and Peple [1916], representatives 
of the banking community, strongly supported the audit of financial 
statements and expected auditors to examine carefully accounts 
receivable and inventories not only for their numerical accuracy but for 
their value. 
Edward Hurley, chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
supported these views. Hurley called for auditing instructions: "Which 
would serve as a guide to accountants, bankers, credit men and the 
business public...that...would at least show clearly the level below which 
the accountant could not go and certify the alleged verity of the 
accounts" [Editorial, 1929, p. 357]. He [1916] also recommended to the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) that a federal audit 
bureau check the credentials and reliability of audit practitioners who 
wished to practice before the FRB and name those approved, zone 
experts. 
Hurley also favored uniform accounting, believing that it would 
make financial statements easier to understand and comparable within an 
industry. Uniform accounting meant an industry-wide chart of accounts, 
a standard definition of what was to enter into those accounts and 
uniform cost accounting standards. Many anticipated that cost 
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accounting standards would end cutthroat competition believing that 
businesses recklessly and ruinously cut prices because they did not know 
their costs [Jordan and Harris, 1921; Dohr et al., 1935]. 
Cost accounting standards did not disturb financial accountants but 
Hurley went further, he wanted to set rules for asset and liability 
valuations. This appalled accountants who believed that such standards 
would grossly misrepresent companies operating in different economic 
environments. They worried that standardization would degrade the 
profession to mere bookkeeping [Previts and Merino, 1979]. 
The 1915 -1917 Minutes of the AAPA and the AIA show that the 
leadership resolved to deflect this potential regulation. To do so, they had 
to demonstrate control over the level of competence of their own 
practitioners. The AIA was formed (and the AAPA dissolved) in 1916 
as a national organization of accountants. Practitioners could gain 
admission and certification by passing a qualifying examination and 
acquiring experience. The Institute elected a board of examiners, 
published "Rules of Professional Conduct," and established a committee 
on professional ethics to exercise disciplinary powers over the 
membership.1 
To meet the challenges to audit practice, the AIA gave the Federal 
Reserve Board a document called Uniform Accounting which the Board 
later published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin of 1917.2 While its title 
and preface suggested that it standardized accounting methods, it did 
not.3 The FRB reissued the document in 1918 under the title Approved 
Methods for Preparation of Balance-Sheet Statements deleting all 
references to uniform accounting. As a result of these actions, Hurley 
dropped the idea of federal registration of accountants [Carey, 1969]. 
1It is probably an exaggeration to assume that the FTC and FRB dropped 
these proposals solely because of the efforts of the profession. The Wilson 
presidential campaign and the entry of the U.S. into World War I necessarily 
deflected the interests of the administration. 
2It was an adaptation of a Price Waterhouse internal control memorandum 
that dealt with auditing procedures for small and medium-sized firms 
[DeMond, 1951]. 
3Both Chatov [1975] and Carey [1969] believe that the AIA took 
advantage of Hurley's confusion over the difference between uniform 
accounting and uniform auditing. 81
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1997, Vol. 24, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 1997
72 The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997 
Wootton and Wolk [1992, p. 6] claim that this document "hastened 
the establishment of minimum auditing standards by many accounting 
firms." In fact, Approved Methods reduced them [Merino et al. 1994]. 
It gave management an authoritative source with which to avoid 
procedures that many thought were vital [Carey, 1969; Chatov, 1975; 
Previts and Merino, 1979]. The auditor was to rely upon client assertions 
for most asset-related information including inventories - despite bankers' 
requests [Smith, 1912; Colley, 1914; Peple, 1916]. Approved Methods 
[10] told auditors to confirm accounts receivable "if time permits and 
clients do not object." Internal control evaluations were made optional 
and large companies were largely exempt because good controls were 
presumed to exist. Deference to management was made official. 
Approved Methods recommended a short, standard audit certificate 
despite banking community complaints that the short form audit report 
conveyed little or no information about scope limitations or other 
deficiencies of the audit process.4 The AIA maintained that a short form 
report was less confusing than the longer, unstandardized report that 
smaller audit firms preferred which often contained the audit procedures 
followed and actions taken. The AIA claimed that the excessive verbiage 
in these reports had at times concealed the absence of major auditing 
procedures. 
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 1 
Until this time, accountancy only loosely met the definition of a 
profession. Under criticism by creditors and facing possible regulation 
by Federal agencies, AIA welcomed these incentives to professionalize 
practice as predicted by the functionalist model. It was unthinkable that 
a government agency, ignorant of accounting, might determine who was 
qualified. It should be noted that these were only first steps. The AIA 
was weak. Although the leadership of the AIA was composed of partners 
from the largest accounting firms, it did not represent the majority of 
practicing accountants and, in fact, many resented the organization for 
its elitism [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti, 1990]. 
The recommended report read as follows: "I have audited the accounts 
of Blank and Co. for the period from to and I certify that the above 
balance sheet and statement of profit and loss have been made in accordance 
with the plan suggested and advised by the Federal Reserve Board and in my 
opinion set forth the financial condition of the firm at and the results of 
its operations for the period" [Uniform Accounting, 24]. 82
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Accounting knowledge had arrived at a level of complexity that 
called for education and experience. In view of the complaints of 
incompetency and collusion voiced by the banking community, and the 
wide variations in certification requirements of the state bodies, the 
AIA's board of examiners recommended that candidates for certification 
complete a 'preliminary education' (a controversial requirement left 
undefined), five years of experience (with exceptions) and an 
examination. Certification would give the public assurance that these 
practitioners possessed a level of competency upon which they could 
rely, an assurance unavailable in some states where certification 
standards were low. These controls may be construed as the first 
attempts of the profession on a national basis to contract with the state 
(represented by the FTC and FRB). In the long term, only licensure 
would ensure that the profession could control the quality of the services 
offered. 
The AIA did not attempt to set accounting standards or to limit 
management choices. The leadership placed a high premium on expert 
judgement and expected the professional to oppose management only 
rarely, using powers of persuasion. Since audits were voluntary, there 
were few other options. There was no process in place where 
practitioners might debate accounting practices and find consensus. 
Given the AIA's lack of influence over a wide range of practitioners, 
limitations on management choice would have to wait until power was 
consolidated. Until then, the AIA could only begin to control the 
qualifications of its own members, build their reputations and increase 
the confidence of the public. As for auditing practice, the AIA again 
relied heavily on professionalism. Approved Methods offered guidelines 
but retained professional judgement as the preserve of the auditor who 
alone could act in the interest of outside users. 
Conflict Theory Interpretation of Event I 
Many of the actions taken by the AIA may have been motivated by 
self interest, as attempts to gain market control and limit audit practice. 
The examination was controlled by an elite group and could restrict the 
number of those admitted and the type of person admitted. Indeed, there 
were many complaints [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti, 1990]. A 
national organization could dislodge competitors and avoid competition. 
By successfully negotiating with federal agencies, the profession not only 
avoided regulation but gained status. Though not a true license, the 
perception of AIA members as purveyors of higher quality service, 
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would disadvantage those practicing outside of the purview of the 
national organization. 
The code of ethics prohibited advertising and competitive bidding. 
While leading practitioners advanced compelling arguments in support 
of the bans [Editorial, 1914 & 1915], smaller firms viewed them as 
deliberate constraints on the expansion of their practices [Letter to the 
Editor, 1914; Shorrock, 1914]. The code, while a symbol of professional 
practice, functioned to preserve the market power of the elite firm. 
Advocacy of a standardized short form report also worked to the 
detriment of the small firm. Those desiring membership in the AIA were 
barred from differentiating their services in a positive way. Byington and 
Sutton [1991] said that buyers rely on brand names as a surrogate for 
quality and recent research shows that a differentiation of quality is 
perceived by buyers of auditing services between the Big 6 and non Big 
6 firms. Indeed, banker J. Cannon wrote " . . . we strongly advocate and 
prefer to buy the paper of those concerns whose accounts are audited by 
established firms of accountants" [Colley, 1914, p. 425]. The AIA 
effectively cut off most of the avenues available to the small firm to 
attract audit clients. 
Claims of specialized knowledge and expertise may mask a self 
interest motivation. The profession cultivated the perception that they 
possessed information difficult to acquire and reliably exercised and 
monitored only by themselves. Educational requirements, examination 
and an esoteric vocabulary perpetuated this notion. The idea that these 
practices might be standardized was understandably anathema. If 
accounting could be standardized then it was a technical discipline which 
could be performed by anyone, threatening the emerging profession. 
With the support of bankers and the federal agencies, the 
accountancy profession might have made progress in setting accounting 
and auditing standards. But the leadership resisted, arguing that uniform 
accounting practices would mislead and that uniform auditing practices 
would reduce audit practice to the lowest common denominator. Only the 
experienced professional could understand the audit requirements of a 
unique accounting system and pass on the appropriateness of the 
accounting choices made [AAPA Yearbook, 1916]. If these functions 
could be exercised by rote, then accountancy was not a profession. 
Deference to corporate management maintained the profession's 
relationship with those with whom there were social and financial 
linkages. Claims that egregious practices would be dealt with in a period 
when there were no authoritative standards can hardly be taken seriously. 
Approved methods provided protection against liability by giving 
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auditors a defense against non-performance of tasks and for reliance on 
management. 
Event 2: Collaboration of the ALA and the NYSE from 1931-1933 
Although George O. May, representing the AIA, had established an 
advisory relationship with the NYSE in 1927 (May, 1962), it was not 
until it was clear that the depression was unlikely to abate and that the 
public anger directed towards business was rising [Krooss, 1970] that 
the Exchange awoke to the value of instituting change. Some form of 
federal regulation over corporate reporting practices appeared imminent 
[Kohler, 1934]. Hoxsey [1931, p. 2ff], executive assistant of the 
Committee on Stock List of the NYSE, wrote to the AIA and warned 
that "some form of regulation is inevitable. . . if we act now. . . we may 
retard unwarranted intrusions." 
The extant correspondence reveals that neither organization was 
anxious to take the lead. Hoxsey [1931] asked the AIA's Special 
Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges5 to assume 
responsibility for the suitability of management-selected accounting 
principles and for a definition of full and fair disclosure. The AIA 
responded that "the primary responsibility for selection of principles and 
scope of disclosure must remain that of directors and officers of the 
corporation" [AIA, 1931]. 
With income statement data becoming more and more important to 
stockholders, Hoxsey asked auditors to insist that stockholders be 
advised as to the sources of income, separately disclosing extraordinary 
items, and to discourage management from using reserves to smooth 
income. The AIA Committee replied that auditors lacked the power to 
mandate such disclosures [Letter, 5/19/31]. 
The AIA Committee in turn [Letter, 9/22/32] asked the Exchange to 
educate the public about the limitations of financial statements, 
particularly their historical nature, to require that accounting methods be 
disclosed and be consistently applied and that extraordinary items and 
subsidiary income be segregated from ordinary income. They 
recommended an annual audit and that every company adhere to five 
broad principles of accounting which they believed were generally 
5
 The member of the committee included Archibald Bowman, Arthur 
Carter, Charles Couchman, Samuel Leidesdorf, William Lybrand, and George 
May—all representatives of major accounting firms. 
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accepted (see Appendix). The Exchange accepted all of the Committee's 
recommendations but one, disclosure of accounting methods. Whitney, 
the president of the NYSE, wrote to the presidents of all listed companies 
that financial statements issued in connection with listing applications 
made after July 1, 1933 had to be audited. He added that, to serve as 
useful safeguards for investors, "audits should be adequate in scope and 
that the responsibility assumed by the auditor should be defined" [Letter, 
1/31/33]. He asked all companies to secure from their auditors a letter 
addressing most of the points made by the AIA's Committee: 
1) was the audit as extensive as that outlined by the 
publication Verification of Financial Statements (VFS) (the 
1929 revision of Approved Methods), 
2) had all subsidiaries been audited or their relative 
importance to the parent company explained, 
3) had the auditors received all information requested, 
4) were the financial statements fairly presented, 
5) were accounting methods consistently applied and, 
6) did the methods used conform to accepted accounting 
practices? (see Appendix.) 
Nine major accounting firms jointly responded to the announcement. 
Although supportive of the specific points outlined above, they wanted 
to clarify the some of the limits of the audit engagement. They reiterated 
[Letter, 2/24/33] that the guidelines outlined by VFS were not intended 
to uncover fraud and that to do so would require an audit so expensive 
as to outweigh any advantages. To avoid fraud, management was 
responsible for establishing and maintaining an adequate system of 
internal control. They reminded the Exchange that the auditor 
traditionally focused on the balance sheet and would continue to do so, 
guarding against overstatements of income not by extensive testing of 
income accounts but by assuring the correctness of beginning and ending 
balance sheets accounts. They reemphasized the importance of 
consistency rather than uniformity of method. The audit report stated 
that management's representations were reasonable, not all inclusive nor 
necessarily optimal, in the auditor's view. The auditor could not replace 
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his judgement for that of management and could only qualify the report 
if the choices were very unsound. 
Hoxsey was not satisfied by these circumscriptions of responsibility. 
He insisted that auditors "should satisfy themselves that the system of 
internal check provides adequate safeguards" and "accept the burden of 
seeing that the income received and the expenditures made are properly 
classified in so far as the facts are known to them" [Letter, 10/24/33]. He 
also asked the AIA to develop a clearer and more informative auditor's 
report. 
The AIA found Hoxsey's income statement requests reasonable but 
were careful in their response to the question of internal control [Letter, 
12/21/33]. "It is always a matter of executive judgment to weigh the 
risks against which safeguards are desirable against the cost of providing 
safeguards." Claiming that accountants evaluated internal control as a 
integral part of the audit, they cited VFS. "The scope of the work 
indicated in these instructions includes. . . an examination of the 
accounting system for the purpose of ascertaining the effectiveness of the 
internal check." It is noteworthy that the adverb "incidentally" which 
appears in VFS in place of the three dots is omitted in the letter to the 
Exchange. The use of the word "incidentally" weakened the guidelines. 
It suggested that checking controls was likely to happen during the 
examination, but not that it must happen. 
The liability that might rise out of the wording of the audit report 
worried accounting firms. May sent a draft of a revised report to the 
major firms for comment and received responses from Leidesdorf, from 
Barrow, Wade and Guthrie, Haskins and Sells, and Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell. Leidesdorf [Letter, 11/17/33] wrote that the statement 
"supplied with all the explanations and information which are necessary" 
be replaced by "based on our examination and information furnished to 
us." He warned that the former did not recognize the possibility that 
management might have withheld information leaving all responsibility 
with the auditor. Carter of Haskins and Sells [Letter, 11/24/33] wrote 
that the report should clearly state the relationship between the auditor 
and the client. 
I refer particularly to the theory of relationship which holds the 
client to be the author of the financial statements and regards 
the accountant as the reviewer of such statements.. This position, 
in addition to having possible legal value, is, as we have learned 
. . . , an invaluable one when controversies arise with clients as 
to the disclosures which should be made. 87
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The format of the standard unqualified audit report was finally approved 
at the beginning of 1934 after considerable debate. 
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 2 
Affiliation with the NYSE gave the leadership a rich opportunity to 
serve the public. With the support of the NYSE, they could resolve some 
of the major issues of accounting practice and presentation and begin a 
process of expanding public knowledge. The leaders of the AIA knew 
that some investors misunderstood the nature of the financial statements 
and the audit report, assuming that the current valuations comprised the 
balance sheet and the report testified to an enterprise's future success. 
Understanding their historical nature was an important component in 
becoming an informed investor. However, the profession needed the 
Exchange's help in publicizing this perhaps because of a lack of funds or 
a lack of access to the public. Whether the Exchange actually embarked 
on a program of educating the public is unknown. 
The profession's unwillingness to expand its responsibility for 
accessing internal control and the detection of fraud was not unrealistic, 
reflecting its knowledge that both were controlled by management. To 
ensure either exceeded their ability. It would not be in the public's 
interest to suggest otherwise. The AIA strongly preferred disclosure and 
consistency of accounting method over uniformity for two reasons. They 
believed that firms were unique and that corporate management could 
best determine which methods most clearly reflected performance and 
condition. Disclosure of methods should provide sufficient information 
for the informed user. They also argued that, taken over time, differences 
between accounting methods were unimportant if those methods were 
consistently applied. Although the AIA only convinced the Exchange to 
require a statement of consistency, at least they minimized a common 
method of manipulating financial statements. The Exchange also 
supported the AIA's opinion on significant issues, such as limiting the 
practice of smoothing income by using surplus accounts to bypass the 
income statement (see Appendix). In this way, the profession could 
protect the investing public from significant and common 
misrepresentations. 
Conflict Theory Interpretation of Event 2 
Collaboration with the NYSE benefitted the AIA considerably. First, 
the formal association with the Exchange was prestigious. Second, the 
NYSE's annual audit requirement granted a contract to accountants 
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ensuring future income. Although the Exchange did not limit audits to 
AIA members, it is likely that its relationship with the AIA bolstered 
member firm's relative power in the accounting market, at least among 
listed corporations. Third, recognizing VFS as the auditing standard 
distinguished the AIA as the authoring institution. Fourth, despite the 
rising profile of the AIA and auditing services, there was no increase in 
auditor responsibilities beyond those supported by the NYSE and 
therefore, no substantive change in the auditor-client relationship. 
The public collaboration with the NYSE created a perception that 
the profession was working to improve the financial reporting function. 
However, little changed. The accounting principles agreed to were few, 
and although 'few' in and of itself is not negative adjective, many of the 
most controversial issues of the period including the treatment of 
depreciation, bond discount and no par stock remained unsettled and no 
mechanism for resolving these issues was put in place. Audits, though 
required, still left major tasks optional and corporate management 
retained the prerogative of preferability choices without disclosure. The 
profession had raised its profile, potentially increased the market share 
of major member firms, and appeared to be working in the public interest 
while minimizing any expansion of its own responsibility. 
Event 3: The SEC and the AIA 1934-1939 
The years 1934-1939 were critical ones. It was possible that the 
traditional practice of accountancy would not survive and the profession 
had to work to maintain its identity. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission, created in 1934, had absolute authority over accounting 
matters. It could determine who could practice before it. It could set 
accounting standards and could require auditors to take responsibility for 
the choice of accounting methods. 
SEC members, inexperienced but determined to put the Act into 
operation, decided that the best approach was to work with existing 
professional bodies. They solicited the profession's help in designing the 
forms needed to satisfy the Act's regulations, in appointing suitable 
commissioners, and encouraged them to set accounting standards. The 
AIA was slow to act on the latter. Consequently, the SEC frequently and 
publicly criticized the profession for the accounting treatments found in 
submissions [Landis, 1936; Blough, 1937a]. Members [Landis, 1936; 
Blough, 1937c; Mathews, 1937; Healy, 1938] threatened that the SEC 
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might have to standardize accounting.6 They displayed irritation at the 
profession's inability to monitor management, its unwillingness to take 
responsibility for accounting presentations, and its repeated issuance of 
uninformative or misleading audit reports. They complained that the 
often-cited generally accepted accounting principles did not exist and 
questioned the qualifications of some appearing before them [Blough, 
1937a, 1937b, 1938; Werntz, 1939]. The SEC began issuing Accounting 
Series Releases (ASR) in 1937, setting accounting rules for registrants. 
The AIA fought these encroachments. It supported corporate 
assertions that disclosure of sales, cost of sales, gross profit, and salaries 
would give too much information to competitors. The AIA's Committee 
on Cooperation with the SEC reproached the SEC for not accepting 
these claims. Chairman Wellington argued that this information "might 
be damaging to the company and therefore of injury to the stockholders" 
[AIA Minutes, 1936, p. 53]. 
Despite its threats of standardization [Landis, 1936; Healy, 1938], 
the agency eventually settled for consistency and disclosure of method 
[Merino and Coe, 1978]. Curiously, the SEC did not mandate that a 
statement of accounting policies appear in the annual reports to 
shareholders. Although such a statement was required in the 10K, the 
latter was not usually mailed to shareholders. Enforcing fair disclosure 
of accounting methods therefore made no sense [Kaplan and Reaugh, 
1939]. 
The SEC's ASRs #1-3 were not new accounting standards but rather 
formalizations of the accounting rules written earlier by the AIA in 
agreement with the NYSE (Coffey, 1976). In 1938, they issued ASR #4. 
This stated that financial statements filed with them would be deemed 
misleading if they lacked substantial authoritative support and left the 
determination of authoritative support to the accounting profession. The 
SEC adopted the role of endorser and enforcer of the AIA rules (Coffee, 
1976, p. 220). 
Regarding audit practice, the AIA issued Examination of Financial 
Statements [1936]. It did not expand audit procedures over internal 
6
"The impact of almost daily tilts with accountants, some of them called 
leaders of their profession, often leaves little doubt that their loyalties to 
management are stronger than their sense of responsibility to the investor. 
Such an experience does not lead readily to acquiescence in the pleas recently 
made by one of the leaders of the accounting profession that the form of 
statement can be less rigidly controlled and left more largely to professional 
responsibility alone" (Landis, 1939). 90
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control, inventories or accounts receivable. Samuel Broad, Chairman of 
the AIA Committee charged with revising VFS, said that VFS had been 
criticized as "too mandatory in its presentation" a defect eliminated in 
this document which emphasized flexibility and judgement [Broad, 1936, 
p. 58-9]. The document reasserted the profession's position that 
disclosure was a management prerogative and that the auditors would 
only rarely issue qualified reports. The audit procedures, the extent of 
disclosures and the accounting principles and practices set out in this 
document were "only those which we believed were pretty generally 
agreed to. . .we did not try to break new ground" [Broad, 1936, p. 59-
60]. 
The AIA remained committed to the short-form standard audit report 
[Letter, 1935; Couchman, 1939]. The AIA Committee on Cooperation 
with the SEC debated the wording extensively [AIA Minutes 1939, p. 
166,170,172]. The Committee wanted a format acceptable to the SEC 
which limited auditor responsibility. The Committee on Auditing 
Procedure made only a few cautiously worded changes to the audit 
report approved in 1939 (Kohler, 1941). The report minimized liability 
more than it provided information to investors. 
Why (did SEC abdicate its power? Some historians insist it did not. 
McCraw [1982] is persuaded that the SEC was entirely successful in 
negotiating substantive change on behalf of stockholders with both the 
accounting profession and the NYSE. Coffee (1976) is slightly less 
sanguine but overall remains confident that the results of the SEC and 
AIA collaboration were successful. Others, more informed about 
accounting, insist all changes were merely symbolic [Merino and 
Neimark, 1987; Chatov, 1975]. 
One reason is that the AIA strengthened itself. Attacked by the 
American Association of University Instructors in Accounting (AAUIA) 
[see Kohler's scathing 1934 editorial] which, with the blessing of SEC 
commissioner Robert Healy [1938], might have preempted the AIA in 
setting accounting standards, the AIA decided to reassert its leadership 
in this area. In 1936 the AIA completed a difficult merger with the rival 
American. Society of Certified Public Accountants (AS CPA), a national 
accounting body of about the same size thereby deflecting a potential 
alliance between that group and the academics of the AAUIA. Now 
larger, representing about a third of accountants nationwide, and with a 
claim to expanded self-monitoring, the new AIA could act from strength. 
They formed the Committee on Accounting Procedure in 1938 to study 
and write accounting standards [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti, 
1990]. Thus, the AIA acted in accordance with the agency's wishes. 
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Another reason may have been that the political tide was shifting to 
the right. Business found that it was again gaining power. The economy 
appeared to be improving, if slowly, and the Supreme Court had declared 
major New Deal legislation unconstitutional. All of business wanted to 
avoid further government regulation. In this atmosphere, it may have 
been expedient for the SEC to back off. 
The ALA now represented a broader constituency and established a 
standard-setting body. The SEC retained their declamatory speeches 
keeping their real power as a constant threat. They continued to issue 
stop orders if particularly egregious accounting presentations were filed 
but, as of 1938, they left accounting matters to the accountants. 
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 3 
The functionalist model predicts that professionals will actively 
protect the public interest but does not require the existence of a formal 
professional organization. The AIA, up until this point, trusted in the 
professionalism of individual practitioners, attempting only to ensure that 
they had been effectively educated and were experienced. Circumstances 
forced the AIA to move the profession to another level. The SEC could 
legally appropriate control over audit practice and accounting matters, 
a possibility which threatened placing nonexperts in the position of 
judging a complex discipline. To protect the public, it became necessary 
for the AIA to convince the SEC that it was best to keep auditing and 
accounting in the hands of professionals. To do so, it was imperative that 
they be able to influence and monitor practitioners since the status quo 
projected disunity and carried the stigma of competition. Unlike other 
businesses, competition in a profession is viewed negatively, suggesting 
that profits are more important than public interest. The merger with the 
ASCAP doubled the AIA's membership and probably included most of 
those who audited public companies. This gave the AIA the ability to 
monitor those likely to appear before the SEC. 
The profession believed that unique environments call for varied 
accounting methods and that standardization across dissimilar industries 
would be misleading at best. Consequently, the leadership first fought the 
SEC's threats of regulation by arguing convincingly for consistency and 
disclosure of methods, which the SEC soon required, as opposed to 
uniformity. 
The Securities Acts did not give power to the profession, but did 
confer on it responsibility and substantial liability. If the profession were 
to act in the public interest, it needed power. This it received, when the 
SEC delegated that authority in ASR #4. With few exceptions, the 
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agency has supported the AIA and the decisions of its successor bodies. 
With this in hand, accountancy's governing bodies could seek consensus 
on matters of general interest and this they tried to do by establishing the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure. Though in hindsight this 
Committee may not have been wholly effective (Previts and Merino, 
1979, 269), its formation and purpose was in the public interest. 
Conflict Theory Interpretation 
The conflict model is also informative. The 1934 Securities Act 
handed accountancy a market.7 The AIA wanted to monopolize it and it 
did so by professionalizing its image. The merger strengthened the AIA's 
negotiating position with the SEC. It now had influence over and 
appeared able to monitor a substantial constituency. Although often 
openly criticized by members of the SEC, the AIA turned some of the 
criticisms to their advantage. They requested, and the SEC agreed 
[Report, 1937], that questionable accounting questions and misleading 
audit certificates be forwarded to them for comment and resolution. This 
gave the AIA additional authority, bringing unsatisfactory reports of 
both member and non-member audit firms under their jurisdiction. 
The formation of the Committee on Accounting Procedure was a 
unifying one. It included AIA members, ex-SEC commissioner Carmen 
Blough, and members of the AAUIA who had frequently criticized the 
AIA. The AIA thus eliminated by incorporation, its challengers to 
accounting setting while creating a body too large to come to consensus 
on controversial issues thus retaining many alternative practices (i.e 
treatment of bond discount and of gains or losses on retirement of bonds) 
and maintaining management freedom. They avoided proactive, positive 
improvements in audit practice. Improvements were to come subsequent 
to the embarrassment of McKesson-Robbins. No significant changes 
appeared in the auditor's certificate. The AIA therefore negotiated a 
successful relationship with the SEC, an agency that posed a definite 
threat and in doing so increased its prestige and consolidated its power 
without altering accounting, the audit function or the relationship of 
auditors with corporate management. 
7It is possible that the audit requirement was added as a result of back 
room lobbying [Miranti 1990]. 
93
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1997, Vol. 24, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 1997
84 The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997 
Postscript: McKesson Robbins Expands Audit Procedures 
Until the McKesson Robbins fraud came to light in 1939, auditing 
guidelines were ambiguous regarding receivables, inventories and 
internal controls. Even sophisticated users were unaware that auditors 
did not physically inspect inventories. Hoxsey, the Secretary of the 
NYSE, was furious to learn that the auditors had used the "testing" 
phrase to limit the scope of audit with respect to receivables and 
inventories [Correspondence, 1939]. 
. . . it simply did not occur to me to doubt that inventories and 
receivables were spot-checked to a sufficient degree to make the 
auditors feel warranted in giving the financial statements 
approval...I did not know that the statement 'but we did not 
make a detailed audit of the transactions' covered such omission 
[Correspondence, 2/22/39]. 
The McKesson Robbins case resulted in increasing auditor 
responsibilities significantly. For the first time, a professional 
pronouncement, "Extension of Audit Procedures" (adopted by the AIA 
council on May 9, 1939) instructed auditors to go beyond the books 
requiring inventory verification, accounts receivable confirmation and an 
assessment of internal control. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Historical evidence can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
Motivation is not observable and formal statements may not be taken at 
face value. Certainly an interpretation that assumes that all change is 
evolutionary and that evolutionary change is progress towards the good 
must be challenged. So it is with the development of the accounting 
profession. One may interpret the adoption of a code of ethics, the 
establishment of educational standards, the creation of a national 
organization with power of self regulation as actions taken to promote 
the public interest. At the same time, these actions do control the 
profession, limit entry to it and secure high economic rents from so 
doing. 
There is no doubt that accounting and auditing are learned skills that 
require the exercise of judgement. But the profession rarely articulated 
what audit services were meant to accomplish stressing instead what 
could not be done and repeating, rather unsatisfactorily, that audit 
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judgements were nothing more than opinions. The AIA was not proactive 
in setting audit standards for critical areas, resisted setting accounting 
standards, declined to clarify the responsibility of the audit firm and 
deferred to the desires of corporate management. Whether these choices 
were made because the profession sincerely believed that the auditor's 
professional judgement must always predominate over standards and 
regulations to ensure reliable reports or whether they were chosen in 
order to sustain the status quo in regards to relationships with corporate 
management is a matter of interpretation. 
Accountancy today is without doubt a profession, carrying with it 
all the characteristics that one might choose to define a profession. It is 
also true that accountancy faces similar criticisms to those it received in 
the past. What is the auditor's responsibility? Has the auditor failed if a 
firm collapses and he or she issued an unqualified report just before the 
collapse? Are the battles to deflect liability attempts to avoid 
responsibility or efforts to restore justice in an unjust system? Should the 
accountant 'blow the whistle' or are quitting or issuing a qualified report 
still the only options available? There is still some doubt about the 
identity of the client. The responses to these questions made by the 
profession, as similar responses were made in the past, will likely be 
claimed by the profession as in the public interest and by critics as in the 
interest of the profession itself. The truth, whatever it may be, is likely 
to lie somewhere in between. 
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APPENDIX 
Statement of Certain Accounting Principles Recommended by 
Committee of American Institute of Accountants on Cooperation With 
Stock Exchanges 
1. Unrealized profit should not be credited to income account of the 
corporation either directly or indirectly, through the medium of charging 
against such unrealized profits amounts which would ordinarily fall to 
be charged against income account. Profit is deemed to be realized when 
a sale in the ordinary course of business is effected, unless the 
circumstances are such that the collection of the sale price is not 
reasonably assured. An exception to the general rule may be made in 
respect of inventories in industries (such as the packing house industry) 
in which owing to the impossibility of determining costs it is a trade 
custom to take inventories at net selling prices which may exceed cost. 
2. Capital surplus, however created, should not be used to relieve the 
income account of the current or future years of charges which would 
otherwise fall to be made there-against. This rule might be subject to the 
exception that where, upon reorganization, a reorganized company would 
be relieved of charges which would require to be made against income 
if the existing corporation were continued, it might be regarded as 
permissible to accomplish the same result without reorganization 
provided the facts were as fully revealed to and the action as formally 
approved by the shareholders as in reorganization. 
3. Earned surplus of a subsidiary company created prior to 
acquisition does not form a part of the consolidated earned surplus of the 
parent company and subsidiaries; nor can any dividend declared out of 
such surplus properly be credited to the income account of the parent 
company. 
4. While it is perhaps in some circumstances permissible to show 
stock of a corporation held in its own treasury as an asset if adequately 
disclosed, the dividends on stock so held should not be treated as a credit 
to the income account of the company. 
5. Notes or accounts receivable due from officers, employees, or 
affiliated companies must be shown separately and not included under 
a general heading such as Notes Receivable or Accounts Receivable. 
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In recent years accounting historiography has been enriched by a 
considerable volume of debate surrounding the chronology and evolution 
of accounting theory and practice. By virtue of their attempts to explain 
the processes of change, accounting historians have become identified 
with a paradigm or world view that constitutes the theoretical context 
within which their research findings are couched. Scholars have either 
self-avowed their paradigmatic affiliations or have had their work so 
classified in the writings of others. Fleischman et al. [1996a], for 
example, trichotomized the field of industrial revolution cost accounting 
into three "schools"—the Neoclassical (economic rationalist), the 
Foucauldian, and the Marxist (labor process). A dichotomized schemata 
might be employed to distinguish "critical" and "traditional" historians. 
Critical historians tend to question the objectivity of much primary 
source material, particularly accounting documents, which can serve the 
self-interest of those in positions of power. Traditionalists have more 
faith that surviving business records provide a less partisan 
approximation 
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of some sort of objective reality. A distinction can likewise be made 
between the "new accounting history" and older approaches, typically 
with a narrower focus. The new genre casts a wider net, deploying a 
variety of contexts to coexist with those economic aspects traditionally 
privileged in much accounting historiography. Many new accounting 
historians attempt to amplify the voices of suppressed groups (women, 
the poor, the illiterate) which have not been heard in mainstream 
literature. 
The current authors believe that recent historiography, be it 
labeled "critical," "new accounting history," or "postmodernist," has 
greatly enriched traditional, mainstream, archive-based offerings and has 
significantly increased our knowledge of the past. On most occasions 
historical reinterpretation has been achieved in a positive fashion. 
However, when the way forward threatens to marginalize archival 
research, disenfranchise various categories of scholars on non-
ideological grounds, or to restrict methodologies and theoretical 
approaches, the current authors, as contemporary descendants of the 
Neoclassical tradition, feel the need to urge restraint. 
Our discomfiture with the current environment in accounting 
history scholarship is discussed in three sections that follow. First, we 
address the question raised by Miller and Napier [1993] that historians 
must attempt to eliminate from their narratives references to practices 
and terminology that exist only in the present. Second, we consider the 
place of archival researchers in an historiographic environment 
characterized increasingly by attention to paradigmatic frameworks. 
Finally, we conclude by identifying the various groups of historians 
seemingly marginalized in some critical scholarship. We are particularly 
concerned with the status of archival researchers, potentially an 
endangered species. 
THE PRESENT IN HISTORY 
Miller and Napier's article, "Genealogies of Calculation" [1993], 
has become the catalyst for debate between traditional and critical 
historians, e.g., Keenan [1996] and Scorgie [1996]. The article has also 
proven to be a positive contribution from the perspective of engendering 
fundamental rethinkings about historical methodology. The authors 
featured four case study genealogies to articulate a comprehensive 
theoretical approach for describing and evaluating the past. 
The discourse in this article reflected Foucauldian rhetoric 
throughout although the authors assiduously avoided labeling the 
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approach as such in the narrative or including Foucault's works in the 
references list. This ancestry was evident in their stress on the 
discontinuities of history; their viewing of historical epochs in terms of 
"ensembles of practices and rationales;" and their attention to the 
symbolic aspects of institutions, "the language and vocabulary in which 
a particular practice is articulated" [Miller and Napier, 1993, p. 633; for 
similar Foucauldian phraseology, see particularly Foucault, 1980, pp. 
146, 162; Gane, 1986, p. 24]. In "Genealogies of Calculation," Miller 
and Napier not only advanced a Foucauldian approach for viewing 
history, but critiqued certain underpinnings of more traditional 
accounting history. In general, they suggested that conventional 
accounting historians are so overly absorbed in centemporary practices 
and procedures that their interpretations of past events suffer 
anachronistic tendencies. In a section entitled "bookkeeping practice and 
decisionmaking" [pp. 636-638], Yamey [1949, 1964] was taken to task 
for linking early bookkeeping practices to business decision making, 
when in reality "the notion of decision making, a concept which, despite 
its seeming self-evidence, was only recently invented, is used to make 
past events and practices intelligible, without acknowledgement of its 
recent emergence and historically localized applicability" [p. 638].1 In 
the succeeding section on "early management accounting," Edwards 
[1989], Edwards et al. [1990], Edwards and Boyns [1992], and 
Fleischman and Parker [1990, 1991] were similarly criticized for 
introducing a present-day vocabulary into their evaluations of British 
Industrial Revolution cost accounting methods [pp. 638-640]. Miller 
and Napier [p. 639] charged specifically that "within the traditional 
evolutionary model, the now is always present, if only in utero, in the 
then." This provocative observation requires response, both to what was 
said specifically and to what might be inferred. The current authors do 
not dispute Miller and Napier's questioning the Whig interpretation of 
history, the idea held by some historians that the past marches inexorably 
into the present with a step that is evolutionary and progressive. In our 
view the past conveys neither lessons nor predictions for the present. 
However, the tenor of the "in utero" phrase does suggest the possibility, 
nay the positive desirability, that the present can be extirpated from 
historical narratives as though the historian wields a surgeon's knife. Is 
it realistic to imagine that historians can so envelop themselves in the 
1It was perplexing to one reviewer of this paper that "decision making [could 
be] a new invention." Apparently the phrase "decision making" as used to 
describe a technique of management is of modern vintage. 103
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1997, Vol. 24, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 1997
94 The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997 
past that references to contemporary conventions, idiom, and prejudices 
can indeed be eliminated? If so, would not historical writing lose some 
of its relevance in the process? 
Noted scholars have argued that past and present events are 
inexorably linked. Bloch [1953, p. 27] defined historical time as "a 
concrete and living reality with an irreversible onward rush." He warned 
of a "modernist climate" wherein the past is construed as unconnected to 
the present [ibid., p. 36]. Muller [1952, p. 33] argued that "the past has 
no meaningful existence except as it exists for us, as it is given meaning 
by us." Nevins [1962, p. 18] expanded the horizon of these past/present 
linkages to include the future when he observed that history "is more 
than a guide for men in their daily round; it is a creator of their future." 
Finally, Commanger [1965] included on a list of the uses of history how 
expanded perspectives and an enlarged variety of experiences provide 
valuable aid in coping with the problems and concerns of the present. 
The insights of these distinguished historians have been replicated 
in the work of accounting historians as well. Previts and Bricker [1994] 
and Carnegie [1994] have both written about the way in which historical 
research in accounting can provide a 
greater understanding of contemporary practice and institutions [see also 
Previts et al., 1990a]. Confirmation of these synergies has also come 
from the published pronouncements of important U.S. practitioner and 
academic groups, such as the "white paper" of the Big Eight managing 
partners [1989] and the position statements of the Accounting Education 
Change Commission [1990, 1992; see also Fleischman et al., 1996b; 
Fleischman and Tyson, 1996]. 
Another facet of the past/present linkage central to certain 
philosophies of history is the obligation of each new present to rewrite 
history to enhance its meaningfulness. At a very basic level, the 
historian must bear in mind his/her contemporary audience. Relating the 
historical narrative to the idiom of the present renders the account more 
meaningful and comprehensible to the reader, although the risks of 
distortion should be managed as carefully as possible. Hill [1986, pp. 
15-17], a leading Marxist historian, articulated a method by which the 
historian attempts to discover those questions that the personalities of 
past ages were attempting to answer. He went on to suggest that: 
This would help to explain why history has to be rewritten 
in every generation. New bits of experience in the present 
open our eyes to questions that man had to answer in the 
past. . . . Experience in the present helps the historian to 
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sharpen and refine his account of the questions so as to get 
better answers. 
From a more philosophical point of view, Gadamer [1989, p. 24], a 
leading exponent of hermeneutics, wrote: 
Likewise, in the experience of history we find that the ideal 
of the objectivity of historical research is only one side of 
the issue, in fact a secondary side, because the special 
feature of historical experience is that we stand in the midst 
of an event without knowing what is happening to us before 
we grasp what has happened in looking backwards. 
Accordingly, history must be written anew by every new 
present. 
Miller and Napier had little patience with historians whose 
narratives employ modern language and vocabulary, as well as with 
those who reference contemporary conventions and practices in 
describing the past. Miller and Napier seemingly assumed that 
historians have the responsibility to exercise the care necessary to 
consider only those factors and institutions chronologically specific to 
the age under their investigation. While within limits we would applaud 
the caution they espoused, disassociation with the present can be a tricky 
endeavor. Scorgie [1996] accused Miller and Napier themselves of an 
anachronistic pitfall of the very genre for which they have castigated 
others in their genealogy on "discounted cash flow." Phrases such as 
"principles of compound interest" and "actuarial practice" had no 
relevance to the chronological periods Miller and Napier were 
addressing. 
Rather than pillory Miller and Napier for that peccadillo, it would 
be more fruitful to debate with them the legitimacy of using the present 
as a yardstick for measuring the accomplishments of the past. 
References to the present permit the reader a more profound 
understanding of the past and, perhaps, a greater appreciation for its 
relevance. While there is no law that effective history must engage the 
contemporary reader, the efforts of those historians who attempt to do so 
by examining links to the present should not be denigrated. We concur 
with Miller and Napier that danger exists that those historians who 
assume progress as the past evolves into the present may distort or even 
marginalize the past. However, all traditional historiography does not 
make such assumptions. Johnson and Kaplan [1987], for example, did 
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not construe the present as representative of best practice. Rather, they 
used history to demonstrate how current practice is badly in need of 
reform. Another effective point was raised by Tosh [1984] who pointed 
out that those who search the past for precedents of present practice have 
almost unfailing tend to stress similarities at the expense of differences. 
Traditional historians must be careful to avoid this imbalance. 
One final parameter of Miller and Napier's cautions with regard 
to the present in history requires discussion—the stance they took on the 
issue of historical origins. With reference to their own genealogical 
investigations, they averred that "we focus on the outcomes of the past, 
rather than looking for the origins of the present" [p. 632]. This 
important distinction is clearly a major tenet of Foucault's philosophy of 
historical writing. Variously Foucault proclaimed that historical 
beginnings were lowly, that knowledge was not the quest for origins, and 
that a purpose of genealogy was to destroy the primacy of origins 
[Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; Foucault, 1980; Smart, 1983]. 
Notwithstanding, several noted advocates of the paradigm have 
subscribed to the notion that our knowledge of the past is enhanced by 
investigating the origins of contemporary events and practices. For 
example, Hoskin and Macve [1988, 1994], in their insightful study of the 
Springfield Armory, unabashedly sought the genesis of modern 
managerialism [see also Ezzamel et al., 1990; Fleischman et al., 1995; 
Hoskin and Macve, 1986]. Miller and Napier have dismissed out-of-
hand a substantial quantity of research centered on the search for origins. 
While the democratic ideals of the new accounting history do not 
mandate that all research protocols be accepted as equally compelling, 
the spirit manifested in Miller et al. [1991] did suggest that rival 
approaches should be respected sufficiently for a fair hearing and 
possible ensuing dialogue [Fleischman et al., 1996a]. The very interest 
that some historians and readers share in the exploration of origins 
should establish its legitimacy although investigations of this type will 
not be viewed as equally valuable by all participants. 
This response to Miller and Napier is in no way intended to be 
disrespectful of the Foucauldian view of history. Neither the 
Foucauldian aversion to the search for origins nor the paradigm's focus 
on the discontinuities of history suggests that Foucauldians are 
disinterested in drawing upon the past to illuminate the present. What 
we are urging here is an alternative philosophy of history. At the same 
time, we are hopeful that our critique does not cast us in the mold of the 
traditionalist caricature so vividly described by Carnegie and Napier 
[1996, p. 8] as one: 
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. . . who celebrates progress and thereby subtly denigrates 
the past, who explains everything by reference to 
neoclassical economics, who at worst sets out on a 'treasure 
hunt' merely to establish the earliest, the oldest, the 
strangest, at best views the past entirely from the 
perspective of the present. 
PARADIGMATIC HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Writing to or within a paradigm or world view has become a 
feature of much critical scholarship in the past two decades. This trend, 
which is to be welcomed most wholeheartedly, has become a facet of the 
new accounting history. Miller et al. [1991], often regarded as a 
testament of faith in the new history, noted how the definitions and 
assumptions of historical objectivity changed, with the 1960s as the 
watershed. Prior to the 1960s, the authors contended, there had been a 
confidence that historical truth (facts) existed and that these truths were 
"unitary rather than perspectival." Subsequently, lines of demarcation 
between facts and values became blurred, and the premise of "letting the 
facts speak for themselves" gave way to a greater emphasis being placed 
on interpretations tested by the facts rather than derived from them [p. 
397]. It is indisputable that this change in direction has occurred. The 
impossibility of historical objectivity gives importance and legitimacy to 
the explanatory paradigms that comprise critical scholarship and the new 
accounting history. At the same time, the evidentiary requirements 
resulting from this enhanced contextualism strengthen the importance of 
archival research. 
A number of philosophers have supported the premise that 
historical writing is necessarily subjective. Hegel [1975] observed that 
in all discourse, whether philosophical or historical, everything depends 
upon prior perceptions and points of view. For Hegel, the historian is "a 
part of the process he is studying, has his own place in that process, and 
can see it only from the point of view which at this present moment he 
occupies within it" [quoted in Gadamer, 1986, p. 468]. Ricoeur [1965, 
pp. 26, 31], in detailing how history is reflective of the historian's 
subjectivity, labeled the "judgment of importance" the selection of those 
events and developments to chronicle. "History wishes to be objective 
but it cannot" [ibid., p. 76]. Historical relativism is also a key principle 
in hermeneutics. Gadamer [1986, p. xx] emphasized how history 
becomes old-fashioned to succeeding generations as "people read the 
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sources differently because they are moved by different questions, 
prejudices and interests." Gadamer glorified the differences in the social 
milieux and circumstances of historical observers, while fighting against, 
as Francis [1994, p. 240] neatly put it, "the Enlightenment's prejudice 
against prejudice." In a similar vein, Habermas [1990, p. 27] observed 
how the value judgments of historians are represented as facts in 
discourse, "because the theoretical framework for an empirical analysis 
of everyday behavior has to be conceptually integrated with the frame of 
reference within which participants themselves interpret their everyday 
lives." 
The subjectivity inherent in the historian's craft is likewise 
appreciated in the historical literature. Bloch [1953, p. 20] warned that 
"it is dangerous and foolhardy to pretend that man can fully eliminate the 
inescapable reality of our biases." Since our knowledge of the past is 
necessarily indirect, it must be "filtered through our understanding of the 
present" [ibid., p. 46]. Hill [1986, p. 14] chastised historians who 
believe that they are providing an objective account for they are 
"ignoring the distorting lens through which they observed past history." 
Given the subjectivity of historical writing, an attention to 
paradigmatic frames of reference logically follows. Historical data are 
always incomplete and must be supplemented by conjecture. 
Himmelfarb [1987, p. 100] noted the attractiveness of the new history to 
"the brightest and the more ambitious," who, based on whatever facts 
they can "ferret out," are then able to submit the data to "deduction, 
generalization, extrapolation, supposition, intuition, and imagination." 
Kuhn [1970, p. 146], with Dobb [1973] and Chalmers [1978] similarly, 
observed the logical transition to paradigmatic analysis given the nature 
of historical subjectivity: 
If, as I have already urged, there can be no scientifically or 
empirically neutral system of language or concepts, then the 
proposed construction of alternate tests and theories must 
proceed within one or another paradigm-based tradition. 
Accounting scholars have also confronted the issue of subjectivity, 
both with regard to source materials and the personal biases of 
historians. Tinker and his collaborators have frequently cautioned that 
accounting historians, like accounting practitioners, can achieve neither 
neutrality nor objective reality [Tinker et al., 1982; Tinker and Neimark, 
1988; Tinker, 1991; Tinker et al. 1991]. Merino and Mayper [1993, p. 
245 fn.] observed that the dangers of "belief transference," ascribing 
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current concepts to past historical figures, "increases exponentially when 
researchers use a theoretical framework to explain a particular historical 
phenomenon." Though we have no wish to silence the historian's voice, 
we urge that historians should expose their own biases whenever possible 
to allow the reader to judge whether it is the past or the historian 
speaking at key junctures. We concur with Muller [1952, pp. 29-32] 
that since "a historical fact never speaks for itself and that every 
historian has some philosophy of history, "however vague or 
unconscious," that determines the selection and evaluation processes, the 
historian does best who makes his/her philosophy "clear, conscious, and 
coherent" and overtly declares these biases. We also aspire to Hill's 
[1986, p. 17] definition of a good historian as one who "questions his 
own assumptions and prejudices," though the task is difficult and the 
way unclear. 
Exposure to primary source material is one way in which readers 
of historical narratives can begin to grapple with the issue of whether 
they are listening to the historian's voice or to the persona of the times. 
By gauging the historian's interpretation of archival materials, in 
combination with knowledge of the historian's frame of reference, the 
reader can evaluate how well the historian has done in offering a 
persuasive account within the context of his/her personal paradigmatic 
view. 
There can be no doubt that archival evidence may be 
misinterpreted, manipulated, culled out, or selectively included in order 
to bolster a particular perspective. In the absence of primary sources, 
readers may place undue reliance on the historian's personal bias and 
interpretation. Thus, although there are critical questions regarding the 
objective reality of evidence, the complete substitution of data with 
theory, language, interpretation, and contextualism is even more 
problematic. Zagorin [1990, p. 274] described shortcomings of 
historical writing unsupported by archival materials: 
they have rarely disputed the reality of the historical past. 
. . . historians, working historians, have traditionally 
assumed some correspondence between interpretation and 
fact, between language and reality. 
It is also the case that to ignore archival evidence assaults one 
cornerstone of historical research and scholarship. To fail to listen to the 
words with which the past attempted to speak to us is an affront to the 
individual men and women who cared enough about the future to 
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document events and preserve an archive. Himmelfarb [1989, pp. 667-
668] described the deleterious impact of this insult: 
What is being deprivileged and deconstructed is not only 
history as traditional historians have understood it but the 
past as contemporaries knew it...it is condescending or 
demeaning to make them bear witness not to their own 
experiences but to those of the historian. 
Of course, it may serve no useful purpose for us to recognize the past as 
it was or perhaps we ought to concede that efforts to do so are fruitless. 
In conclusion, we wish to offer a partial disclaimer lest it would 
appear that we overstate the case either for the dangers of paradigmatic 
historiography or the necessity of archival research. A distinction can 
be made between an historian writing "to" a paradigm (generally 
conceived as an unwarranted intrusion of bias) and writing "within" a 
paradigm (generally welcomed for providing an explanatory context). 
We are not prepared in this paper to attempt a demarcation of the two 
realms. Also, we appreciate the paradox in that we are arguing for the 
virtues of archival research into primary sources, while at the same time 
espousing the theory that facts do not speak for themselves. Here we 
suggest that primary materials can be helpful in supporting an 
explanatory theory, although they are not an imperative. Much critical 
scholarship is based on archival research; other extremely valuable 
critical offerings have been accomplished without direct reference to 
these materials. It is our personal preference to use primary sources to 
support historical theorizing and interpretation, but we do not feel such 
recourse to be a prerequisite for good scholarship.2 
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES 
Miller et al. [1991] not only served as an introduction to a 
collection of papers from the Second Manchester Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on Accounting Conference, but as a concise and readable 
preamble for the "new accounting history." It augured a greater 
2We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer who suggested the distinction 
between writing to and within a paradigm, brought to our attention the 
paradox of calling for sources that cannot speak for themselves, and felt that 
former drafts of this paper marginalized the contributions of critical scholars, 
many of whom did archival research. 
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eclecticism through its inclusion of political, social, behavorial, and 
environmental contexts to accompany more traditional economic 
explanations for particular practices and processes of change in 
accounting's history. The article was replete with welcoming phrases 
such as the "pluralization of methodologies" [p. 395] and the 
"heterogeneous range of theoretical approaches" [p. 400] which promised 
not only an expanded universe in accounting historiography, but a more 
democratic one as well. 
However, all has not been halcyon in the world of accounting 
history. While a heightened attention to paradigmatic issues has created 
an interpretive richness and a faster pace of change absent in past 
generations, the process has occasionally been carried out against a 
backdrop of dysfunctional hostility. One participant elegantly referred 
to this disharmonious environment as "academic antler-clashing" before 
lowering his own head to engage in a theoretical contretemps [Hoskin, 
1994, p. 59]. We have argued elsewhere [Fleischman et al., 1996a] our 
conviction that dialogue and collaborative effort will harness the 
synergies and additive value forthcoming from the interactions of 
differing paradigms. 
If it be true, as Gadamer [1986, p. 465] observed, that "even a 
master of the historical method is not able to keep himself entirely free 
from the prejudice of his time, his social environment and his national 
situation etc.," are we faced with paradigmatic anarchy in accounting 
historiography because all interpretations of the past are equally valid? 
We think not. Although the new accounting history democratically 
welcomes the full gamut of theories and promises a hearing for all, those 
efforts that are more cogently argued and those that more convincingly 
use source material to reinforce arguments will be more compelling. 
The welcoming spirit of the new accounting history 
notwithstanding, a place at the table does not appear secure for certain 
categories of scholars. Earlier in the paper it was documented how 
aspersions have been cast on those historians who find value in utilizing 
contemporary reference points in their evaluations of the past [Miller and 
Napier, 1993, pp. 632-640]. Likewise, those historians who have 
interest in seeking the origins of accounting practices in history have 
been soundly criticized, particularly in Foucauldian scholarship [Miller 
et al., 1991, p. 398; Miller and Napier, 1993, p. 632]. In this concluding 
section, we consider the plight of other classifications of accounting 
historians who seemingly stand at the periphery of the new accounting 
history or, in a worst case scenario, appear to be disenfranchised. Our 
main concern, as the title of this article conveys, lies with archival 
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researchers whose contributions have been marginalized when they 
attempt to stand apart from the paradigmatic debates that have both 
expanded and factionalized contemporary historiography. These 
scholars are ultimately the endangered species. 
Many traditionalist historians, very much aware that seemingly 
objective evidence is value-laden, have appreciated that the mere 
reporting of data derived from archival investigations may not serve a 
useful purpose in the absence of interpretation. Typical is the remark of 
Previts et al. [1990b, p. 146]: "Historians,. . . influenced by the research 
traditions of the social sciences, champion the view that explanation is 
inherent to history and thus interpretation, more than just the factual 
story, must be undertaken." A substantial majority of traditionalists do 
evaluate the documents they have unearthed in their archival research, 
usually within the context of an economic rationalist paradigm [e.g., 
Edwards, 1989; Edwards and Newell, 1991; Fleischman and Parker, 
1991, 1992, 1997; Tyson, 1990; 1993]. In this regard, their 
methodology, although not their chosen paradigmatic grounding, 
parallels the efforts of critical scholars [e.g., Hoskin and Macve, 1988, 
1994; Walsh and Stewart, 1993]. Others, however, feel more 
comfortable presenting research findings with little or no interpretive 
analysis, leaving such evaluations to others possessed of a more 
theoretical bent. While these researchers may not be the objective 
reporters of data they might consider themselves to be because of the 
partisan nature of their selection processes, their contribution to the 
historical process ought not be minimalized.3 
Critical scholars have repeatedly told traditional historians that 
their work suffers a major shortcoming when revealed data are 
unaccompanied by explanation and evaluation. There is value in quoting 
this perception at length from the classic statement of the new accounting 
history's philosophy [Miller et al., 1991, p. 398]. 
However, the fortunes of accounting history are likely to 
depend on more than the tenacity of researchers in 
uncovering new facts or dating the initial practice of this or 
that accounting technique. The questioning and debates 
that have generally taken place around the objectivity 
question in history more rudely impose themselves within 
3Although one reviewer urged that citations to work of this genre be 
provided, we decline to do so lest the scholars so identified be embarrassed by 
this categorization. 112
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accounting. A concern with language, with the rationales 
and ideologies for accounting practices, comes to assume a 
prominent role in the new accounting history. But this is 
not the same as saying that the analysis of particular 
accounting events can be conducted with disregard for 
chronology, national specificity or the key actors or 
institutions. Far from it. However, these important issues 
of archival enquiry only gain their significance within a 
particular theoretical or explanatory framework. 
The critique of archival researchers disinclined to analyze their 
findings has not always been so kind. Napier [1989, p. 241] charged 
that the reporting of historical records without interpretation was "simple 
antiquarianism." Stewart [1992] used the same word to describe 
approaches which emphasized facts rather than explanations. Hopper 
and Armstrong [1991, p. 405] branded as "accounting antiquariansm" 
the efforts of those researchers concerned more with the discovery of 
accounting origins than with the articulation of theories of change. 
While these critics may not feel they are disparaging the research efforts 
of their colleagues in using this phraseology, the epithet "antiquarian" 
conveys a greater pejorative connotation among North American 
historians (perhaps as distinct from accounting historians) than in U.K. 
academic circles. We must be cautious not to brand archivist colleagues 
as drones whose only job is to provide grist for the paradigmatic mills. 
The new accounting history has been characterized by a 
substantial expansion in the variety of influences collectively investigated 
in the ongoing effort to explain past developments and patterns of 
change. The panorama has now come to include social, political, 
ideological, and cultural contexts, as well as the voices of suppressed 
peoples. At one time many traditional historians in accounting were 
deserving of an economic reductionist label, sharing that identity with 
early Marxist scholars ("vulgar" Marxism). While many traditional 
historians have broadened their horizons, influenced perhaps by the 
exponents of critical history, some have not. Some traditionalists 
continue to privilege the economic environment as the motivating force 
behind institutional change. Notwithstanding, these scholars have a 
substantial contribution to make in bringing new information to light. 
The issue for them should not be a blanket indictment of their 
methodological choice, but rather the danger that their contributions 
might not be remembered since their more limited focus diminishes the 
possibility for a compelling narrative. 
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It is our view that the regard with which archival research is held 
by traditional historians is not paralleled in postmodernism. 
Postmodernists are skeptical of the tendency of some archival 
researchers to consider historical documents as bias-free representations 
of reality. Many of those who do archival research typically fit those 
categories marginalized in recent literature, including those who gather 
facts which are allowed to "speak for themselves," those who investigate 
the origins of contemporary practice, those who believe that historical 
figures are essentially motivated by economic influences [Tyson, 1995], 
and those disinclined to write to a paradigm. Napier several years ago 
appeared more sympathetic to archival researchers of various stamps 
than in his more recent work with Miller. He perceived a dichotomy of 
function in the accounting history craft. Traditional archival researchers 
would feel most at home in "the discovery stage" in which original 
accounting sources and documents are studied. These investigations 
constituted an essential precursor to the "contextualising" function so as 
to "avoid the erection of theoretical superstructures on inadequate 
foundations" [Napier, 1989, p. 239]. Napier staked out a niche for 
traditional archivists, observing that "the contextualisers are likely, 
however, to wish to rely on the traditionalists to generate much of the 
raw data for their theorising" [ibid., p. 250].4 
We would urge the contextualizers to be mindful that the flow of 
data used to support the theorizing must continue. Summary articles 
relating the findings of archival research should not be minimalized lest 
scholarly articles of the new history genre come to be written and 
rewritten without bringing new information to light. This plea in no way 
intends the suggestion that the discovery and contextualizing functions 
are mutually exclusive. Many practitioners of the new accounting 
history, particularly critical and postmodernist historians, have done both 
extraordinarily well. However, the research protocols of the new 
accounting history seemingly allow academics the freedom to choose 
their research agendas in confidence that both discovery and 
4In a recent article with Carnegie, Napier has returned to the traditionalist 
fold that typified his archival research over the course of the past decade. 
Carnegie and Napier [1996, p. 8] acknowledged that "historical research in 
accounting gains its strength from its firm basis in the 'archive,'" though they 
do define that term in its broadest possible sense. Moreover, they observed 
that historians who rely upon secondary sources open themselves for others 
"to challenge these conclusions by reference to primary archival material" 
[ibid., p. 20]. 114
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contexualizing contribute value to our knowledge and understanding. 
Miller and Napier should be keenly aware of the importance of 
archival research based on their own past experience. One of the four 
genealogies Miller and Napier [1993, pp. 641-642] narrated to illustrate 
their approach was the emergence of costing at Wedgwood pottery. Our 
knowledge of accounting at Wedgwood comes almost entirely from the 
archival research efforts of Professor McKendrick [1960, 1964, 1970]. 
The Wedgwood archive at the Keele University Library is largely 
uncatalogued to the modern day. It took painstaking and meticulous 
effort to generate the source material vital for later analyses by Hopwood 
[1987], Fleischman and Parker [1991], and, last but not least, Miller and 
Napier [1993]. Two of the most prestigious contributions to critical 
scholarship have been Miller and O'Leary [1987] and Hopper and 
Armstrong [1991]. Both these substantial theoretical undertakings were 
done without reference to primary sources. The debt owed to those who 
provided the archival background should be obvious. We would ask the 
further question, by what standard is it more acceptable to write an 
interpretive piece without doing archival research than it is to report the 
results of archival research without accompanying interpretation? We 
subscribe to the belief that effective history comes in multiple 
forms—well-researched archival investigation, well-reasoned 
interpretation and evaluation, and combinations thereof. We conclude 
by challenging critical and traditionalist historians alike to recall the 
democratic tenets espoused in Miller et al. [1991, p. 400]: 
It is inappropriate to specify criteria that would exclude 
certain types of research on the basis of their 
methodological protocols or the time period they address. 
It is also highly inappropriate to specify the methodological 
protocols that stamp a particular piece of research as a part 
of the new accounting history. 
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Abstract: Historical research in accounting and management, 
hitherto largely neglected as a field of inquiry by many 
management and accounting researchers, has experienced a 
resurgence of interest and activity in research conferences and 
journals over the past decade. The potential lessons of the past for 
contemporary issues have been rediscovered, but the way forward 
is littered with antiquarian narratives, methodologically naive 
analyses, ideologically driven interpretation and ignorance of the 
traditions, schools and philosophy of the craft by accounting and 
management researchers as well as traditional and critical 
historians themselves. This paper offers an introduction to 
contributions made to the philosophies and methods of history by 
significant historians in the past, a review of some of the 
influential schools of historical thought, insights into philosophies 
of historical knowledge and explanation and a brief introduction 
to oral and business history. On this basis the case is made for the 
philosophically and methodologically informed approach to the 
investigation of our past heritage in accounting and management 
Accounting and management research has proliferated in both 
volume and variety in recent decades, yet much of it remains curiously 
ahistorical. Many contemporary research journal articles for instance 
contain all but the briefest allusions to prior practices and knowledge, 
often confining themselves to the almost obligatory but cursory review 
of the previous ten years' literature. Not only do many contemporary 
accounting and management researchers risk leaving themselves without 
a sense of tradition, but they also risk revisiting earlier solved issues or 
making decisions about the future in isolation from the past. The 
problem does not end here. It is not difficult to locate in the extant 
accounting and management literature, examples of historical research 
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that varies from theoretical naivete to doctrinaire predisposition, and 
from archival neglect to antiquarianism, or that simply appear to be 
methodologically uninformed. The value of such material to 
practitioners, policy-makers and researchers may therefore be doubtful 
or at least suspect. 
This paper aims to address some of these issues by offering a 
selective overview of the theoretical and philosophical traditions that 
have informed historical research and writing generally. It therefore sets 
out to acquaint the accounting and management reader with theories and 
methodologies adopted and advocated by a sample of significant 
historians in human history. Also briefly reviewed are some of the most 
influential schools of historical methodology as well as historical 
philosophies of knowledge and explanation that have informed 
interpretive historical research. In addition, two particular areas of 
accounting history research extension, oral and business history, are 
highlighted. Finally some implications for future historical research in 
accounting and management will be discussed. 
PURPOSES, BENEFITS AND DIRECTIONS 
Why should we concern ourselves at all with undertaking studies 
of accounting and management history? One pragmatic answer can be 
offered by Alfred Chandler's (1977) work. His are arguably the books 
on business history most often consulted by business executives and 
possibly the reason is that they have "explained the sea to the fish who 
swam within it" (Smoler, 1992). 
In general, history offers a variety of potential uses. It may be 
employed to build a view of the past from which professional 
consciousness and cohesion can be manufactured. It can reveal and 
render visible parties, practices, and outcomes previously ignored. 
Alternatively it can challenge and overturn fallacious beliefs and 
unfounded traditions or offer some indicators of precedents and previous 
experiences that may affect future actions and policies (Tosh, 1991). 
Management and accounting policy and practice are often discussed and 
applied ahistorically. Historical research can offer a prologue to 
deliberations on contemporary issues and provide insights into not only 
precedents but also conditioning factors (economic, political, social, and 
institutional) and possible outcomes (Previts et al, 1990a, b). 
121
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1997, Vol. 24, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 1997
Parker: Informing Historical Research in Accounting and 113 
Management: Tradition, Philosophies, and Opportunities 
Identifying Benefits 
Accounting and management history can help us identify within 
our particular nations and cultures, what has worked in the past and 
what hasn't. It also helps us understand why we have had our successes 
and failures over long periods of time. It offers the prospect of 
accountants and managers learning from ignored or forgotten past 
experiences, both successful and unsuccessful. Chandler himself argues 
that our focus on quantitative tools and analyses have been the source of 
many of our present day difficulties in accounting and management, in 
that they have emphasised what is measurable but not necessarily what 
is important, and that they have lead to a short-term decision making 
focus rather than a long term decision making orientation. A better 
understanding of the histories of accounting, management and business 
may assist us to avoid these pitfalls. 
The study of accounting and management history also offers the 
prospect of researchers operating in particular cultures (such as Asian 
versus Western cultures) being able to discover the unique features, 
impacts and potential advantages of the cultural contexts within which 
their organizations and professions operate. This may for example avoid 
the tendency towards wholesale adoption of Western management and 
accounting practices in Asian or Middle Eastern contexts and 
organizations within which they may prove to be inappropriate and 
therefore unsuccessful (Parker, 1994). So there are strong arguments to 
suggest that we should indeed bother with history. It helps us put our 
present into context and better informs and sensitises the accounting and 
management decisions we must make tomorrow. 
Accounting and Management Directions 
Napier's (1989) overview of recent research directions in 
accounting history argues that examination of original accounting 
documents gives our contemporary theories and generalisations some 
empirical content. Despite invariable limitations in availability of 
historical evidence, historical analysis of accounting and business 
records can reveal much about techniques and processes as well as what 
has been accounted for in the past. Historical analysis can provide us 
with information as to accounting choices taken in the past and as to the 
interaction of accounting considerations and business decisions. Napier 
correctly points out that accounting records are not the only sources that 
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are available to the historian. Further sources include publicly available 
documents such as legal cases, journalistic writings and also private 
documents such as minute books of directors meetings, correspondence 
between owners and managers, managers notebooks and so on. However 
he notes that much historical accounting research has been aimed at 
assembling primary and secondary historical evidence, which has been 
much needed but at times accused of antiquarianism. Further benefits 
from historical research in accounting include the contextualising of 
accounting history. This implies that the researcher studies the history of 
accounting not as a technique in itself but as one element of a social, 
institutional and organizational context over time. This can be provided 
by interpretive, critical or postmodern approaches. 
Goodman and Kruger (1988) have provided an informative review 
of the potential contribution that historical research can make to the 
management literature. They recognise that historiography (the body of 
techniques, theories and principles associated with historical research) 
has been attacked for lacking objectivity but argue that as a research 
method, historiography is no more subjective than many other social 
science methods. Historiography has also been criticised for data 
dredging but generally, historiographic research examines sources with 
the intention of providing explanations and generating substantive 
theory. Goodman and Kruger argue that historical research has three 
major potential applications in management research: 
1. Variable selection and evaluation. 
2. Theory construction. 
3. Hypothesis generation. 
In all the above areas historical research has the strong potential to make 
major contributions through its evaluation of multiple sources, its 
addressing of questions such as "what happened?", "what was?", and 
"why?", and through its emphasis upon multiple influences and multiple 
hypotheses that enables the researcher to set hypotheses within a broader 
context. An example of that broader context which management 
historiography offers can be found in Pindur et al's (1995) global review 
of the history of management in which they argue that to understand and 
apply contemporary management principles and techniques effectively, 
an understanding of historical theories, models and processes is required. 
To that end they traverse the scientific management, administrative 
management, behavioural management, quantitative management, as 
well as systems, contingency, strategic and "Japanese" management 
movements. 
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The potential utility of a historical perspective in accounting 
research has already been argued by such writers as Baladouni (1979), 
Baxter (1981), and Parker (1981). Contributions to accounting 
historiography have also been gradually emerging in the research 
literature since the 1970s (Goldberg, 1974; Baladouni, 1979; Parker, 
1981; Gaffikin, 1987, 1988a, 1988b). With the accumulation of such 
writings, particularly in the accounting literature, there has developed a 
growing appreciation that history in this discipline, as in others, is a 
cultural product reflecting social, economic, and political environments 
(Lister, 1983; Previts, 1984; Hopwood and Johnson, 1986). In addition 
has emerged the understandings gained from the perspectives offered by 
critical accounting history researchers that accounting is an influencing 
activity that creates its environment at least as much as it may reflect 
that environment. From such studies, our understandings of accounting 
have broken away from its previously assumed characteristics of 
neutrality, objectivity and technicist isolation (Gaffikin, 1987, 1988a). 
Recent Reflections 
A number of historians have been more recently adding to the 
historiographic literature in the field of accounting research, expanding 
upon the themes of history's nature, utility, methodologies and ongoing 
developments. Previts et al (1990a,b) produced two papers which 
commenced by distinguishing between narrative and interpretive history, 
and considering the relevance of extant accounting history research to 
accounting teaching, policy and practice as well as outlining some of the 
limitations of historical research. Their review included some of the 
major areas of accounting history inquiry, including biography, 
institutional history, development of accounting thought, general history, 
critical history, data base development and critical history. Their 
consideration of historical method extended to general methodological 
issues, cliometrics, empirical and statistical studies, content analysis, and 
case studies. 
Even more recently, Carnegie and Napier (1996) provided a 
significant analysis of the state of the art with respect to critical and 
interpretive history research in accounting in which they addressed the 
roles of accounting history in conferring status upon the discipline of 
accounting, serving functionalist policy informing purposes, and 
providing bases for critiques of past and present practice. As Previts et 
al (1990b) had done, but with differing selections, they highlighted a 
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variety of areas of ongoing accounting history research including studies 
of surviving firm records, accounting records in business history, 
biography, prosopography, institutional history, public sector accounting 
and comparative international accounting history. 
From a more strictly methodological "primer" viewpoint, 
Fleischman, Mills and Tyson (1996) revisit the concept and definition of 
history, and discuss issues of subjectivity, evidence types, historical 
construction, and historical versus social science perspectives. They also 
briefly outline some significant accounting historians of the 20th century 
as well as research journals currently publishing accounting history and 
comment on the emerging critical history research perspectives as 
opposed to interpretive and narrative, archival traditions. 
This paper builds further upon these foregoing historiographic 
works by returning to a somewhat broader canvass in providing an 
introduction to the work, philosophies and methodological perspectives 
adopted by some of the leading historical writers of the past. The 
intention is to illustrate the wealth and variety of theoretical and 
methodological sources available for accounting and management 
historians to consult. This also provides a backdrop to some of the 
pervasive schools of thought that have been influencing historical 
scholarship in the 20th century. Some of these foundation philosophies 
are reflected in methodological elements such as historian's attitude, 
objectivity, events, facts, ideas, causation, interpretation, explanation 
and discovery through writing. Indeed even in such growing areas of 
historical research innovation as oral history, faint but perceptible traces 
of the work and approaches of very early historians can be detected. 
SIGNIFICANT HISTORIANS FROM THE PAST 
In some respects accounting and management historians could be 
accused of deficits in their appreciation of the predecessors in their own 
historical writing craft. Yet there is much to be learned and appreciated 
in terms of perspective, theory, and methodology from the work of 
significant historians from the past. What follows is a very brief and 
admittedly selective review of the contributions to methodological 
thought made by some of these historians (Barker, 1982; Gooch, 1952; 
Thomson, 1969; Tosh, 1991; Goetz, 1986). These brief overviews 
provide an insight into the methodological foundations and debates in 
historical thinking and offer the management and accounting historian a 
variety of issues to consider and a range of potential research approaches 
that might be adopted. 
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Herodotus was born in approximately 484BC and wrote the first 
great narrative history of the ancient world, the history of the Greco-
Persian wars. He is considered to be the first historian in that he recorded 
what happened and tried to show how the two peoples involved, came 
into that conflict. His work brought a new principle of critical enquiry 
in asking why the war had occurred. His histories were designed to be 
read aloud and included features still common to the discipline of history, 
namely critical enquiry, prose narrative, popular presentation and 
cultural significance. Herodotus employed a then new method of 
historical enquiry that first asked a question, looked for information 
relevant to that question and then drew a conclusion from the data 
collected. 
Thucydides was born around 455BC and wrote the history of the 
Peloponnesian War. He wrote a contemporary history of events through 
which he lived and attempted to explain impartially the intricacies and 
complexities of the events that he observed. Like Herodotus, Thucydides 
wanted to enquire into the origins of the war and to distinguish 
precipitating from underlying causes. He was also concerned to answer 
the question "what actually happened?" and grappled with the questions 
of "what is the nature of power?" and "what lessons can history teach?". 
His methods included cross checking between witnesses' accounts before 
recording and establishing a reliable chronology. His work had three 
definable stages: 
1. Notes he made of events as they took place. 
2. The arrangement and rewriting of those notes into a chronicle 
(consecutive narrative). 
3. The construction of a final elaborated narrative. 
Pan Ku was born in China in approximately 32 AD. He was one 
of China's most notable historians. He was an official and scholar of the 
Eastern (later Han) dynasty and his Han Shu (History of the Former Han 
Dynasty) became the approach most frequently employed by later 
Chinese historians. Carrying on work commenced by his father, he spent 
over 16 years compiling and editing the history. Pan Ku attempted to 
represent the Han dynasty and empire as factually as possible through 
an organised compendium of existing documents. He founded the so-
called Han style of prose - simple, lucid, not particularly vivid and 
avoiding elaborateness. His work has been admired for its thoroughness 
and apparent objectivity. 
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Voltaire was born in Paris in 1694. His historical works ranged 
over the whole field of culture and society. His approach to history had 
four major characteristics: 
1. A scientific methodology which included a critical 
appraisal of evidence. 
2. Treatment of the past on a universal scale. 
3. A view of the Reformation as a social and political as 
well as religious phenomenon. 
4. A concentration on the history of the human mind. 
Voltaire hoped to establish a fundamental historical law - to explain the 
historical process and benefit the human race. He developed a law that 
humanity had never progressed without guidance of strong enlightened 
persons in positions of authority. 
Gibbon (Edward) was born in Surrey, England in 1737 and was 
regarded as a rationalist, historian and scholar. He broke from the 18th 
century belief in God's will being the primary explanator of past 
patterns. His historical writing was characterised by rational argument 
and the employment of irony. Gibbon adopted an analytical, secular 
attitude favoured by most historians today. The influences upon events 
he chose to investigate were not divine or miraculous, but the interplay 
of personality, ideas, conditions and events. His History of the Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-88), a continuous narrative from 
the 2nd century AD to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, is regarded as 
a masterpiece of philosophical historiography. It realised his ideal of 
writing history that was related to and explained by the social institutions 
in which it is contained. He was motivated to write it by his worry about 
the possible collapse of Western civilization. He sought to unravel the 
causes of the Roman empire's collapse so as to argue that Western 
civilization had reached a superior state of development and was, 
therefore, immune from similar collapse. Gibbon, untiringly industrious 
and accurate in consulting his sources, demonstrated a sense of fairness 
and probity, and employed a literary writing style that exhibited both 
flair and acumen. 
Ranke (Leopold von) was born in Saxony, Germany in 1795. 
Ranke is considered to have founded modern historical professionalism. 
He introduced the critical approach to sources into mainstream 
historiography and founded a new breed of historians trained in the 
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critical evaluation of primary sources. He attempted, by applying his 
skills of textual criticism to history (working on original documentary 
sources) to "show the actual past". He perceived history as drawn solely 
from original documents, critically examined and authenticated. The 
facts were to speak for themselves. Ranke's concern to portray, as 
objectively as possible, the past as it really was, represented a protest 
against the moralising history commonly being written in the early 
1800s. Indeed a Rankean scholar exhaustively explores the small area 
of the past in which he or she is an expert, asking limited questions and 
then producing a reliable report for other historians to use (so that there 
will be no need for the evidence to be inspected again). Ranke believed 
that history evolves in the development of the individual, peoples and 
states which together constitute the process of culture. For him, 
continuity was a prerequisite for the development of a culture and its 
underlying historical reality. His approach to historical research also 
emphasised the role of contemplation and intuition required for 
addressing the variety and unpredictability of individual human 
behaviour. Ranke is regarded as the founder of Historicism and has 
exercised a major influence over Western historiography. 
Karl Marx was born in Germany in 1818. He developed his ideas 
starting from the classical economists, believing he had discovered a 
science of human society in which politics, economics, philosophy and 
literature as well as history, interacted to create the social structure from 
which it sprang. He learned from the German Idealist philosopher 
G.W.F. Engel that the past could exhibit a pattern and a destination. 
Marx chose to envision these as a class war between those who own the 
means of production and those who are limited to selling their labour. In 
his view, humanity's beliefs reflected primary physical needs and 
everything in the human world had grown from humanity's attempts to 
satisfy those needs. His concept of history is called historical materialism 
or economic determinism. His work accelerated the trend of history 
away from memoirs and letters towards documentation provided by 
public records, charters, parish registers and the like. 
Marx saw history as being about the growth in human productive 
power. Once humanity had satisfied its basic needs, then it could pursue 
self-fulfillment and achieve its potential in all other spheres. Thus he 
contended that the only true, objective view of the historical process is 
rooted in the material conditions of life. He therefore chose to reject 
nationalism, freedom and religion as major defining themes of history. 
Instead he believed that people are the victims of material forces, but 
128
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 11
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
120 The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997 
under the right conditions can be the agents of historical change. Classes 
were not defined by him in terms of wealth, status or education, but in 
terms of their role in the productive process. Thus each mode of 
production was seen to result in the emergence of classes with 
antagonistic interests, each successive stage producing its own dominant 
class. 
In proposing his theory as a guide to the study of history, Marx 
rejected the historical methods employed by the leading historians of his 
day, considering Ranke and others to be captives of the dominant 
ideology of the age being studied by them. That dominant ideology (of 
each period being researched) was in Marx's view, a cover for the 
material interests of the dominant class. The dialectic between the forces 
and participants in production was for him, the principal driver of long 
term historical change. However it is arguable that Marx never 
developed his own clearly specified methodology of historical research. 
Trevelyan (George Macaulay) was born in Warwickshire, 
England in 1876. He was Master of Trinity College Cambridge 1940-51; 
liberal by training and temperament, he demonstrated an appreciation of 
the Whig tradition in English politics and thought. Trevelyan wrote 
history for the general reader as well as for the history student and 
campaigned for the revival of a literary style of history - elegantly 
presented and able to interest a wider public readership. He spearheaded 
a reaction in England against scientific approaches to history that had 
almost stifled the reading of history. For example he wrote English 
Social History (1942) which portrayed the life and pursuits of society 
via a powerful literary style. Trevelyan was not so concerned with 
explanatory history, preferring to argue that the appeal of history is, in 
the final analysis, poetic. He did make the telling observation that for the 
historian it will always be difficult to tell the story as it really was 
because inevitably the historian has to select from all the available facts 
in compiling his or her account. 
Collingwood (R.G.) was born in Lancashire, England, in 1889. 
He was an English historian and philosopher who attempted to reconcile 
philosophy and history. He was a tutor in philosophy at Oxford 
University from 1912 till 1941 and was regarded as the leading authority 
of his day on Roman Britain. In his last work, the posthumously 
published The Idea of History (1946), he argued that all history is 
essentially the history of thought and that the role of the historian is one 
of re-enacting in his/her own mind the thoughts and intentions of 
individuals in the past. According to Collingwood, only by immersing 
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oneself in historical events participants' mental processes and rethinking 
the past in the context of one's own experiences, can the historian 
discover the significant patterns and dynamics of cultures and 
civilizations. As the most sophisticated exponent of the Idealist position 
Collingwood made a contribution to setting history on a new path, 
eschewing the desire to provide a synoptic vision of the entire historical 
process and the idea of proposing universal laws to explain historical 
occurrences. Instead he advocated an analytical approach to historical 
research, focussing upon concepts, methods of classification, 
justification of interpretations and the logic of explanations proffered. 
Toynbee (Arnold Joseph) was born in London in 1889. His 
monumental 12 volume work, A Study of History (1934-61), proposed 
a philosophy of history based on the analysis of the cyclical development 
and decline of civilizations, demonstrating an awareness of the relativity 
of historical thought. He also produced volumes on world religions, 
western civilization and world travel. He was a traveller and observer of 
international affairs and asked the broadest of questions (often those 
asked by laypersons). Toynbee was obsessed with humanity's necessary 
choice between self-subordination and self-extinction. He was 
preoccupied with the task of explaining historical change (e.g. how did 
the laws of civilised warfare become overthrown in the 20th century?). 
He was a historian of the Thucydidean kind - scientific in his methods, 
thorough in his investigations and detached in his conclusions. Unlike 
Marx, Toynbee saw history as governed by spiritual forces subject to the 
law of God. His A Study of History is essentially a 20th century 
condemnation of the idea of progress and of the historians who produced 
that idea. It is a personalised, holistic and subjective interpretation of 
history which argues that under the leadership of creative minorities, 
civilizations grow by responding successfully to challenges and decline 
when leaders fail to react creatively. He is considered therefore to be a 
historical system-maker, repudiating the idea that history is chaotic and 
fortuitous, revealing no discernible pattern or rhythm Toynbee 
encouraged a recognition that large scale patterns of behaviour have 
always been with humanity and are enshrined in myth and legend. While 
his work has been criticised for its ambiguous definitions, its 
assumptions, its large scale system building and its according to myths 
and metaphors, equality of status with facts, his work has also been 
praised as a stimulating response to the specialising tendency of modern 
historical research. 
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Carr (Edward Hallett) was a British political scientist and 
historian, born in London in 1892. He was assistant editor of The Times 
from 1941 to 1946 and was subsequently a tutor and fellow of Balliol 
College, Oxford and fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. His major 
contribution to historical thought came from his book What is History 
(1961). He argued for a distinction between the facts of the past 
(limitless and unknowable in their entirety) and the facts of history (a 
selection made by historians in order to reconstruct and explain history). 
He regarded any attempt to reconstruct the past from the inside as 
misconceived, preferring to apply a standard of significance to the past 
based upon a sense of the direction of history including the trajectory of 
contemporary events, thereby approaching an understanding of the 
future. Carr argued that all historians reflect to some degree the outlook 
of their own age but advocated that historians should read and write 
simultaneously in order to better understand the significance and 
relevance of what they find. For him, facts without explanation and 
interpretation leave history that is unappealing to the reader and of 
limited use. Facts and explanation should be in constant interaction in the 
process of historical research and writing. 
Drawing Lessons For Today 
While the above historical writers by no means constitute an 
exhaustive list of major contributors to the field of historical scholarship, 
they give us a brief insight into both the commonality and variety of their 
approaches to historical research. There is much from which we can 
select to inform the conduct of our own historical research projects. Both 
narratives and interpretations of past events and circumstances have been 
of vital concern to historians and continue to offer alternatives for 
investigating periods and practices in the accounting and management 
past. In studying history, many historians have been drawn to the search 
for patterns of events and behaviour as well as relationships between 
institutions, people, events and general contexts. We are invited to first 
discern what are significant (rather than trivial) questions that 
researchers in this field should be addressing and then to impose rigorous 
standards of critical enquiry in our investigation of evidence, depth of 
interpretation and logic of argument. 
Since historians are inevitably faced with the task of dealing with 
the complexity and sheer volume of data involved in past events, 
thoroughness and detail should not be sacrificed in pursuit of 
interpretation and explanation. Both have an essential part to play in the 
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telling of the story and the revealing of its undercurrents. We are called 
onto search for the dynamics of change and its conditioning influences, 
being alert to the potential discovery of direction and destination in 
historical events and seeking to portray the interplay of people, ideas, 
conditions and events. One important challenge to accounting and 
management historians is to immerse themselves in the literature of the 
period they select to investigate so that they can gain a broader and 
deeper appreciation of the perceptions, behaviour and context of the 
historical participants of that period themselves. Finally, as historians we 
are challenged to rediscover the value and power of more adventurous 
and engaging styles of writing history in accounting and management so 
that readers will be attracted and drawn into investigation and debate of 
the issues historians seek to raise and contribute to the enhancement of 
knowledge and practice in the accounting and management disciplines. 
The above albeit brief insights demonstrate the opportunities for 
informing the theoretical "lenses", methodological approaches, 
interpretive approaches and styles of presentation that contemporary 
accounting and management historians have available for their selection. 
Revisiting the works and critiques of leading historians from the past 
offers a rich and hitherto inadequately tapped resource for this purpose. 
Some of this resourcing of contemporary historians' theoretical and 
methodological approaches to their research has been provided via 
particular methodological schools of thought that have gained support 
and adherence from groups of historians this century. For example 
Ranke's work provided the underpinning impetus for the historicist 
school of thought, while Marx provided the basis for the school of 
historical materialism. By way of contrast however, we must also 
recognise the contemporary popularity of the Foucaultian school of 
thought in historical research which is based upon the work of the French 
philosopher and sociologist Michel Foucault, who would not have 
considered himself to be a major historian and has not primarily been 
recognised as such. Others such as Herodotus, Thucydides, Gibbon, 
Collingwood and Carr provided the methodological foundations for the 
more general interpretive historiographic tradition represented in this 
paper's discussion of philosophies of historical knowledge and 
explanation. These complex linkages cannot be explored in any detail 
here, but they lend further support to the argument that our historical 
research in accounting and management would be well served by a 
revisiting and appreciation of the perspectives and methodologies of 
leading historians of the past. For now, we turn to a brief review of some 
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historical schools of thought that are pervasive amongst contemporary 
historians. 
METHODOLOGICAL SCHOOLS 
Considerable debate continues between various schools of 
historical thought as to the relative merits of their philosophies of and 
assumptions about historical knowledge and methodology. What they do 
offer is an increasingly rich array of historical perspectives, each 
offering potentially new insights into or critiques of our past. For a 
detailed assessment of the debates between three particular schools in 
relation to interpretations of industrial revolution firms' cost 
management practices, Fleischman et al (1996) provide a useful case in 
point. What follows here is a brief outline and summary of critical 
aspects of five particular schools that have been influential amongst 
contemporary historians - historicism, the Annales school, historical 
materialism, the Foucaultian school and postmodernism. As the works 
of leading individual historians from the past offer contemporary 
historical researchers a useful theoretical and methodological resource, 
so do these following schools of thought. 
Historicism 
As already pointed out earlier in this paper, Leopold von Ranke 
was pre-eminent in establishing historicism as the dominant mode of 
contemporary historical research beginning early in the 19th century in 
Germany. Historicism started as a conservative reaction to the excesses 
witnessed in the French revolution. Their observations of what happened 
when radical elements turned their backs on their country's past led to 
their rejection of previous beliefs in history as progress. The 
fundamental premise of historicism is that each age is a unique 
manifestation of the human spirit, having its own culture and values. 
Thus present-day values must be set aside and an earlier age seen from 
the inside (that is from the standpoint of its own time-bound context and 
beliefs). Accordingly historicism argues that the culture and institutions 
of a particular period can only be understood from the standpoint of that 
period itself (Tholfsen, 1967). 
Historicism does not simply aim to reconstruct the events of the 
past but to also reconstruct the atmosphere and mentality of the past -
trying to ascertain why people acted as they did by stepping into their 
shoes and attempting to see the world of their day through their eyes and 
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hence gaining a better understanding of their perceptions and 
judgements. Thus historicism tries to elucidate what is durable and what 
is transient or contingent upon our present condition or unique situation 
at a particular point in time. This recreating of the past in context or 
from the inside is regarded as a necessary precursor to explaining the 
past. Explanation requires the identification of trends, influencing and 
conditioning factors, consequences and an understanding of history as a 
process. In these respects historicism lays claim to a legitimate 
facilitating role (Goetz, 1986; Tosh, 1991). 
There are qualifications and criticisms that have been levelled at 
historicism. If historians try to examine a social grouping from their own 
perspective, whose standards of judgement should be adopted? - manager 
or employee, accountants or marketers, regulators or shareholders? It is 
certainly arguable that the historian can be subject to the influence of the 
priorities or assumptions of those who created the sources of evidence 
and by his or her own values (consciously or subconsciously). So 
objectivity for the historicist remains an elusive ideal. It is also argued 
that we can never recapture the complete impression of a historical 
moment as it was experienced by people at the time, because with the 
benefit of hindsight, we know what happened next and therefore our 
interpretations of the events and the significance we ascribe to them are 
unavoidably conditioned by that knowledge. However that same 
hindsight offers the historian an opportunity in two particular respects. 
It assists in identifying conditioning factors of which the historical 
participants were unaware and it enables the comparison of actual with 
originally intended consequences (Tosh, 1991). 
Annales School 
It is important for accounting and management historians to be 
aware of the work of the Annales School of historical research which 
was founded in 1929. Its founders were Marc Bloch (a mediaevalist) and 
Lucien Febvre (a 16th century specialist) who established a historical 
journal known as Annales d'Histoire Sociale et Economique. Febvre 
called for a "historical psychology" to be developed by historians and 
psychologists working together in order to avoid psychological 
anachronisms (the assumption that the mental framework by which 
people of earlier periods interpreted their world was the same as our own 
contemporary mental framework). This school demanded that historians 
learn from other social sciences such as economics, sociology, social 
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psychology and geography in order to make them aware of the full range 
of questions that they could ask of their sources of evidence. They 
attacked l'histoire evenementielle which was a narrative approach to 
history that sought to identify grand causes of events and situations. 
Instead the Annales School argued for more detailed and specific 
analyses of events, their interrelationships and influencing factors. 
Annales historians called for an end to compartmentalisation in 
history. They aimed to write "total history" (histoire totale or histoire 
integrale) which would recapture the great variety of human life and 
events (Stanford, 1987). This aim also oriented them towards the ideal 
of integrating physical and human geography, economic and social life, 
and political structures. Such an ideal remains difficult to achieve 
without some degree of compartmentalisation. The Annales School 
considered that historians who specialise in one branch of history risk 
attributing too much to one kind of factor in their explanations of 
historical change. Hence their advocacy of interdisciplinary 
considerations in historical study and their affinity for the methodologies 
of the social sciences. Historians of this school have continued to refine 
and broaden historical content and methodology and new directions in 
history over recent decades owe much to their influence ( Stanford, 
1986; Tosh, 1991). 
Historical Materialism 
As referred to earlier, this historical school of thought emanated 
from the writings of Karl Marx (Goetz, 1986; Tosh, 1991). From this 
perspective, events and structure are central to the understanding of 
historical process and action and structure of society are reciprocally 
related. The tensions between classes in a class ridden society are 
therefore a focal point of concern for historians of this school. Historical 
materialism contends that people engaging in social production enter into 
relations of production that are independent of their will and that the sum 
total of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of 
society. On that foundation, the legal and political superstructure are 
built. The mode of production in material life determines the general 
character of the social, political and intellectual processes of life. Thus 
political, legal and social structures and relationships are all based upon 
and dependent upon material production. 
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In this conceptualisation, society is conceived of as comprising 
three levels: 
1. Underlying the other levels are the forces of production (tools, 
techniques, raw materials, labour). 
2. The relations of production (the economic structure of society, 
being the division of labour and forms of co-operation 
/subordination sustaining production). 
3. The superstructure (the legal and political institutions and 
their supporting ideology). 
The interplay of these and certain long term structural factors are 
considered to make some historical events inevitable in the long term and 
constitute defining limits to the actions of groups and individuals. 
Over time, Marx's materialist concept of history has been applied, 
expounded and extended by many subsequent authors who have sought 
to refine and elaborate his approach to the past. The growth of Marxist 
historiography in recent decades has been diverse in nature although the 
bankruptcy and fall of some communist governments, the rise of renewed 
forces of conservatism in western societies, and a postmodern reaction 
against Marxism and other grand theories has produced a more acute 
appreciation of the limitations of historical materialism. Nevertheless, 
while subjecting history to such a doctrinaire theory risks producing 
interpretations of historical events that ignore or distort the complexities 
of the historical processes involved, this approach can produce 
challenging and illuminating hypotheses that raise important questions 
not previously considered by scholars bring some of the big questions of 
history more insistently to the centre of the arena (Tosh, 1991). 
Foucaultian History 
Another emerging tradition of historical scholarship in more recent 
times has been informed by the work of the French philosopher Michel 
Foucault. In studying the history of asylums, prisons and other closed 
institutions, he developed a theory of power and knowledge that has been 
taken up as an approach to historical investigations and analysis by 
historians concerned to discern these factors as underlying explanators 
of events and patterns of behaviour (Stewart, 1992). From the 
perspective adopted by this school of thought, power and knowledge are 
closely interconnected, power being viewed as a network of relationships 
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that operates from below as well as from above, being both potentially 
repressive and productive. Historians of this persuasion consider that 
from the late eighteenth century onwards, industrialists developed 
economic surveillance systems that constituted a new form of 
disciplinary power (Fleischman et al, 1995). Thus from the Foucaultian 
perspective, management and accounting systems are not simply rational 
economically driven mechanisms designed to facilitate economic 
efficiency and market competitiveness, but are systems of surveillance 
that render human activity subject to measurement and control. The 
Foucaultian historian is not particularly concerned with the origins of 
practices or events under study, nor with their patterns of development 
over time. Instead, the focus is upon the exercising of power and control 
within the historical situation being investigated. 
Arguably then, for Foucaultian historians, the central question is 
one of diagnosing the present by asking "How did we reach the present 
position?". They reject notions of evolutionary progress, of continuity in 
history (although Foucault became uncomfortable with being 
characterised as advocating the discontinuity of history), of the primacy 
of origins and economic forces (Fleischman et al, 1995; Stewart, 1992). 
Marxist historians have been the most vocal critics of the 
Foucaultian school, accusing them of ignoring power at the level of the 
State and being averse to economic and class structure variables in their 
analysis and explanations. They point to the Foucaultians' concern with 
language as diverting attention from materialist concerns and to the 
problematical nature of a universalist view (at the micro level) of power 
being allegedly common to all disciplinary regimes regardless of 
organizational differences. At the general level, the Foucaultian school 
has been criticised for undertheorising material, economic and political 
realities (Neimark, 1990, 1994; Armstrong, 1994). 
Postmodernism 
Foucault reflects a trend in some more recently constructed 
historical methodologies to reject the notion of grand theories and long 
term patterns of development in favour of diverse and eclectic 
approaches to and reinterpretations of historical events and practices 
(Tosh, 1991). Postmodernism seeks to problematise conventional 
explanations of history and to break away from an alleged 
unidimensional picture of historical development (Stewart, 1992). Such 
theorists as Foucault and Derrida have been identified with the 
movement towards discourse analysis which attempts to overturn any 
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notion of a privileged reading of history, instead choosing to reappraise 
discourses such as philosophy, politics, linguistics and history (Tosh, 
1991; Jenkins, 1991; Francis, 1990). 
So a growing number of historians of the postmodernist school 
reject what they see as the privileging of various centres (eg. Eurocentric, 
ethnocentric) and metanarratives. They represent a group that is post-
liberal, post-Marxist, post-western, post-industrial, but do not represent 
some cohesive, unified alternative group of scholars. They operate from 
a variety of perspectives but have reached a common view that neither 
their own positions nor anyone else's have an identifiable foundation. 
Instead they see history as "willed" and historical interpretations as 
entirely contingent upon the varying mix of epistemological, 
methodological and ideological assumptions adopted by the historian or 
reader. Thus instead of allowing "professional histories" to exercise 
hegemony, a whole range of distinctive histories are being constructed, 
including black histories, feminist histories, revolutionary histories, oral 
histories etc. Thus the postmodernists see history not as aiming at a real 
knowledge of the past but as a discursive practice that allows 
contemporary people to investigate the past and to reorganise it and 
reinterpret it according to their contemporary interests. The intention is 
one of making the previously invisible (eg. activities of women and 
previously ignored ethnic groups) become visible and developing fresh 
insights into the past that can be utilised to emancipate the present 
(Jenkins, 1991). 
A Rich Tapestry 
The above schools exhibit an array of widely varying philosophies 
of and approaches to the study of history. Together, they offer the 
contemporary historian a rich tapestry of divergent images and colours. 
Depending upon their particular research subject and objectives, 
historians acquainted with such schools have the opportunity to select 
from their theoretical perspectives, focal issues of concern, and preferred 
methodological and interpretive schemes in designing and executing their 
research. While research conducted upon the same archival material 
from perspectives of differing schools may yield alternative and at times 
conflicting historical stories and interpretations, such diversity in 
approach and outcomes should be celebrated rather than feared. This 
argument has recently been made by Fleischman et al (1996) in the form 
of advocating the potential advancement to knowledge through dialogue 
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between historians of different schools concerning their variant findings. 
The revisiting of archives from these differing perspectives affords us the 
opportunity to accumulate incremental knowledge concerning different 
dimensions of particular historical events, situations and periods. Some 
may be additive and complementary and others may conflict and thereby 
challenge previously held views that may have previously been 
uncritically accepted. 
While the various schools do differ in their philosophical, 
theoretical and methodological assumptions and underpinnings, it is 
arguable that accounting and management historians should have due 
regard for fundamental elements of historical knowledge and 
explanation. While there are divergent views concerning these elements, 
it is incumbent upon historical researchers to be familiar with the 
fundamental approaches to such matters as researcher beliefs and 
attitudes, the question of objectivity, the conceptual nature of historical 
events, facts and ideas, the attribution of causation, the process of 
interpretation and explanation, and the discovery role of historical 
writing. Without familiarity with these elements, historical researchers 
risk making methodological assumptions and/or selections that are 
inappropriate to the subject of study and incompatible with the school of 
thought to which they wish to adhere. What is being advocated here is 
not a slavish subservience to a set of methodological principles, but an 
awareness of some of the fundamental methodological choices which 
researchers should consciously consider and decide upon before 
embarking upon each project. 
PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 
AND EXPLANATION 
As a rich and distinctive field of research, history, like other 
disciplines, searches for events, relationships, values, significance, 
causation, and explanation. Philosophers of history have been primarily 
concerned with examining the significance and truth of historical 
statements, the plausibility of objectivity, and the process of 
interpretation and explanation (Atkinson, 1978). What follows is a 
selective excursion into approaches to the creation of historical 
knowledge that have informed traditional interpretive historical 
methodology. The approaches are reflective of "traditional 
historiographic" understandings which nonetheless have exhibited a great 
degree of variance between historiographers and philosophers of history 
over time. Nevertheless both in their commonalities and diversity, they 
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offer a fertile source of methodological approaches to investigation and 
analysis from which accounting and management historians can draw. 
That drawing may occur in a variety of ways. For example, a historian 
of the labour process school may not consider the question of researcher 
objectivity to be as desirable or achievable as might a historian of the 
historicist school, but can still benefit from an understanding of the 
traditional historiographic concern for the pursuit of objectivity. The 
benefit takes the form of making an informed choice about the degree of 
prior theorisation admitted to evidence interpretation and the clarification 
of the grounds upon which that variance from the pursuit of objectivity 
is to be justified. The traditional interpretive historian benefits from 
exposure to methodological choices which can facilitate greater rigour 
in the accessing and interpretation of primary sources and can lift the 
ensuing analysis above the level of naive antiquarian narrative. What 
follows does not represent a set of uncontroversial general principles but 
rather, key areas of historical understanding and explanation that have 
concerned historiographers over time and about which they have debated 
and advocated a variety of views and arguments. 
The Historian's Mental Attitude 
The mental attitude of the historian is both conditioned and 
disciplined by a number of elements and factors. They influence the 
historian's "angle of vision", define the approach, questions posed and 
avenues of inquiry utilised (Tholfsen, 1967, p.258). Arguably, the 
attitudinal characteristic most vital to the historian is historical 
understanding. This is produced by a combination of accumulated 
knowledge of the field and era, maturity of judgement and sufficient 
experience for the tasks of assessing probability, determining influences 
and consequences and assessing the relative significance of 
immeasurable forces (Thomson, 1969). Historical understanding is 
particularly assisted by the historian's general knowledge of the age 
within which his or her particular study is situated. This is essential if 
the historian is to identify and understand the governing presuppositions, 
assumptions, values and characteristics of people, institutions and 
organizations in the period under study ( Stanford, 1987). 
The historian is of course subject to a variety of influences that 
affect his or her investigation, analysis, interpretation and conclusions. 
This has been well recognised by those interpretive historians well versed 
in their philosophical underpinnings and methodological craft (and well 
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before critical historians voiced their concerns in this area). The 
historian's own psychological makeup, personal life experiences, areas 
of education, and contemporary social environment all influence his or 
her work. Further influences include the informal relationships and 
interchanges with colleagues and the current dominating philosophies 
and methodologies of relevant academic and professional disciplines 
(Stanford, 1987). These influences cannot all be recognised by the 
historian, but as far as possible the historian should aim to be self-aware, 
identifying and declaring any particularly significant potentially hidden 
assumptions or sources of bias (Barzun and Graff, 1985). 
While searching for relationships, patterns and trends, the 
historian should be alert to the risks of unjustified system building and 
simplistic generalisations. Diversity in time and place, change and 
continuity and discontinuity over time are all possibilities for discovery. 
Individuality, situational uniqueness and change are all elements of any 
age and their discovery and assessment requires the tracing of their 
relationships (whether continuous or discontinuous ) with prior and 
subsequent periods and the appropriation of knowledge and insights from 
other disciplines such as literature, philosophy, politics and other areas 
of the social sciences. In this way both the uniqueness and the evolution 
of events, practices and beliefs can be more fully penetrated (Tholfsen, 
1967; Thomson, 1969). 
For both the historian and the reader, history is a vicarious 
experience - a "second life extended indefinitely into the dark backward 
and abysm of time" (Barzun and Graff, 1985, p. 40). The practice of the 
craft requires imagination in determining the types of desirable sources 
before seeking and finding them, and in the reconstruction of a past 
world. The documents and artifacts of themselves have no life and never 
did have. What gave them life was the part they played in the activities 
and interchanges of people, so that to give meaning to these dead things, 
the historian must utilise imagination as well as judgement and argument 
in reconstructing the personal, organizational, social, economic and/or 
political world in which they were utilised (Barzun and Graff, 1985; 
Stanford, 1987). 
Still, essential disciplines of historical investigation and writing 
include the continual striving for accuracy in recording, order in 
assembling supporting notes and documentation, logic in tracing and 
making sense of sources, and intellectual honesty in confronting evidence 
and declaring its implications, regardless of whether they support or 
shatter one's hypotheses. Traditional interpretive historiography calls for 
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independence of attitude from creed, regime or orthodoxy so that the 
historian remains focussed upon the pursuit of truth, to the extent that it 
can be determined (Barzun and Graff, 1985; Thomson, 1969). As 
Thomson (1969, p. 104) has said; 
a vigorous and flourishing historiography is a symptom , 
and evidence, of a free society and a free culture. To fear 
the truth even about the past is a mark of true despotism. 
The Quest For Objectivity 
The past can never be seen or experienced "as it was" because 
historians can only access it via documents, artifacts and other people's 
recollections. Even then, objective knowledge of the past can only be 
approached via the subjective "experiencing" of these sources by the 
historian (Stanford, 1987). Historians in turn, are influenced in their 
selection and interpretation judgements by their contemporary social 
culture, interpretive framework and world-views (Weltanschauungen) 
(Tholfsen, 1967; Stanford, 1985). 
Atkinson (1978) points out that concerns about historical 
objectivity do not all arise at the same level. First, there is the issue of 
selection, for it is impossible to write down all valid statements about 
even the most narrowly defined past period or topic - such an exercise 
would fill untold volumes and never be read ! Further up the scale is the 
issue of interpretation and explanation. How is this informed and upon 
what questions (eg. conscious intent versus unconscious class interests) 
is it focussed? Yet selection and interpretation need not be automatically 
condemned as incompatible with objectivity. Different selections or 
interpretations of elements of a situation or event may prove to be 
complementary or supplementary, providing a greater composite picture 
of a complex "whole". 
What positivist researchers in the scientific tradition often fail to 
recognise is that the concept of objectivity is subject to multiple 
interpretations. For example it may be referred to as corresponding to 
fact or external reality, or alternatively it may be referred to as capable 
in principle of being agreed upon by any rational person. These two 
meanings may be divergent. Mathematical or scientific statements may 
be objective in the latter rather than the former sense because they are 
too abstract and idealised to correspond with reality in any external, 
independent sense. Biographical statements drawn from oral histories 
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may be objective more in terms of the former than the latter sense. When 
two or more historical accounts of the same event diverge, they may 
differ in terms of only one of the above meanings of objectivity and not 
always both. Historical objectivity might be asserted as increasing when 
the inevitably subjective judgements of a number of historians about a 
particular train of events or circumstances are found to be in agreement. 
This is characteristic of the social sciences where we seek to understand 
and explain people's thinking and behaviour by observing what they do 
across cumulative cases or repeated observations ( Atkinson, 1978; 
Stanford, 1987). 
In both scientific and historical research domains, the terms 
"subjective" and "objective" are at times used quite loosely to imply 
"opinion" versus "fact". This is a serious mistake. Barzun and Graff 
(1985) argue that every living person is automatically subjective in all 
his or her sensations, whether experiencing sensations of objects or his 
or her feelings relating to those objects. Objects are no more real than the 
sensations attached to them because objects can only be known by 
persons who subjectively experience them. Therefore they contend that: 
An objective judgement is one made by testing in all ways 
possible one's subjective impressions, so as to arrive at a 
knowledge of objects. (Barzun and Graff, 1985, p.175) 
For the historian then, the quest for objectivity is not the 
impossible challenge that scientific researchers might assume. Values 
and experiences of historians and historical subjects are not 
automatically obstacles to be overcome, but are useful tools in the 
rendering of historical accounts and explanations. To at least some 
degree, the determined historian can step outside his or her own time and 
its influences to study and empathise with the past, utilising inherited 
language, concepts and techniques of that period. At the same time, 
historians must recognise that they cannot entirely avoid the influence of 
their contemporary environment upon their selection and interpretation 
of facts.. Objectivity for the historian assumes a different meaning to that 
of the scientist or positivist. It represents the desire and continuing 
attempt to see things as they really were, striving to remove as far as 
possible the colouring of understanding by personally held intellectual 
presuppositions, political persuasions, and moral or philosophical 
principles. This requires self-criticism and declaration of the possible 
personal predispositions by the historian. Thus objectivity, variously 
defined, and admittedly difficult to attain (or even closely approach) 
nonethless represents a challenge that can be addressed by critical and 
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traditional historian alike—even if in different ways. Both can pursue 
historical objectivity via self-awareness, commitment to truth, and 
capacity for critical thinking and analysis (Tholfsen, 1967; Atkinson, 
1978; Stanford, 1987). 
Events, Facts and Ideas 
Stanford (1987, p.30) has argued that "What men and women do 
and suffer, make up the events of history." In turn, a selection of these 
events "make history" in their own right or in the judgement of a 
historian. Events can be variously conceived from the historian's 
perspective. They can be conceived as being the effects of causes and the 
portents of events to come (Oakeshott, 1983), patterns of experience that 
are brought into focus by individuals, groups, institutions and ideas 
involved in the event's organization (Porter, 1981), and happenings that 
do not survive but which are judged by observers to be important 
occurrences (Stanford, 1987). Events are divisible into smaller parts 
which may range in duration from a split second to a period of years. 
Thus the notion of time is derived from events. It is not an absolute but 
is comprised of the interaction between events (Stanford, 1987; Porter, 
1981). Thus the historian reconstructs the past from an assemblage and 
interpretation of events. History-as-account (the historian's 
reconstruction) emerges from history-as-event (events preserved in 
verbal and written forms) via the process of selection, analysis, creative 
imagination, interpretation and argument (Stanford, 1987; Oakeshott, 
1983). 
In selecting and assembling facts about events, we face another 
issue of conceptual specification. Facts are connected both to the world 
of things and the world of words, being neither wholly one or the other 
but always part of both. They are formulated only when a human mind 
judges that the world part and the word part of a fact fit one another. 
That is to say, the existence of facts depends upon human judgement 
about events and states of affairs and the words to appropriately 
represent them (Stanford, 1987). Any tendency to assume that facts 
speak for themselves must be studiously avoided. As Thomson (1969, p. 
39) puts it, "They speak only when spoken to and when asked the right 
questions". Facts very rarely can be found to occur independently of 
ideas or interpretation and even if they could, their assemblage would 
amount to no more than an unintelligible chronicle of little interest or 
intellectual merit (Barzun and Graff, 1985; Thomson, 1969). Indeed 
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Stanford (1987) argues that the term "fact" is best left unmentioned, 
given its "slippery" conceptual nature. 
Causes and Conditions 
In the most simple historical narrative there can be found 
embedded causal inferences or assumptions even when the authors were 
not ostensibly concerned with explaining what they were describing. 
What the writer may have intended as a factual observation, may prove 
to be an implication concerning causation to a reader (Atkinson, 1978). 
So for historians and their readers, the question of ascertaining causation 
is unavoidable and its nature and manner of approach is therefore crucial 
to the historian. 
When dealing in human affairs, it is almost impossible to uncover 
the cause of any particular event or circumstance. We can only hope to 
identify some of the conditions that lead to the emergence of the observed 
event or circumstance. Formalising causal analysis or assigning a 
dominant cause implies a capacity to model and measure which history 
rarely affords (Barzun and Graff, 1985). Thus multiple causes or 
preconditions are the likely background to any event, though the 
historian may be able to ascertain and justify some hierarchy among 
those conditions (Carr, 1987). These attendant conditions are the 
interaction of ideas, personality, environment, and events that yield some 
explanation of historical change (Thomson, 1969). Historians then, tend 
to offer a variety of conditioning historical factors, including states of 
affairs, events, actions and reasons for actions. Such conditioning factors 
tend to be offered in specific terms rather than as general causes 
although there is a willingness to attempt to identify more important 
conditions, as just stated. In addition, the historian may elect to 
distinguish between longer term fundamental conditioning factors that 
may have rendered an event more likely than more immediate factors 
(Atkinson, 1978). 
Thus historians are faced with the task of selecting conditioning 
factors of significance, just as they do when selecting from the sea of 
facts available to them. Carr (1987) argues that the standard of historical 
significance is whether the selected conditions can be fitted into a pattern 
of rational explanation and interpretation. That selection and 
determination is of course influenced by a variety of elements such as the 
historian's primary discipline (eg. economics, politics, accounting, 
management, sociology), or the focus of the overall study of which a 
particular event being explained forms part. Even the length of time 
between the event and when the historian studies it may influence this 
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selection, given comparisons with subsequent events (Atkinson, 1978). 
Thus it is a virtual dictum that historical assertions about factors that 
have conditioned events must be made not in terms of possibility, nor in 
terms of plausibility, but only in terms of probability. The probability of 
conditions leading to a particular event must be weighed up and critically 
judged by the historian. Those that are judged to have been significant 
must pass the test of having had a significant and highly probable 
influence upon the event under study and capable of having a logical and 
rational case made for their probable influence (Barzun and Graff, 
1985). 
Once again, the notion of causation in history can be said to differ 
from the natural sciences. The field of study and multiplicity of events, 
environments, conditioning factors and outcomes with which the 
historian must inevitably deal, is far too complex and variable for 
containment in any scientifically testable model requiring "necessary and 
sufficient under all circumstances" conditions to be met before any 
causal inference can be made. Intuitive but disciplined causal judgement 
is a necessary part of the historian's world. Partly this is also the result 
of evidence rarely being available in appropriate or sufficient form for 
a scientific approach to theory testing. Attempts to replicate the scientific 
approach in this regard may lead the historian to draw conclusions about 
conditioning factors well beyond the scope and justification of the data 
available. Thus judgement regarding conditioning factors is to be 
improved through a disciplined understanding and application of the 
concepts and tools of the historian's craft and by recourse to as much 
reliable evidence as can be located and analysed (Atkinson, 1978). 
Interpretation and Explanation 
Interpretation and explanation are closely related historical 
activities. Interpretation attempts to render an account of what really 
happened rather than what appears to have happened, thereby 
penetrating the manifest history of the conscious and stated intentions to 
reveal a latent history of underlying values, economic, social, cultural 
and political influences of which participants at the time were unaware 
(or only partly aware). The role of explanation is to clarify the minds and 
intentions of the historical participants and to elucidate the linkages 
between conditioning factors, events and outcomes ( Stanford, 1987; 
Tosh, 1991). Historical explanation, Atkinson (1978, p. 138) argues, has 
"achieved the highest level of sophistication and professionalism, without 
becoming theoretical; without to any significant extent developing a 
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technical vocabulary of its own...." Historical thinking, with its precise 
and subtle content, stands in contrast to the relative simplicity of its 
forms of expression. In Atkinson's (1978, p. 139) view then, history has 
developed into "an impressive exemplification of what can be achieved 
by the careful use of very ordinary intellectual tools". 
Explanation in history operates along a gradient, from implied 
explanations that underpin a purely narrative historical account to 
studies that focus upon rational evidence-based explanations of observed 
events. Some historians concentrate their efforts upon presenting a 
seamless narrative, pruned of methodological scaffolding and posing 
questions or relationships by implication. Others present the narrative as 
part of a broader canvass that clearly paints the questions left 
unanswered from prior studies or new questions raised by the discovery 
of new evidence. The latter choose to tackle historical questions directly 
by way of detailing processes involved in the events portrayed in the 
narrative, making them intelligible to the reader, and accounting for the 
reasons why the process appears to have occurred, taken its observed 
shape and produced its observed outcomes (Atkinson, 1978). 
Historical interpretation and explanation have their limitations. 
For example, readers often expect historians to explain how and why 
events occurred as they did. So explanations may be in part conditioned 
by the focus of the study and the historian's own background and 
perspectives but also by the historian's perceptions of the readers' own 
expectations (Stanford, 1987). The standing of historical explanations 
is somewhat more limited than those to be found in the sciences. 
Scientifically derived and tested hypotheses may be subject to change as 
new evidence emerges, but at any one point in time, they can be found to 
attract a wide range of support and agreement among scientists. 
Consensus can be rather more difficult to find among historians in 
relation to some historical events and their associated explanations. 
Diverse explanations can be brought about by the number and 
complexities of factors to be considered and assessed, the multiple 
elements involved in historical change, and the variety of overlapping 
environments that may have been at work. Each historical situation is 
unique in that it represents a confluence of environmental variables, 
people, situations, circumstances and events that will never be exactly 
repeated. Thus each historical situation must be investigated anew, with 
the attendant possibility of different findings, all subject to the already 
discussed limitations of being able only to ascribe probable conditioning 
factors and their relative importance (Tosh, 1991). 
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That no historical explanation can be valid or reliable because it 
is always capable of being rewritten ten or twenty years on, misses the 
point and value of historical explanation. That explanations can and do 
change offers clear evidence of the usefulness of the exercise. History 
should and does respond to the demands that society makes upon it. 
Successive revisions of past explanations do not necessarily negate 
former explanations but are potentially additive, revealing more and 
more about our past, gradually eliminating those views that are clearly 
untenable and offering us a richly textured picture of a complex past 
(Barzun and Graff, 1985). 
Revelation Through Writing 
The discipline of writing is probably nowhere more important than 
in the course of historical research. History is a way of using language 
and language has many different functions including recalling the past, 
conveying information, enabling imagination, stimulating emotion, 
provoking action, and giving form to life. History addresses and 
represents the world almost completely by means of language, in both 
linguistic and literary senses. Thus history has the capacity at the one 
time to be descriptive, analytical, philosophical and poetic (Stanford, 
1987). Historians therefore can enhance their analysis and final product 
greatly by attention to the organizing of sections, chapters etc.; the words 
and idioms employed; the emphasis, tone and rhythm of their sentence 
construction; the art of quoting and citing; and the modes of presentation 
employed (Barzun and Graff, 1985). 
But the task of writing history of itself offers the prospect of 
revelation. Sources and the complexity of conditioning factors and 
interrelated events may prove so difficult to penetrate at the stage of 
primary analysis that only through the discipline of writing historical 
prose does the researcher begin to more clearly identify and more folly 
comprehend the interconnections between different elements and 
experiences. Thus for the historian, the task of writing is a creative one. 
This stands in marked contrast to the scientific or positivist researcher 
whose research and analysis has usually yielded its findings and 
conclusions before writing commences. For the latter, writing is a task 
of clearly expressing and summarising what the researcher has already 
discovered before commencing the writing up process. Quite a different 
experience awaits the historian who commences writing with a partial 
understanding of the sources of evidence and their possible implications, 
but who travels further on a voyage of discovery that invariably yields 148
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new insights and understandings progressively as the composition of the 
prose proceeds (Tosh, 1991). 
In addition, for the historian, writing represents a crucial tool for 
conveying a mental reconstruction of the past to the readers. The 
historian's construction of the past stands between the past events and 
the present book or article and the book or article stands between the 
historian's construction and the reader's construction. Thus the writing 
of history is a disciplined and demanding art, attempting to meet the 
challenge of conveying the intended meanings of the historian's 
construction of the past intact to the reader, thereby achieving a similar 
construction in the readers' minds. It is a task of securing the readers' 
intellectual and imaginative co-operation (Stanford, 1987). Thus history 
emerges as hybrid discipline that requires the simultaneous application 
of disciplined technical and analytical procedures with imaginative and 
stylistic skills, implying a composite application of scientific, critical and 
artistic methods (Tosh, 1991). 
Historical Discipline 
The above excursion into elements of traditional interpretive 
historiography offer the intending accounting and management history 
researcher a set of disciplinary philosophies, reference points and tools 
which can be considered, selectively employed and modified according 
to the school of thought or particular methodological perspective adopted 
by the researcher. Regardless of the school of thought or perspective 
adopted, they offer a disciplined starting point that can enhance the 
rigour and credibility of the investigation and its resulting findings. That 
such methodoligical discipline is facilitative and adaptive is best 
demonstrated by the emerging extensions of accounting history into 
interdisciplinary areas such as oral and business history (oral history 
being sociologically oriented and business history being economics 
oriented). Once again methodological issues common to traditional 
interpretive historiography and unique to the characteristics of these 
other fields of study are apparent. As is depicted in the following brief 
outlines of these two fields, they present both challenges and 
opportunities. 
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EXTENSIONS INTO ORAL AND BUSINESS HISTORY 
Oral History 
Oral history provides us with first-hand recollections of 
participants in events or situations being studied. Their recollections are 
obtained by interviews (normally taped) which are archived in electronic 
form or written up in print form (Tosh, 1991). Early historians such as 
Herodotus and Thucydides utilised oral sources as major primary 
sources of evidence for their work, as did historians and chroniclers in 
the Middle Ages. From the Renaissance to the 19th century, while written 
sources grew in importance, oral sources were still regarded as a 
valuable supplement. In the 19th century, oral sources were largely 
abandoned, until they regained a measure of popularity in the late 1960s, 
particularly among social historians. That resurgence has been further 
stimulated by historians' investigations of groups such as women, the 
working class, immigrants and ethnic minorities who have been omitted 
from recorded history (and until more recent times, thereby silenced). 
Oral history interview techniques generally follow social science 
field research interview techniques (Collins and Bloom, 1991; 
Thompson, 1988). Background literature requires consulting for 
familiarising the researcher with context, issues, terminology and to 
assist the formulating of interview questions. Decisions must be made 
regarding the degree of structuring of the interview (versus unstructured) 
and some pilot interviews may assist in testing, determining and refining 
the appropriate approach. Even when a structured set of interview 
questions have been developed, the interviewer may find it necessary to 
allow the interview to digress into unplanned matters due to unexpected 
observations being made by the interviewee. Generally, questions should 
be framed in as simple, straightforward and neutral a style as possible. 
Complex issues should be tackled via a hierarchy of questions. The 
language employed in questioning should be familiar to the interviewee 
and leading questions must be avoided at all costs. The interview is 
generally located in a place where the interviewee feels at ease and 
generally the person is interviewed alone (to help avoid any peer pressure 
for socially acceptable answers). Interviewer comments are restricted to 
questions, prompts, acknowledgements and encouragement. Oral history 
can be assembled as a single informant's narrative story, a collection of 
stories or as a cross sectional or longitudinal analysis. 
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Oral history allows us to penetrate how events, structures and 
contexts were experienced. Indeed, it allows us to penetrate perceptions, 
motivations and beliefs. In explaining past actions, what participants 
believe happened can be just as important a contribution to our 
understanding as the "facts" of what happened (Thomson, 1969). 
Impressions, symbols and even myths are all inextricably mixed in 
individual and collective human perception and can shed light on change 
processes, past decisions, attitudes and relationships. In this way, oral 
history offers the historian the prospect of getting a little closer to 
entering into the experience of people in the past, penetrating the deeper 
structures and processes at work in the activities of participants in 
historical events and their environments (Tosh, 1991). Of course oral 
history carries its own limitations. The interviewer may have 
unintentionally (eg. even by relative social status to the interviewee) 
affected interviewee responses. The interviewee in a sense shares in the 
creating of new evidence. Interviewees' recollections may be 
contaminated by information they have absorbed from other sources, 
nostalgia for times past or some sense of past grievance. The 
researcher's topic may not be of great interest to the interviewee or they 
may not be willing to tell the truth about certain events. Assertions may 
be made with less care than if they had been written and recollections 
may be a combination of past memories and contemporary 
reinterpretations in the mind of the interviewee (Thompson, 1988; 
Collins and Bloom, 1991). As Tosh (1991) puts it, the notion of an 
absolutely direct encounter with the past is an illusion, since the voice of 
the past is the voice of the present too. Nevertheless, oral history 
provides us with history that is more personal, more socially oriented and 
more immediate than traditional written sources. It has the potential to 
add significant new dimensions to published history. 
Relatively recent examples of oral history research in the field of 
accounting include Spacek (1985), Mumford (1991), Hammond and 
Streeter (1994), and Parker (1994). Most recently, a critical appraisal of 
methodological issues in oral accounting history has been provided by 
Hammond and Sikka (1996). They challenge the notion of apolitical and 
objective histories and focus their attention upon oral history's potential 
for giving a voice to individuals and groups who have been 
underrepresented in the accounting literature and hence effectively 
silenced. Their methodological discussion extends our understandings 
of the unique potential, methodological characteristics and interpretive 
challenges of oral history research. 
151
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1997, Vol. 24, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 1997
Parker: Informing Historical Research in Accounting and 143 
Management: Tradition, Philosophies, and Opportunities 
Business History 
The foregoing methodological dimensions apply equally to the 
research and writing of accounting, management and business histories. 
While critical and postmodernist historians would debate the 
applicability of some dimensions to their particular approaches, the 
perception, rigour, and defensibility of all historians' work stands to gain 
from greater attention to such dimensions. Duke and Coffman (1993) 
have provided a detailed methodological guide to the writing of business 
histories and their observations are equally applicable to accounting and 
management historians who may be contemplating or engaged in such a 
task. They address important practical issues such as the contract of 
access and work between the company and the researchers, defining the 
scope of the project, interviewing and transcribing, writing and rewriting, 
and the employment of photographs and images. The role and 
methodologies of business history are critically reviewed by Gourvish 
(1995) who addresses the problems of developing theory, the relationship 
between business history and the social sciences, and argues for the 
retention of case study method. 
Armstrong (1990) has provided a comprehensive discussion of 
approaches to dealing with archival materials in the writing of business 
histories (with specific reference to British archives).. These offer a 
foundation for accounting and management historians dealing with any 
research topic involving the investigation of archival sources. The 
premier examples of business history research can be accessed in the 
journals Business History (UK) and Business History Review (USA). 
The potential uses and problems in business history have been discussed 
and critiqued by Coleman (1987). He summarises the problems as those 
histories which are manifestly anecdotal, unreadable, purely narrative 
(lacking any analysis), and public relations exercises. The potential he 
ascribes to scholarly business histories are a more profound 
understanding of the most important unit of organization in our 
contemporary economies, ascribing equal importance to the business and 
political past, and rendering assistance to the process of contemporary 
economic change. In the business history domain, researchers are 
beginning to appreciate the potential for cross fertilisation between the 
work, foci and concerns of business and accounting historians. This is 
evidenced in the accounting research being published in business history 
journals (eg. Edwards and Newell, 1990; Parker, 1991). This potential 
relationship between business and accounting history is more explicitly 
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discussed by Mathias (1993) who argues that synergy exists between 
them with potential advantages accruing to both. 
IN CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion has painted a broad canvass that offers 
a "grand tour" view of the foundations of historical research. It reiterates 
the case for the importance of historical research in the fields of 
accounting and management, introduces some of the significant historical 
writing traditions in the history of humanity, outlines some of the schools 
of thought that have governed historical research and writing in the past, 
and identifies dimensions of historical philosophy that inform historical 
investigation and writing. While each of these areas of discussion have 
generated and warrant whole fields of literature in their own right, they 
have been assembled here to give the reader an outline of the overall 
context within which accounting and management history studies must 
find their place. 
Historians' purposes include the identification of patterns, the 
analysis of causes and consequences, and the interpretation and 
explanation of historical events. They aim to make visible past 
situations, activities, groups, issues and contexts. Arguably, the 
analysies and interpretations offered by historical researchers of all 
philosophical and methodological persuasions will be better informed by 
an appreciation of the variety and wealth of philosophical traditions that 
to date have underpinned historical scholarship. Such familiarity should 
permit a selection of approach from among these traditions that is 
appropriate to the purpose of study and defensible. Similarly, a 
consciously articulated position on historiographic concepts such as 
objectivity, reconstruction of events, causation, interpretation and 
explanation, can better position and inform the construction of narrative, 
the explanation of events and the arguments concerning outcomes. 
The responsibility of accounting and management historians is to 
provide a historical perspective that can bring new insights into our 
understanding of the past and inform debate rather than producing 
historical interpretations simply aimed at servicing or supporting a 
particular predetermined ideology or strategy. For accounting and 
management historians it is also important to remember that an 
excessively single-minded preoccupation with a narrow set of technical 
issues may lead to evidence being taken out of context and 
misinterpreted. Indeed we must be wary of the temptation to develop 
histories that are exclusively or narrowly technicist focussed. Accounting 
and management issues, concepts and practices may be equally 
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effectively investigated in the broader context of organizational, social 
and political studies. Furthermore, the historian must be sufficiently 
flexible and broadly focussed to modify objectives in the light of 
questions generated by the sources themselves rather than imposing 
predetermined ideas on the evidence itself. 
Nevertheless we must recognise and welcome the emerging 
contribution of critical and postmodernist historians. Through their 
particular theoretical lenses, they offer fresh perspectives and insights 
into "old" issues, and challenge previously accepted assumptions and 
interpretations. By the questions they raise, accounting and management 
researchers are forced to reconsider their taken-for-granted assumptions, 
to confront previously invisible or silenced constituents of accounting 
and management. Finally, critical and postmodernist historians compel 
us to grapple with contemporary questions of ethics and equity in the 
light of newly revealed historical understandings. 
History is a craft that offers a voyage of discovery in the process 
of consulting sources of evidence and in analysing discourses. This also 
occurs in the very act of writing, when the historian is confronted by new 
understandings and insights that emerge from the process of detailing 
situations, events, relationships and their contexts. In their "scientific" 
pursuit of knowledge, the majority of contemporary accounting and 
management researchers have chosen to ignore the heritage of the past, 
failing to see its potential relevance to contemporary issues and avoiding 
the challenge of dealing with its investigation. Yet there are encouraging 
signs of an upsurge in accounting history, and more recently, 
management history papers and texts in the research literature. 
Researchers of various theoretical and philosophical persuasions are 
beginning to discover that historical reservoir of untapped knowledge. 
We have an opportunity to press ahead in that voyage into the past and 
a duty to equip ourselves adequately for the journey. 
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In MEMORIAM 
MARY ELLEN DECOSTE 
And he will raise you up on eagle's wings, bear you 
on the breathe of dawn, make you shine like the sun. . 
Mary Ellen DeCoste, a doctoral student at UNT, served as 
Associate Editor of AHJ from 1994 until her untimely death on 
April 15, 1997. She brought the same indomitable spirit to that 
task, despite trying circumstances, that she did to all of her work. 
Mary Ellen was trained as a mathematician and worked as a 
research scientist at MIT for many years until the death of her 
oldest son in the Gulf War prompted a career change. She 
brought a keen analytic mind, a love of learning, and a pure joy in 
teaching to our doctoral program. She brightened everyone's day 
with her boundless enthusiasm. She is sorely missed by all who 
worked with her; but she has left a rich legacy of resiliency and 
pursuit of excellence that will not be forgotten. 
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Abstract: Samuel Paul Garner spent nearly seven decades, 
as a student, professor, administrator, leader and visionary, 
enhancing the understanding and development of our 
academic community. Born in 1910, he studied at Duke 
University, then briefly as a non degree student at Columbia 
before teaching and then entering the Ph.D. program at the 
University of Texas at Austin. At Texas, under the 
direction of George Hillis Newlove, he focused upon 
accounting. His interest in history had been kindled by a 
noted economic historian Earl J. Hamilton, under whom 
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Garner had studied at Duke. His first post doctoral 
appointment would be his lifelong assignment, as a member 
of the faculty of what is now the Culverhouse School of 
Accountancy at the University of Alabama. Starting in 
1939 he served as a faculty member, next as department 
chair, and then for seventeen years, from 1954 to 1971, as 
dean of the College of Business. His career achievements 
are many and include being the only person to serve as 
President of both the American Accounting Association 
[1951] and the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools 
of Business [1964-65]. His post-retirement activities 
identified with the quarter century from 1971 through 1996 
permitted members of subsequent generations to benefit 
from his knowledge and counsel. Garner's work as a 
scholar, a historian, an institutional developer and a 
visionary—especially in the area of international relations, 
are told in this paper. A special appendix, which contains 
the last known curriculum vita prepared by Garner, is also 
provided. 
Si Monumentum - Requires Circumspice/If You Seek His 
Monument, Look Around You. 
Paul Garner died October 16, 1996, at the age of 86. In this paper, 
we present some of his many achievements. However, this is but a 
"glimpse" of the accomplishments of this remarkable human being. Paul 
was perhaps the last of the leaders of an age when the academic and 
professional community were driven to new levels of size and activity 
during the economic expansion of the post World War II period. Garner 
worked with and knew well the individuals who comprise a list of 
Accounting Hall of Fame members, including William Paton, Carman 
Blough, Eric Kohler and David Solomons. His involvements spanned 
the six decades following his doctoral work at the University of Texas, 
which was completed in 1940. Although he "retired" in 1971, he enjoyed 
good health most all of his life, and he remained a presence in events, 
including the Accounting Historians Seventh World Congress in 
Kingston, Ontario in August 1996 and being in attendance at research 
seminars and Ph.D. student presentations until shortly before the brief 
hospitalization which preceded his death. 
This paper is presented in six sections. The first provides a 
biographical review, followed by a section which profiles Garner's view 
of scholarship. The third and fourth sections consider his research and 
institutional contributions. The final two sections address his 
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international activities and role and his legacy of wisdom. An appendix 
is also provided which reproduces curriculum vita, believed to the last 
one completed by Garner. It contains many details which are beyond the 
scope of the text of this paper. 
BACKGROUND 
Paul Garner was born August 15, 1910, in Yadkinville, North 
Carolina to a family of moderate means, a factor that proved repeatedly 
important in shaping his life. He was the oldest of seven children and 
fond of telling stories about these times and the lengthy walks required 
to get to school, or to anywhere for that matter. His younger brother 
Thad, [who died in 1997], with whom Paul was very close, and advised, 
became a local business legend in the Carolinas for making "Texas Pete 
Hot Sauce" which is one of the best selling products of is kind in the 
nation. 
Garner did undergraduate study in the field of economics at Duke 
University where he had earned a scholarship. He tutored football 
players, waited tables and worked in the library and during the summer, 
drove a cab for his father who owned a taxi business, so as to pay part 
of the cost of his college education. He even managed to save. From his 
savings, Paul paid for a graduation trip to Europe in the summer of 1932. 
This six week trip was the prelude to his becoming a famous global 
traveler and the "ambassador" of academic accountancy from the U.S. 
Paul returned to Duke and, in 1934, earned a Master's degree in 
economics. With the support of Dr. Earl J. Hamilton, a graduate of 
Mississippi State University, under whom Garner had first studied 
business history at Duke, Paul was hired to teach at Mississippi State for 
two years, 1935-37. Among the five courses he taught each semester 
were several courses in accounting. He became aware that accounting 
professors were relatively better paid than those in economics. Realizing 
that a doctorate in accounting would provide him a better return, he 
decided to specialize his advance studies in the accounting discipline. 
Garner entered the University of Texas in the Fall of 1937 to pursue the 
Ph.D. Working under the direction of, and with materials available from 
George Hillis Newlove, he completed a dissertation, Evolution of Cost 
Accounting to 1925, in 1940. 
Prior to defending this dissertation, he chose his most rewarding 
offer, of an appointment at the University of Alabama, in 1939. He and 
his wife, Ruth Bailey Garner, who he had married in 1934, and later 
traveled the world with and had three children by, settled in to make 
Tuscaloosa their home. At the University, he achieved full professorship 
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in 1943 and became department chair in 1949. In 1954, Dean Lee 
Bidgood, who served 35 years in that office, retired and Paul succeeded 
him as dean where he would serve until his retirement at age 60 in 1971. 
GENTLEMAN SCHOLAR 
Perhaps the quality which was universally attributed to Paul Garner 
by all who knew him well was that he was a gentle man, the truest 
gentleman. His presence at conferences and seminars constantly 
reminded all of gentile consideration and behavior of a time gone by. 
Paul was always constructive in his comments at seminars, glowing in 
his praise when he heard a new idea, supportive of scholarly efforts 
irrespective of direction, conclusion or paradigm. He was genuinely 
interested in all areas of accounting and he read widely to support his 
ability to understand issues. Above all, Paul continuously, but gently, 
sought to keep research presentations focused on the application to 
current, practical problems facing accounting. In Paul's world, it was 
not scholarly to demean another's work as a tactic in attacking a 
different paradigm. His world of scholarship involved growth, 
expansion, new ideas and new insight and breadth of understanding and 
knowledge. In this world, no person and no research was omniscient. 
No one possessed all the answers to a particular question. Research was 
exciting because of its promise of discovery. In this sense, his pursuit of 
knowledge was a lifelong scholarly endeavor. 
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
Paul Garner published over forty scholarly papers which appeared 
in a variety of languages from 1940 to 1980. Several of these papers 
were published in the Accounting Review [TAR]. The subject matter 
included historical and biographical topics, papers on accounting 
education and papers on practice issues such as cost accounting for 
government contracts. 
His last major publication activity was to serve as co-editor with 
Atsuo Tsuji for the Greenwood Publishing volume Studies in Accounting 
History—Tradition and Innovation for the Twenty-First Century, which 
appeared in 1995. A reviewer, writing in the July 1996 volume of the 
CPA Journal, observed that while "reading this book one is reminded 
that some of these situations have occurred in other countries over an 
expansive period of time." In this regard, the volume had served its 
purpose to provide perspective for today's practitioner! 
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In addition to this extensive variety of publication, Paul served as 
originating editor of the "Teacher's Clinic" a popular section of TAR, 
from 1947-1950. 
Paul's most notable contribution to the literature of our discipline 
stemmed from his dissertation. With the support of his mentor, 
Newlove, Garner revised and updated the doctoral project and published 
it in 1954. Evolution of Cost Accounting to 1925 has been reprinted in 
paperback and hardback and has consistently been used by scholars into 
a third generation. It has been translated and published in Japan [1954] 
with a version in Chinese [1989] as well. In 1996, with the support of 
The Academy of Accounting Historians and an alumnus of the 
University of Alabama, Garner gave permission for the book to be 
"published" it is entirety on the Academy's website, without any fees or 
charges to be assessed. It was to be his final legacy. The work appeared 
in full text in June 1996. It is now available instantaneously around the 
world; the first accounting book known to be so published. In this way, 
Paul Garner was the visual, living and symbolic link between classic 
accounting theorists such as William Paton and A.C. Littleton and 
cyberspace. A. C. Littleton's comprehensive tome Accounting Evolution 
to 1900, first published in 1933, provided both a guide and a challenge to 
Garner. Littleton's work was recognized and acclaimed, but seemingly 
overlooked cost-managerial accounting's role in the development of 
industrial capital market accounting. Paul undertook his research project 
with materials provided by Newlove during this early period of academic 
historical research development in the United States. Garner 
meticulously traced numerous examples of cost accounting for labor and 
materials in job cost systems in the 14th through 16th Centuries in Europe 
and thereby established the "provenance" of what was becoming known 
as management accounting. He observed that these early cost techniques 
were not widespread, perhaps due to secrecy as required in the business, 
for such techniques were valuable to managing complex enterprises. He 
also observed that, despite evidence of books published on financial 
accounting for trade and agriculture, no texts on cost accounting appear 
until the mid-Nineteenth Century, thus limiting the dispersion of cost 
practices. Cost accounting during the Renaissance arose, Gamer noted, 
because "owners of small central workshops found themselves 
competing now not only against guilds, but also among themselves" [pp. 
2-3]. More accurate records of costs became necessary as a factor of 
success. An incentive was provided then for careful study of many 
phases of practice which had previously been neglected. 
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After examining why, where and how cost accounting was used in 
the centuries before the Industrial Revolution, Garner then devoted the 
major portion of his work to the examination of various topics in cost 
accounting such as overhead allocation, transfer pricing among 
departments, byproduct and scrap accounting. As noted above, Paul's 
work was just as Littleton's, a general history. Furthermore, Garner 
begins and ends his work with quotations from Littleton's "Evolution" 
[pp. 1; 349]. 
In addition to this major treatise, Garner's other major writings 
included authorship of textbooks and teaching materials with his mentor, 
George Hillis Newlove and others. Elementary Cost Accounting [1941] 
written with Newlove and revised in 1949 was adopted by the United 
States Department of Defense during World War II as a basic instruction 
manual to train defense contractor personnel in the Educational Defense 
Program. Thousands of managers and engineers of companies dealing 
with the Defense Department learned cost accounting via the Newlove-
Garner book. With the revision in 1949, the text was translated into 
Spanish and distributed throughout Latin America by the U.S. Agency 
for Assistance in Development. 
Another major Newlove-Garner project was a two volume advanced 
accounting text written in the early 1950s which received excellent 
reviews in TAR. [16 (Fall 1950) p. 47 for Vol. II 17 (Spring 1951) p. 60 
for Vol. I] 
BUILDER OF INSTITUTIONS 
Paul Garner will be remembered not only for his scholarship but also 
because he was instrumental in the development of several important 
institutions. Paul's skill as a leader and visionary have benefited a wide 
range of organizations. This legacy will be felt into the 21st Century. 
His involvement, for instance, in the American Accounting Association 
[AAA] began in the early 1940s. Paul assisted in the 1948 founding of 
the Southeast Region of the AAA, including annual regional meetings. 
The Southeast was the AAA's first region and served as an important 
example for the formation of other regions. Paul served as national 
president of the AAA in 1951. Under his leadership, regionalism was 
promoted and regions expanded. Paul visited many locations and gave 
support to the idea of regions, which critics argued would divide the 
association. One of Paul's legacies is the success which the regions have 
achieved in building the service base for the AAA. Decades later, Paul 
also assisted in the formation of both the International and Public 
Interest sections of the AAA. 
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When the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business 
[AACSB] initiated an international outreach program in the mid 1960s, 
Paul was an influence, especially during his term as President of that 
organization in 1964. In the 1950s, he had begun to "invest" in his 
personal balance sheet by traveling to business and academic 
conferences throughout the world. Accompanied by his wife, Ruth, he 
thus came to be recognized as the unofficial ambassador of the U.S. 
academic accounting community. His network was supported by a "pen 
pal" correspondence list which numbered in the hundreds. An active 
correspondent, Paul's letter's, dictated, typed but then most often hand 
addressed, were a common link before the rise of e-mail. He continued 
this activity until immediately before his death. His worldwide contacts 
and his standing among not only accountants, but also business school 
deans and business leaders, especially in countries which were 
developing management education, continued to grow until the very end. 
His interest in international subject matter was an important catalyst in 
the eventual development of an accreditation rationale for the subject. 
In the 1970s, Paul supported the formation of The Academy of 
Accounting Historians, which held its formative meeting in Quebec 
during the 1973 annual meeting of the American Accounting 
Association. Although the Academy did not become a special interest 
section of the AAA, it predated and modeled the special interest 
movement, and early Academy leaders counseled with the founders of the 
American Taxation Association, for example, when the latter group held 
its formative meetings in 1974 at the AAA meetings in New Orleans. In 
1984, Garner served as founding President of the International 
Association for Accounting Education and Research [IAAER]. This 
organization presently serves as a unifying force to enhance global 
relations among accounting academic organizations worldwide. 
Perhaps the institution which benefited the most from a long 
association with Paul is The University of Alabama. During his years, 
as enrollments grew from post World War II expansion, Paul was 
instrumental in preparing the foundation for the future of management 
education in the state through supporting program development. Student 
enrollment in the College of Commerce grew from a small base to more 
than 700 annual graduates at the time of his retirement. Graduate and 
undergraduate program faculty grew and, in turn, improved curriculum 
and performance. Under Paul's leadership as accounting department 
chairman, the College's first two Ph.D.s were awarded to Catherine 
Miles and Robert Seiler in 1953. Paul had actively supervised their 
accounting research. These were the sixth and seventh Ph.D.s granted 
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by the University of Alabama which had begun offering Ph.D.s in 
selected areas only three years before. Catherine Miles was not only the 
first Ph.D. from the College, she was the first female at UA to earn a 
doctorate. In 1965, Vivian Malone Jones, the first black student to 
receive a degree from the University, graduated in management. Paul 
had played a role in opening new programs and in opening doors in other 
ways as well. 
Soon after Paul was appointed to the faculty, he and Chester Knight, 
the chair of the accounting faculty, formed the CPA firm of Knight and 
Garner. It was the first such firm in Tuscaloosa. In his CPA capacity, 
Paul served as the external auditor for the city, and later, as its financial 
advisor over many decades as the city grew substantially in the 1970s 
through the 1990s. Up to the time of his death, he maintained a small tax 
clientele and continued to serve on boards of directors of several 
businesses. From this perspective, Paul made his contribution to the 
financial and professional infrastructure of his community, serving as a 
counselor, guiding new practitioners and a developing city. 
During the early 1950s, Garner became involved in continuing 
professional education. This concept had been popularized in the 
literature following World War II as CPAs returned from either military 
or government services and required "refresher" courses. Paul led to the 
effort to teach the first course of this type in Alabama. He presented a 
course on "How to Set Fees" in Birmingham in 1954 which was 
subsequently used in other states across the country. Also, at about this 
time, following the departure from the University of Alabama of 
Professor Ralph Russell, one of Garner's Ph.D. classmates, Paul 
"inherited" the fledgling CPA Review Course, and invited others on the 
faculty to participate. Fifty years and over 10,000 candidates-students 
later, the program continues as a hallmark of continuing education 
activity at the University. 
ACCOUNTANCY'S AMBASSADOR 
At the time of his death, Paul was continuing his "pen pal" 
correspondence and was in active communication with scores of the 
individuals who were a part of his letter writing network at home and 
abroad. In several places, especially the Far East, his role and influence 
is widely recognized. Indeed it was in the Far East where Paul and Ruth 
first traveled extensively—continuing to "invest" in the personal balance 
sheet asset of professional contact development. Citizens of South 
America, Africa and Europe also were his neighbors. Paul, in fact, 
visited many of the principal countries in these regions not once, but 
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several times. For example, South Africa alone was visited by the 
Garners on six separate occasions. In the 1970s, following his "official" 
retirement from the University, Paul would respond with interest to 
inquiries about a travel map in his office, a wall map of the world with 
pin and string routes leading from Alabama to all the parts of the world 
he had traveled. It was an impressive "website." 
Beginning with the six week, $500 graduation trip to Europe in 1932, 
to which he treated himself from savings from his college work, Paul 
enthusiasm for travel was unbounded. More significantly, the travel had 
a mission of meeting scholars, exchanging ideas and building a network. 
He attended innumerable world conferences in the 1950s and 1960s. In 
a video taped interview in 1992, Garner suggested that his desire to 
continue to travel and develop the international accounting community 
had been a reason for his decision to retire just before his sixty-first 
birthday in 1970. And travel he did! When someone from the U.S. visited 
a country and met with accounting faculty there was likely to be the 
question asked of the American "Do you know Paul Garner?" 
REMEMBERING HIS LEGACY OF WISDOM 
Paul was as unassuming as he was courteous, almost to a fault. 
These personal traits will be emulated and remembered. He will be 
remembered for his research and his writings, for his colleagueship and 
mentoring, for his leadership and for his genuine hospitality. Paul's 
example of fellowship, international friendship and historical scholarship 
will not likely be surpassed. It serves as a model to us at a time when the 
truly global nature of our profession is being defined and the nature of 
teaching and scholarship in this environment is being designed in daily 
exchanges on the Internet and by e-mail. 
In conversation with Paul shortly before his death, one could not 
help but be impressed with the clarity and purpose with which he would 
become engaged in a discussion. There was a sense of graciousness 
about his commentary which might lead the unwary or pretentious to 
ignore the wisdom which would unfold in the short commentaries he 
provided. One example which comes to mind involved Paul's concerns 
about the limits of human perception and ability to adapt characteristics 
of human nature which he had studied his entire career. Paul, appearing 
sincerely perplexed, observed: "It is difficult to perceived the average 
person grasping all the implications, on a day to day basis, of a truly 
global economy. And yet that is what will be required because that is 
what it has become." He wondered aloud whether an individual's ability 
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to think in global terms...beyond regional and national boundaries... 
would be the principal restraint to achieving lasting global harmony. 
This was the type of issue, beyond mere accounting, which Paul 
challenged his friends and colleagues to consider. In this manner, his 
sense of intellectual curiosity served to stimulate us to exercise our own 
capacity for thinking about the future. His investment to our discipline, 
our professional community and to international fellowship has provided 
the downpayment for future generations. 
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Jonathan Barron Baskin and Paul J. Miranti, A History of Corporate 
Finance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 350 pp., 
$29.95). 
Reviewed by 
Raj Aggarwal 
John Carroll University 
This book is a study of the role of institutions and organizations 
in the historical development of corporate finance in Western Europe 
and North America. A major goal of this book is to "demonstrate the 
need for greater recognition of path dependence and historical evolution 
in the modern theory of finance" [p. 3]. In addition, a number of 
writers have argued that the study of economic and financial history 
can be useful in understanding contemporary developments [North, 
1978; Braudel, 1982]. However, there are relatively few books on the 
history of corporate finance and, thus, this book is a particularly 
welcome addition. 
This book consists of a preface and an introduction, seven 
chapters organized into three parts, and an epilogue and two 
appendices. The introduction notes that business institutions represent 
constraints that "are, in effect, the rules of the game for pursuing 
opportunity...and their value lies largely in their ability to reduce 
uncertainty" [p.4]. It is also noted that "firms bolstered efficiency 
through financial innovation" [p. 5]. 
The introduction goes on to explain how finance contributed to 
business efficiency and growth. First, finance allowed firms the time 
and stable funding to exploit economies of scale and scope. Second, 
financial innovation often helped firms cope with and even take 
advantage of external economic shocks. Financial innovations also 
lowered perceived risks faced by investors and allowed better 
monitoring of managers. Finally, financial innovation also allowed 
better management of corporate resources and gave firms the ability to 
overcome market imperfections by internalizing high-cost market 
transactions. The rest of the introduction describes the development of 
the modern theories of asset pricing, agency costs, asymmetric 
information, and corporate debt policies. Curiously, in discussing the 
random behavior of market determined asset prices, this book cites the 
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1953 study by M.G. Kendall as the beginning of this recognition, 
ignoring the well-known and much earlier (19th century) work of Louis 
Bachelier and others (e.g., Bernstein, 1996). 
Part I consists of three chapters that review finance in the pre-
industrial world (actually just Europe). The two chapters in Part II 
cover the development of European finance during the era of 
industrialization. Part III traces the evolution of finance in Western 
Europe and North America into the modern era. 
Chapter one describes the development of finance in Italy in the 
late middle ages and the early Renaissance period. This chapter has 
some excellent descriptions of international banking and how business 
financial structures in Florence and Venice of the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries were used to diversify risk and leverage returns on 
equity. However, it has very little about business financial 
arrangements prior to that period. 
Chapter two covers the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries 
and traces the rise, along with international trade, of the Joint Stock 
Companies, like the East India Company, as precursors to modern 
limited liability corporations. Chapter three covers the early 
development of public securities markets in England and western 
Europe in the eighteenth century. 
Part II consists of two chapters and covers the development of 
corporate finance in the age of industrialization (late eighteenth to the 
mid twentieth centuries). Chapter four covers the financing of canals 
and railroads especially in the United States and chapter five describes 
the rise of equity markets and managerial capitalism in the first half of 
the twentieth century. 
Part III also consists of two chapters and traces the evolution of 
corporate finance into the modern era. Chapter six focuses on the 
financing of large US companies in the post-war era until the oil shock 
of 1973, while chapter seven covers the rise of the conglomerate firm 
and the leveraged buy-out phenomenon in recent years. The epilogue 
is an essay on the relationships between environmental and firm-
specific factors in explaining the evolution of corporate finance. 
While this book does not break much fresh ground, it is a fairly 
comprehensive review of the history of Anglo-Saxon corporate finance. 
It is well written and seems reasonably well researched. In fact, as is 
the case with any other good book, it leaves us wanting more. For 
example, the focus on post-Renaissance Anglo-Saxon corporate finance 
in this book means that there are at least two important areas that are 
omitted. 
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First, there is relatively little on finance in times before the 
Renaissance. This is unfortunate especially since many aspects of 
modern finance were developed in the so-called Dark Ages (see for 
example Braudel, 1982; or the footnotes in Tuchman, 1978). Second, 
while even the English language literature has many excellent sources 
(e.g., Banerji, 1995; Chandler, 1990; Cizakca, 1996; Hirschmeier, 
1964), there is practically nothing in this book on the development of 
Indian, Islamic, Ottoman, or Asian corporate finance. This latter 
omission is particularly unfortunate given that it is widely contended 
that even the non-Japanese Asian economy is on track to be larger than 
the North American or European economies in the next few years (e.g., 
Aggarwal, 1991; Kennedy, 1993). While North American hearts and 
minds are likely to remain largely in Europe, its wallets are increasingly 
in Asia, and it is necessary that American books and other publications 
include Pacific Asian perspectives. 
On balance, these limitations are relatively minor quibbles, and 
this book is recommended for scholars and others interested in the 
historical development of modern corporate finance. In addition, this 
book would also be useful reading for any student of corporate finance. 
It could be, and perhaps should be, required reading for advanced 
undergraduate and graduate students in finance and accounting. In 
conclusion, this book is recommended reading as it is an excellent and 
very readable review of the extensive scholarly literature on the 
historical antecedents of modern North American corporate finance. 
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Garry D. Carnegie and Peter W. Wolnizer, Eds., Accounting History 
Newsletter 1980-1989 and Accounting History 1989-1994 (New 
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996, 416 pp., $80). 
Reviewed by 
Michael E. Scorgie 
La Trobe University and Nilai College, Malaysia 
This anthology is a tribute to Robert Gibson, a foundation editor 
of the antipodean newsletter from which the 25 articles were drawn. 
Gibson retired from Deakin University in 1993 where he had 
encouraged others to conduct accounting history research. Noteworthy 
amongst those at Deakin were the joint-editors of the anthology, Garry 
Carnegie, the present editor of the new series of Accounting History, 
and Peter Wolnizer. Gibson's interest in accounting history was 
undoubtedly stimulated during the 1960s when he worked with Lou 
Goldberg at the University of Melbourne. 
The compilation of a worthwhile anthology is not an easy task 
particularly if the source(s) from which articles may be drawn is 
limited. Such was the case in this instance. Yet, Carnegie and Wolnizer 
succeeded because their anthology demonstrates that humble 
beginnings combined with Gibson's dedication provided stimulation not 
only to established scholars but also to those who sought to enter the 
field of accounting history. Carnegie and Wolnizer classified the 
articles selected into five sets, each comprising four, five or six items. 
The sets are: Early Accounting Systems; Twentieth Century 
Accounting Thinkers; Professional Associations; Accounting and 
Auditing Standards; and Accounting Education. The names of some of 
the authors, Willard Stone, Ray Chambers and Lou Goldberg are well-
known. Others such as Warwick Funnell, Dale Flesher and Garry 
Carnegie may yet reach the same heights. 
180
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 11
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
Book Reviews 175 
The first set classified as Early Accounting Systems comprises 
four items that might be summarized by key words: Werner Sombart; 
medieval estate management and accounting; charge and discharge; and 
mining cost accounts. Similarly the second set of six items grouped 
under the heading Twentieth Century Accounting Thinkers can be 
reduced to: Stephen Gilman; Ray Chambers; G.E. and A.A. 
Fitzgerald; Henry Sweeney; Paton and Littleton; and Kenneth 
MacNeal. In contrast to the somewhat international flavour of the 
second set the last three sets that deal with professional associations, 
standards and education are devoted to the Australian experience. Yet, 
the form and content of the items will be useful guides to those 
elsewhere who seek to document, describe and interpret the history of 
the accountancy profession in other countries. 
In conclusion, anthologies were designed for browsers long before 
surfing the internet became a popular pastime. In this regard Garland's 
contribution has been outstanding. Their catalogs list a number of 
anthologies such as Accounting in France, Accounting Research 
1948-1958 and Milestones in the British Accounting Literature that 
in effect are companion volumes to Carnegie and Wolnizer. Volumes 
that ought to be acquired by every university, college and professional 
library that aspires to be known for its research collection. 
Alfred W. Crosby, The Measure of Realty: Quantification in Western 
Europe, 1250-1600 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 
245 pp., $24.95). 
Reviewed by 
Richard K. Fleischman 
John Carroll University 
The title of the book, coupled with the vivid reproduction of 
Barbari's famous portrait of Pacioli on its jacket, conveys the 
impression that the reader will be treated to a monograph on the 
European origins of accounting. That expectation is not realized, 
however, as only the last chapter before the conclusion 
["Bookkeeping," pp. 199-233] is dedicated to accounting history topics. 
Furthermore, that single chapter deals only with the famous friar (at 
considerable length) and Datini (more briefly). Although the dates 
provided suggest an inclusion of the exploits of the Medicis, Plantin, 
the Bracci, Francisco del Bene, the Fuggers, and others, these early 
pioneers are scarcely mentioned. Moreover, this chapter suffers a 
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diminution of the high research standard that characterizes the 
remainder of the volume. As the author himself admits, the analysis of 
the Summa is based almost entirely on the work of Taylor [1980] and 
Brown & Johnston [1984]. Consequently, Crosby's interpretation lacks 
the breadth and cogency of other recent work of this genre, as, for 
example, Macve's chapter on Pacioli in Lee, Bishop, & Parker [1996]. 
It is unfortunate that the book's weakest chapter would be the very 
one of greatest interest to accounting historians. Indeed, the 
background Crosby provides through the remainder of the book 
describing the intellectual climate within which Pacioli wrote is of great 
value. The author demonstrates convincingly the remarkable transition 
in Europe from a society almost without hope to one that based its 
emerging culture, culminating in the Renaissance, on the calculation 
and quantification of its reality. This transition is richly illustrated in 
chapters dedicated to changing European perceptions of time and 
space, accompanied by resultant achievements in mathematics, music, 
painting, and, last but sadly least, bookkeeping. 
Crosby writes with a vibrant style that has earned him high honors 
for previous books and perhaps for this offering as well. His research 
for the chapters other than the one on bookkeeping is impressive and 
reflective of his pedigree as a history professor at the University of 
Texas, Austin (visiting at Yale). The number of historical actors that 
appear on his stage is staggering. Though having myself instructed 
medieval history for many years, I confess to knowledge of only about 
half of the figures encountered in this historical panorama. The book 
was a humbling but valuable learning experience for me. I marvel at 
its flowing style and erudition. 
In conclusion, I accord the book my highest recommendation for 
readers with considerable background in medieval studies who wish to 
grapple with a thought-provoking, yet highly entertaining masterpiece 
of historical narrative. However, within the more limited confines of 
pure accounting history, aficionados will find less of value. 
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Arno Press, 1980. 
Alan J. Richardson, Ed., Disorder and Harmony: 20th Century 
Perspectives on Accounting History, Selected Papers from the Seventh 
World Congress of Accounting Historians, CGA-Canada Research 
Foundation Research Monograph Number 23 (Vancouver: CGA-
Canada Research Foundation, 1996, 356 pp., $30 Canadian). 
Reviewed by 
Vaughan Radcliffe 
Case Western Reserve University 
For evidence of the vibrancy and potential of historical research 
in accounting, colleagues need only turn to Richardson's impressive 
collection of papers from the recent 7th World Congress of Accounting 
Historians, held in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. The breadth and vigor 
of current historical research is well represented in a collection which 
brings together a range of topics and national perspectives. As 
Richardson observes in the introduction to this volume, "the papers 
published here and presented at the Congress provide a fascinating 
snapshot of the current state of the global economy and the range of 
issues which are in the collective conscious" [p. 2]. Given this diversity 
of work, it is impossible to do fully address the range of topics covered 
in the collection. Instead, I provide a broad overview of what is 
available here, and of the body of work represented. 
The papers are organized into six sections: Cost and Management 
Accounting; Education; Financial Accounting and Auditing; 
Professional Organizations; Taxation and Texts. A variety of 
approaches are represented, including the more traditional scholarship 
as well as emerging research paradigms inspired by work in other 
disciplines. 
In the Cost and Management Accounting section De Beelde 
explores aspects of the Belgian experience, while Okano revisits 
Emerson's work on cost accounting. McNair and Vangermeersch 
provide a stimulating and thoughtful analysis of the US National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and its influence on management 
accounting concerns. Their discussion of the "blue eagle" symbol used 
to mark the goods of those supporting the NIRA provides fascinating 
insights into the broader socio-political frameworks within which 
accountancy operates. Their overall argument that full cost pricing was 
fostered by the NIRA at the expense of more economically inspired 
approaches was, for me at least, a real eye opener. 
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The occasion of the centennial of the US CPA exam motivates the 
two education papers represented here. Flesher et al. review the 
accounting education movement and provide brief biographies of 
relevant characters. Oliverio and Newman focus more on the first CPA 
examination, its format and nature. The Financial Accounting and 
Auditing section includes a variety of work, dealing with American, 
Spanish and Portuguese experiences: a refreshing breadth of national 
experience, given the more limited empirical domains associated with 
financial reporting work in the bulk of the accounting literature. 
In the Professional Organizations section of the monograph, two 
authors discuss differing aspects of professionalisation projects in 
Australasia. Anderson analyses the integration of cost accounting 
bodies within the national societies of accountants in Australia and 
New Zealand, arguing that this was to the detriment of cost accounting 
as a profession. Kathie Cooper casts a critical eye on the legitimization 
of Australian accountancy, suggesting that broad alliances among 
those interested in accounting associations, (such as the business press, 
financial interests, government bodies, and the then colonial British 
government) were an intrinsic part of the professionalisation project in 
Australia. I am unsure that these alliances really are as "non-
traditional" as Cooper characterizes them; surely such networks have 
been recognized in the literature as being integral to the production and 
reproduction of professional claims. But this argument stands as a 
counterpoint to a more traditional (and often functionalist) view of the 
pre-eminence of education, examination and training in procuring 
professional status. 
Several papers comprise the Taxation section of the monograph, 
with work from Samson, Smith and Yelvington et al. These papers deal 
with the progressivity of the US and Canadian income tax, the 
historical development of the lower of cost or market rule in the UK, 
and an examination of "sin" taxes in the US and Canada respectively. 
In reading these papers shortly before dealing with my own US taxes 
I must admit that Yelvington et al. approach taxation with more good 
humor than I have so far been able to manage—one reason for their 
paper being an entertaining as well as informative read. Their analysis 
of the political promotion of "sin" taxes has special resonance to me as 
I write in Cleveland, a city that has chosen to raise regressive sin taxes 
so as to erect the palatial facilities demanded by the monied elite of 
professional sport. Though not centrally a part of their analysis, 
Yelvington et al.'s work serves to highlight issues of social justice. 
Clarke and Lanero round out the monograph with two papers 
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examining original texts, their focus being Ireland's Ammonet, and 
Mellis' English treatise. Both approach their subject with sensitivity to 
detail, and to the context in which the work was written. 
The monograph includes a listing of papers presented at the 7th 
World Congress, and a review of this work and the contents of this 
volume suggests two clear themes. Firstly, historical work seems 
poised to explore a variety of national experiences, including those 
influenced by former colonial rule. The breadth of contexts explored 
within the monograph itself provides evidence of the variety of venues 
in which accounting history is being explored. The analytical 
significance of the nation state could well be questioned, but the 
differing cultural experiences and traditions that are pointed to in this 
body of work suggests a broadening of historical discourse. 
The second theme can be discerned in certain of the papers, but 
especially in the work presented at the Congress. Although more 
traditional historical work still appears to dominate historical effort, it 
is clear that theoretically informed critical (or, as Richardson terms it, 
"emancipatory" [p. 1]) work is on the rise. Kathie Cooper's work in the 
monograph provides one example; more are found in remaining papers 
which depart from what Neu and Richardson describe as a more 
conventional narrative concerned largely with the details of practice 
rather than the context in which practices evolved [p. 339]. The 
relevance that the U.S. Accounting Education Change Commission 
finds in history as a means to understand practice seems likely to be 
met by a more theoretically informed literature more directly concerned 
with producing a "history of the present." In this, the monograph 
reminds us that accounting history is a discipline in flux. 
Kyojiro Someya, Japanese Accounting: A Historical Approach 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, 241 pp., $70). 
Reviewed by 
Robert Bloom 
John Carroll University 
An anthology of essays on Japanese accounting since World War 
II written by Kyojiro Someya, a retired professor, this book deals with 
the history of accounting in Japan. Outside of Japan, not much is 
known about academic studies in accounting in that country since such 
research is usually published in Japanese. In the preface, the author 
contends that the application of this research served to enhance 
economic recovery and growth in Japan following the war. 
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Someya's own research is historical for the most part. In 
particular, his interest in cash flow theory was an attempt on his part 
to comprehend post-war inflation in Japan. His study of financial 
statement analysis began as a need to understand business productivity. 
In addition, his work on financial accounting theory was intended to 
shed light on securities exchange, focusing on the process of raising 
capital in Japan. As international business expanded in Japan starting 
in the 1960s, his research shifted to that area. 
The book is divided into three parts. Part I covers Japanese 
accounting history, the most useful piece being "Accounting 
'Revolutions' in Japan," originally published in The Accounting 
Historians Journal in 1989 [Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 75-86]. Part II is 
concerned with issues in financial accounting, the best piece of which 
is "Accounting Standard Selection and Its Socio-economic 
Consequences," originally published in the International Journal of 
Accounting in 1993 [Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 93-103]. Part III focuses on 
the cash flow statement, the most informative section being "The Use 
of Funds Statements in Japan," originally published in the Accounting 
Review in 1964 [Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 983-989]. 
In the 20 articles republished in the book (13 having been first 
published in Japan), Someya accentuates the role of accounting in 
providing accountability and information for decision making. He 
asserts that accounting is dynamically a function of the environment in 
which it prevails, and therefore should be compatible with that 
environment. 
Someya is critical of Japanese accounting, and for good reason. 
In view of the emphasis that taxation exerts on accounting standards, 
which is typically the case in code law countries like Japan, the 
accounting profession appears to be weak. The Minister of Finance 
is responsible for setting accounting standards. Additionally, while the 
author does not say so, there is no fundamental conceptual framework 
of financial reporting in Japan. Conservatism appears to be one, if not 
the, basic accounting standard, and present value, lease capitalization, 
and inflation standards are non-existent. Furthermore, a cash flow 
statement is not required for external reporting, which the author does 
acknowledge. Someya wishes to see considerably more emphasis on 
economic substance rather than legal form in Japanese accounting. 
Moreover, he observes a need in Japan to limit the flexibility companies 
have in selecting alternative accounting standards in light of their social 
and economic consequences. Paradoxically, Japan has prospered 
economically despite its inadequate system of financial reporting. 
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For those who have no previous knowledge of Japanese accounting 
history, this book may be of interest. However, considerable overlap 
exists in topics covered among the articles in the book. 
Atsuo Tsuji and Paul Garner, Eds., Studies in Accounting History: 
Tradition and Innovation for the Twenty-First Century (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1995, 280 pp., $75). 
Reviewed by 
Thomas N. Tyson 
St. John Fisher College 
Tradition and Innovation for the Twenty-First Century brings 
together 13 of the 50 papers presented in August, 1992, at the Sixth 
World Congress of Accounting Historians in Kyoto, Japan and may 
represent Paul Garner's final contribution to accounting literature. I 
was privileged to know Paul Garner personally and to receive two 
wonderful letters encouraging me to continue research in accounting 
history. Notwithstanding my respect for Paul and his dedication to 
accounting history, I am unable to recommend unequivocally this 
collection which is co-edited by Atsuo Tsuji and Paul Garner. 
In their prefaces, Tsuji states that the selection criteria for 
inclusion were "regional factors and treated themes" [p. vii], while 
Garner notes similarly that these essays "show an unusually wide range 
of research and investigation" [p. x]. Thus, readers are forewarned that 
the collection is wide ranging and will include essays on disparate 
topics. In addition to thematic variation, however, essays by 
practitioners and new scholars contrast markedly from those by more 
renowned historians, especially in terms of organization structure and 
the extent of literature reviewed. Consequently, active and seasoned 
scholars, those most likely to acquire the collection, may be 
discomforted by these multiple dimensions of diversity. Readers who 
prefer more critical perspectives of accounting history will also be 
disappointed by the paucity of essays written in this venue. 
The collection does contain a number of interesting and well-
written pieces. For example, in a smoothly flowing introductory essay 
entitled "Accounting History and Public Policy," Gary Previts provides 
an overview of accounting history in the context of a constantly 
changing and politicized world. Tsunehiro Tsumori crafts another 
strong entry entitled "Development of a 'Philosophy of Disclosure' in 
Accounting Institutions of Japan." Tsumori describes thoughtfully the 
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impact of the Anglo-American and Franco-German accounting 
traditions on the historical development of accounting disclosure in 
Japan. Christopher Napier sustains his excellent scholarship with an 
essay on secret reserves in New Zealand. Unlike many accounting 
historians, Napier explains clearly the business environment to which 
the accounting issues he explores relate. Napier's attention to the 
background story and historical context makes the essay much more 
intriguing and accessible. 
The subtitle of the collection, "tradition and innovation for the 
twenty-first century," intimated to me that a number of essays would 
address current historical debates or long-standing controversies in 
accounting history. Papers by Gormly and Wells, "Costing Activities: 
Alternative Views of History," and Kataoka, "The Relationship 
between the Bookkeeping Systems of Pacioli and Schweicker," fulfilled 
this expectation. However, most essays focus on disparate and 
regional issues. Once again, certain readers might be displeased in this 
regard. 
Perhaps the collection's most noticeable shortcoming is the 
absence of active editorial involvement. Given its diversity, readers 
would have benefited greatly from an introductory essay which 
summarized each paper and indicated the rationale for its inclusion. 
Alternatively, each essay could have been preceded by a short synopsis, 
or authors could have been asked to provide an abstract describing 
their essay's scope and purpose. Unfortunately, because these aides 
are not furnished, readers must rely on an essay's title or its author's 
repute for guidance about content and perspective. In the case of 
unknown authors, readers must venture forth and hope the experience 
is worth the effort. A related concern is that biographical information 
about contributors lacks consistency and omits important details. In 
several cases the editors provide only the name and affiliation of an 
author while in others, they identify an author's academic department 
but fail to mention their terminal degree, research interests, publication 
record, or teaching or practice specialty. 
In summary, while there are a number of well-written essays that 
will interest new and seasoned accounting historians alike, the 
collection is too diverse, the quality of essays too variable, and the 
absence of editorial assistance too salient to produce a monograph 
which can be regarded as a notable contribution to accounting history 
literature. 
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